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Date:   Wed,  6 Oct 2021 12:46:09 -0700
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Subject: [PATCH v3 2/3] binder: use cred instead of task for getsecid
From:   Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
To:     gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, arve@android.com, tkjos@android.com,
        maco@android.com, christian@brauner.io, jmorris@namei.org,
        serge@hallyn.com, paul@paul-moore.com,
        stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, eparis@parisplace.org,
        keescook@chromium.org, jannh@google.com, jeffv@google.com,
        zohar@linux.ibm.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        selinux@vger.kernel.org, devel@driverdev.osuosl.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     joel@joelfernandes.org, kernel-team@android.com,
        Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>, stable@vger.kernel.org
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Precedence: bulk

Use the 'struct cred' saved at binder_open() to lookup
the security ID via security_cred_getsecid(). This
ensures that the security context that opened binder
is the one used to generate the secctx.

Fixes: ec74136ded79 ("binder: create node flag to request sender's
security context")
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
---
v3: added this patch to series

 drivers/android/binder.c | 11 +----------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index ca599ebdea4a..989afd0804ca 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2722,16 +2722,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
 		u32 secid;
 		size_t added_size;
 
-		/*
-		 * Arguably this should be the task's subjective LSM secid but
-		 * we can't reliably access the subjective creds of a task
-		 * other than our own so we must use the objective creds, which
-		 * are safe to access.  The downside is that if a task is
-		 * temporarily overriding it's creds it will not be reflected
-		 * here; however, it isn't clear that binder would handle that
-		 * case well anyway.
-		 */
-		security_task_getsecid_obj(proc->tsk, &secid);
+		security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &secid);
 		ret = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
 		if (ret) {
 			return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
-- 
2.33.0.800.g4c38ced690-goog