Message-ID: <4593C702.4000604@qumranet.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Dec 2006 15:30:42 +0200
From: Avi Kivity <avi@qumranet.com>
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To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CC: kvm-devel <kvm-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>,
       linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
       Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Subject: Re: [patch, try#2] kvm: fix GFP_KERNEL allocation in atomic section
 in kvm_dev_ioctl_create_vcpu()
References: <45939755.7010603@qumranet.com> <20061228124224.GA28573@elte.hu> <4593BEE6.30206@qumranet.com> <20061228125544.GA31207@elte.hu> <20061228130833.GA555@elte.hu> <4593C345.9040306@qumranet.com> <20061228132325.GA2176@elte.hu>
In-Reply-To: <20061228132325.GA2176@elte.hu>
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Ingo Molnar wrote:
> I've got a security related question as well: vcpu_load() sets up a 
> physical CPU's VM registers/state, and vcpu_put() drops that. But 
> vcpu_put() only does a put_cpu() call - it does not tear down any VM 
> state that has been loaded into the CPU. Is it guaranteed that (hostile) 
> user-space cannot use that VM state in any unauthorized way? The state 
> is still loaded while arbitrary tasks execute on the CPU. The next 
> vcpu_load() will then override it, but the state lingers around forever.
>
> The new x86 VM instructions: vmclear, vmlaunch, vmresume, vmptrld, 
> vmread, vmwrite, vmxoff, vmxon are all privileged so i guess it should 
> be mostly safe - i'm just wondering whether you thought about this 
> attack angle.
>   

Yes.  Userspace cannot snoop on a VM state.

> ultimately we want to integrate VM state management into the scheduler 
> and the context-switch lowlevel arch code, but right now CPU state 
> management is done by the KVM 'driver' and there's nothing that isolates 
> other tasks from possible side-effects of a loaded VMX/SVN state.
>   

AFAICS in vmx root mode the vm state only affects vmx instructions; SVM 
has no architecturally hidden state.


-- 
error compiling committee.c: too many arguments to function

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