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The memory of these vms are encrypted and host can't access guest memory directly. Hyper-V provides new host visibility hvcall and the guest needs to call new hvcall to mark memory visible to host before sharing memory with host. For security, all network/storage stack memory should not be shared with host and so there is bounce buffer requests. Vmbus channel ring buffer already plays bounce buffer role because all data from/to host needs to copy from/to between the ring buffer and IO stack memory. So mark vmbus channel ring buffer visible. For SNP isolation VM, guest needs to access the shared memory via extra address space which is specified by Hyper-V CPUID HYPERV_CPUID_ ISOLATION_CONFIG. The access physical address of the shared memory should be bounce buffer memory GPA plus with shared_gpa_boundary reported by CPUID. This patchset is rebased on the commit d9abdee of Linux mainline tree and plus clean up patch from Borislav Petkov(https://lore.kernel.org/r/ YWRwxImd9Qcls/Yy@zn.tnic) Change since v8 - Fix compile issue in the patch " x86/sev-es: Expose sev_es_ghcb_hv_call() to call ghcb hv call out of sev code via adding check AMD SEV option in the ivm.c and not compile the ghcb related function when the option is not selected. Change since v7 - Rework sev_es_ghcb_hv_call() and export it for Hyper-V according to suggestion from Borislav Petkov. Change since v6 - Add hv_set_mem_host_visibility() when CONFIG_HYPERV is no. Fix compile error. - Add comment to describe __set_memory_enc_pgtable(). - Split SEV change into patch "Expose __sev_es_ghcb_hv_call() to call ghcb hv call out of sev code" - Add comment about calling memunmap() in the non-snp IVM. Change since v5 - Replace HVPFN_UP() with PFN_UP() in the __vmbus_establish_gpadl() - Remove unused variable gpadl in the __vmbus_open() and vmbus_close_ internal() - Clean gpadl_handle in the vmbus_teardown_gpadl(). - Adjust change layout in the asm/mshyperv.h to make hv_is_synic_reg(), hv_get_register() and hv_set_register() ahead of the #include of asm-generic/mshyperv.h - Change vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_pa type from unsigned long to phys_addr_t Change since v4: - Hide hv_mark_gpa_visibility() and set memory visibility via set_memory_encrypted/decrypted() - Change gpadl handle in netvsc and uio driver from u32 to struct vmbus_gpadl. - Change vmbus_establish_gpadl()'s gpadl_handle parameter to vmbus_gpadl data structure. - Remove hv_get_simp(), hv_get_siefp() hv_get_synint_*() helper function. Move the logic into hv_get/set_register(). - Use scsi_dma_map/unmap() instead of dma_map/unmap_sg() in storvsc driver. - Allocate rx/tx ring buffer via alloc_pages() in Isolation VM Change since V3: - Initalize GHCB page in the cpu init callbac. - Change vmbus_teardown_gpadl() parameter in order to mask the memory back to non-visible to host. - Merge hv_ringbuffer_post_init() into hv_ringbuffer_init(). - Keep Hyper-V bounce buffer size as same as AMD SEV VM - Use dma_map_sg() instead of dm_map_page() in the storvsc driver. Change since V2: - Drop x86_set_memory_enc static call and use platform check in the __set_memory_enc_dec() to run platform callback of set memory encrypted or decrypted. Change since V1: - Introduce x86_set_memory_enc static call and so platforms can override __set_memory_enc_dec() with their implementation - Introduce sev_es_ghcb_hv_call_simple() and share code between SEV and Hyper-V code. - Not remap monitor pages in the non-SNP isolation VM - Make swiotlb_init_io_tlb_mem() return error code and return error when dma_map_decrypted() fails. Change since RFC V4: - Introduce dma map decrypted function to remap bounce buffer and provide dma map decrypted ops for platform to hook callback. - Split swiotlb and dma map decrypted change into two patches - Replace vstart with vaddr in swiotlb changes. Change since RFC v3: - Add interface set_memory_decrypted_map() to decrypt memory and map bounce buffer in extra address space - Remove swiotlb remap function and store the remap address returned by set_memory_decrypted_map() in swiotlb mem data structure. - Introduce hv_set_mem_enc() to make code more readable in the __set_memory_enc_dec(). Change since RFC v2: - Remove not UIO driver in Isolation VM patch - Use vmap_pfn() to replace ioremap_page_range function in order to avoid exposing symbol ioremap_page_range() and ioremap_page_range() - Call hv set mem host visibility hvcall in set_memory_encrypted/decrypted() - Enable swiotlb force mode instead of adding Hyper-V dma map/unmap hook - Fix code style Tianyu Lan (9): x86/hyperv: Initialize GHCB page in Isolation VM x86/hyperv: Initialize shared memory boundary in the Isolation VM. x86/hyperv: Add new hvcall guest address host visibility support Drivers: hv: vmbus: Mark vmbus ring buffer visible to host in Isolation VM x86/sev-es: Expose sev_es_ghcb_hv_call() to call ghcb hv call out of sev code x86/hyperv: Add Write/Read MSR registers via ghcb page x86/hyperv: Add ghcb hvcall support for SNP VM Drivers: hv: vmbus: Add SNP support for VMbus channel initiate message Drivers: hv : vmbus: Initialize VMbus ring buffer for Isolation VM arch/x86/hyperv/Makefile | 2 +- arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c | 78 ++++++-- arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c | 291 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/hyperv-tlfs.h | 17 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h | 70 +++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 5 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c | 5 + arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 25 ++- arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 13 +- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 23 ++- drivers/hv/Kconfig | 1 + drivers/hv/channel.c | 72 ++++--- drivers/hv/connection.c | 101 +++++++++- drivers/hv/hv.c | 82 ++++++-- drivers/hv/hv_common.c | 12 ++ drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h | 2 + drivers/hv/ring_buffer.c | 55 ++++-- drivers/net/hyperv/hyperv_net.h | 5 +- drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c | 15 +- drivers/uio/uio_hv_generic.c | 18 +- include/asm-generic/hyperv-tlfs.h | 1 + include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h | 20 +- include/linux/hyperv.h | 12 +- 23 files changed, 786 insertions(+), 139 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c -- 2.25.1