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Date:   Mon, 25 Oct 2021 20:55:59 +0000
From:   Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
To:     Tianyu Lan <ltykernel@gmail.com>
Cc:     kys@microsoft.com, haiyangz@microsoft.com, sthemmin@microsoft.com,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH V9 0/9] x86/Hyper-V: Add Hyper-V Isolation VM
 support(First part)
Message-ID: <20211025205559.5wge6ohiktif5hwt@liuwe-devbox-debian-v2>
References: <20211025122116.264793-1-ltykernel@gmail.com>
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On Mon, Oct 25, 2021 at 08:21:05AM -0400, Tianyu Lan wrote:
> From: Tianyu Lan <Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com>
> 
> Hyper-V provides two kinds of Isolation VMs. VBS(Virtualization-based
> security) and AMD SEV-SNP unenlightened Isolation VMs. This patchset
> is to add support for these Isolation VM support in Linux.
> 
> The memory of these vms are encrypted and host can't access guest
> memory directly. Hyper-V provides new host visibility hvcall and
> the guest needs to call new hvcall to mark memory visible to host
> before sharing memory with host. For security, all network/storage
> stack memory should not be shared with host and so there is bounce
> buffer requests.
> 
> Vmbus channel ring buffer already plays bounce buffer role because
> all data from/to host needs to copy from/to between the ring buffer
> and IO stack memory. So mark vmbus channel ring buffer visible.
> 
> For SNP isolation VM, guest needs to access the shared memory via
> extra address space which is specified by Hyper-V CPUID HYPERV_CPUID_
> ISOLATION_CONFIG. The access physical address of the shared memory
> should be bounce buffer memory GPA plus with shared_gpa_boundary
> reported by CPUID.
> 
> This patchset is rebased on the commit d9abdee of Linux mainline tree
> and plus clean up patch from Borislav Petkov(https://lore.kernel.org/r/
> YWRwxImd9Qcls/Yy@zn.tnic)
> 
> 

Applied to hyperv-next. Thanks.

Wei.