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From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        stable@vger.kernel.org, Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>,
        Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
        Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 5.10 70/77] sctp: add vtag check in sctp_sf_ootb
Date:   Mon,  1 Nov 2021 10:17:58 +0100
Message-Id: <20211101082526.215677294@linuxfoundation.org>
In-Reply-To: <20211101082511.254155853@linuxfoundation.org>
References: <20211101082511.254155853@linuxfoundation.org>
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From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 9d02831e517aa36ee6bdb453a0eb47bd49923fe3 ]

sctp_sf_ootb() is called when processing DATA chunk in closed state,
and many other places are also using it.

The vtag in the chunk's sctphdr should be verified, otherwise, as
later in chunk length check, it may send abort with the existent
asoc's vtag, which can be exploited by one to cook a malicious
chunk to terminate a SCTP asoc.

When fails to verify the vtag from the chunk, this patch sets asoc
to NULL, so that the abort will be made with the vtag from the
received chunk later.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
index 82a76fda226b..096e6be1d8fc 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
@@ -3568,6 +3568,9 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net,
 
 	SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_OUTOFBLUES);
 
+	if (asoc && !sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc))
+		asoc = NULL;
+
 	ch = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)chunk->chunk_hdr;
 	do {
 		/* Report violation if the chunk is less then minimal */
-- 
2.33.0