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From:   Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Date:   Tue, 2 Nov 2021 11:52:20 +0800
Message-ID: <CACGkMEtbs3u7J7krpkusfqczTU00+6o_YtZjD8htC=+Un9cNew@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V9 7/9] vhost: introduce vDPA-based backend
To:     Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Cc:     mst <mst@redhat.com>, linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        kvm <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
        virtualization <virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
        netdev <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
        Maxime Coquelin <maxime.coquelin@redhat.com>,
        "Liang, Cunming" <cunming.liang@intel.com>, zhihong.wang@intel.com,
        rob.miller@broadcom.com, Xiao W Wang <xiao.w.wang@intel.com>,
        Zhu Lingshan <lingshan.zhu@intel.com>,
        eperezma <eperezma@redhat.com>, Cindy Lu <lulu@redhat.com>,
        Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>,
        "Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@intel.com>,
        Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
        Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
        Ariel Adam <aadam@redhat.com>, jiri@mellanox.com,
        shahafs@mellanox.com, Harpreet Singh Anand <hanand@xilinx.com>,
        mhabets@solarflare.com, Gautam Dawar <gdawar@xilinx.com>,
        Saugat Mitra <saugatm@xilinx.com>, vmireyno@marvell.com,
        zhangweining@ruijie.com.cn, Tiwei Bie <tiwei.bie@intel.com>,
        Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
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On Mon, Nov 1, 2021 at 10:11 PM Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Mar 26, 2020 at 10:01:23PM +0800, Jason Wang wrote:
> > From: Tiwei Bie <tiwei.bie@intel.com>
> >
> > This patch introduces a vDPA-based vhost backend. This backend is
> > built on top of the same interface defined in virtio-vDPA and provides
> > a generic vhost interface for userspace to accelerate the virtio
> > devices in guest.
> >
> > This backend is implemented as a vDPA device driver on top of the same
> > ops used in virtio-vDPA. It will create char device entry named
> > vhost-vdpa-$index for userspace to use. Userspace can use vhost ioctls
> > on top of this char device to setup the backend.
> >
> > Vhost ioctls are extended to make it type agnostic and behave like a
> > virtio device, this help to eliminate type specific API like what
> > vhost_net/scsi/vsock did:
> >
> > - VHOST_VDPA_GET_DEVICE_ID: get the virtio device ID which is defined
> >   by virtio specification to differ from different type of devices
> > - VHOST_VDPA_GET_VRING_NUM: get the maximum size of virtqueue
> >   supported by the vDPA device
> > - VHSOT_VDPA_SET/GET_STATUS: set and get virtio status of vDPA device
> > - VHOST_VDPA_SET/GET_CONFIG: access virtio config space
> > - VHOST_VDPA_SET_VRING_ENABLE: enable a specific virtqueue
> >
> > For memory mapping, IOTLB API is mandated for vhost-vDPA which means
> > userspace drivers are required to use
> > VHOST_IOTLB_UPDATE/VHOST_IOTLB_INVALIDATE to add or remove mapping for
> > a specific userspace memory region.
> >
> > The vhost-vDPA API is designed to be type agnostic, but it allows net
> > device only in current stage. Due to the lacking of control virtqueue
> > support, some features were filter out by vhost-vdpa.
> >
> > We will enable more features and devices in the near future.
>
> [..]
>
> > +static int vhost_vdpa_alloc_domain(struct vhost_vdpa *v)
> > +{
> > +     struct vdpa_device *vdpa = v->vdpa;
> > +     const struct vdpa_config_ops *ops = vdpa->config;
> > +     struct device *dma_dev = vdpa_get_dma_dev(vdpa);
> > +     struct bus_type *bus;
> > +     int ret;
> > +
> > +     /* Device want to do DMA by itself */
> > +     if (ops->set_map || ops->dma_map)
> > +             return 0;
> > +
> > +     bus = dma_dev->bus;
> > +     if (!bus)
> > +             return -EFAULT;
> > +
> > +     if (!iommu_capable(bus, IOMMU_CAP_CACHE_COHERENCY))
> > +             return -ENOTSUPP;
> > +
> > +     v->domain = iommu_domain_alloc(bus);
> > +     if (!v->domain)
> > +             return -EIO;
> > +
> > +     ret = iommu_attach_device(v->domain, dma_dev);
> > +     if (ret)
> > +             goto err_attach;
> >
>
> I've been looking at the security of iommu_attach_device() users, and
> I wonder if this is safe?
>
> The security question is if userspace is able to control the DMA
> address the devices uses? Eg if any of the cpu to device ring's are in
> userspace memory?
>
> For instance if userspace can tell the device to send a packet from an
> arbitrary user controlled address.

The map is validated via pin_user_pages() which guarantees that the
address is not arbitrary and must belong to userspace?

Thanks

>
> Thanks,
> Jason
>