Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 95633C433EF for ; Tue, 9 Nov 2021 16:56:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 78D7E61151 for ; Tue, 9 Nov 2021 16:56:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S240662AbhKIQ7U (ORCPT ); Tue, 9 Nov 2021 11:59:20 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:34410 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S236209AbhKIQ7R (ORCPT ); Tue, 9 Nov 2021 11:59:17 -0500 Received: from mail-lj1-x22d.google.com (mail-lj1-x22d.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::22d]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DA41FC061767 for ; Tue, 9 Nov 2021 08:56:30 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-lj1-x22d.google.com with SMTP id e11so18315350ljo.13 for ; Tue, 09 Nov 2021 08:56:30 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20210112; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=g/boREeiOnUsS7l12hdWo7Yz/43cU9hRgiBg0G45VUI=; b=U644LgmH5os0YhjyX2lXGVcMnJy/jzLf+nmKZWo4uzo4LdV1H8Cv0tRTOTTy7/M6Aq ZrFTYuHQ3V5e40aKm+hxm5JZ08l1WUXxk64GmITWcPwbOWVJbsp1fmyA9DZftQSsHuPR weHY4BIvmTZtEyip2t8+bf6UVbzSFsL/zUI+tS9yGAYBLWSikonnZM7GeKILQesWnuLT woivcyqg6fgqO8+otNCwxgPTTZpGD3uN9/wgeDTmUS6oXMJvaPJrE2qskAb89Vw0/d1k Dx4SDGwPDT8KwiqjSf9kxaa7t45b+eS+I2hVNMgo0QhQvh2N9MALqreUVFN3MxboqNEE d2sg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=g/boREeiOnUsS7l12hdWo7Yz/43cU9hRgiBg0G45VUI=; b=GtTrLIl4VHjbab+fgnEycBHiMrVT6F86AiT5z+7f5UjE32TLc6FP4GbQPJuJWQ3f3d 9zbXGqwBrl0XSYxrVpi7i4IUBwrYkGW/XReL8osdXFxRdUo17FPVLVnc3NgdHq/tfjR0 WmKCD7SQ6PfZ6dJMj4luFibUAb2O5xihyyBqmrjJNkK9Osux07iTibqk1dAtPSjI0+ci LjUbiZoSLQuSAZ9QcvIbRyMbUnpfHAMvz514oIS5Fj6h8sdsJgigSoqL5qFRJOU3Ox5Y dgIv1WeOpFlnEvdmbx3PLPAdn8m8I/Kg2aAaciHw7HX1smBZ2btMEaKt7zz9zATdstx0 mIgQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM533WiE1Qb3GqqioVjMTzWZRsuvgkX9ciTQs5BBtWYCPKHHf/BiI3 8jFZ/PE3mUD992rdqev5y9aMMyoIfLP8xM5hIIKaPQ== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJzDj9Vv1wNyWnEEvLmld2YkGi0DQTUPwiqlGO23z4KMUMdDxmu6xiSKFYw+E4RgCf2MhFP+zpUg6U2e12w0JDE= X-Received: by 2002:a2e:b8cd:: with SMTP id s13mr9222842ljp.527.1636476988886; Tue, 09 Nov 2021 08:56:28 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20211102142331.3753798-1-pgonda@google.com> <20211102142331.3753798-3-pgonda@google.com> In-Reply-To: From: Peter Gonda Date: Tue, 9 Nov 2021 09:56:17 -0700 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH V3 2/4] crypto: ccp - Move SEV_INIT retry for corrupted data To: Sean Christopherson Cc: Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com, Marc Orr , David Rientjes , Brijesh Singh , Joerg Roedel , Herbert Xu , John Allen , "David S. Miller" , Paolo Bonzini , linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Nov 9, 2021 at 9:31 AM Sean Christopherson wrote: > > On Tue, Nov 02, 2021, Peter Gonda wrote: > > This change moves the data corrupted retry of SEV_INIT into the > > Use imperative mood. Will do for next revision > > > __sev_platform_init_locked() function. This is for upcoming INIT_EX > > support as well as helping direct callers of > > __sev_platform_init_locked() which currently do not support the > > retry. > > > > Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda > > Reviewed-by: Marc Orr > > Acked-by: David Rientjes > > Acked-by: Tom Lendacky > > Cc: Tom Lendacky > > Cc: Brijesh Singh > > Cc: Marc Orr > > Cc: Joerg Roedel > > Cc: Herbert Xu > > Cc: David Rientjes > > Cc: John Allen > > Cc: "David S. Miller" > > Cc: Paolo Bonzini > > Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org > > Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org > > --- > > drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------ > > 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c > > index ec89a82ba267..e4bc833949a0 100644 > > --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c > > +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c > > @@ -267,6 +267,18 @@ static int __sev_platform_init_locked(int *error) > > } > > > > rc = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_INIT, &data, error); > > + if (rc && *error == SEV_RET_SECURE_DATA_INVALID) { > > There are no guarantees that @error is non-NULL as this is reachable via an > exported function, sev_platform_init(). Which ties in with my complaints in the > previous patch that the API is a bit of a mess. That seems like a bug from the caller right? Is it typical that we sanity-check the caller in these instances? For example the same comment could be made here: https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c#L336 ``` static int sev_get_platform_state(int *state, int *error) { struct sev_user_data_status data; int rc; rc = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_PLATFORM_STATUS, &data, error); if (rc) return rc; *state = data.state; <--- State could be null. return rc; } ``` Example outside of this driver: https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v5.15.1/source/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c#L468 ``` int kvm_set_apic_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) { enum lapic_mode old_mode = kvm_get_apic_mode(vcpu); enum lapic_mode new_mode = kvm_apic_mode(msr_info->data); <--- msr_info could be null here u64 reserved_bits = kvm_vcpu_reserved_gpa_bits_raw(vcpu) | 0x2ff | (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_X2APIC) ? 0 : X2APIC_ENABLE); if ((msr_info->data & reserved_bits) != 0 || new_mode == LAPIC_MODE_INVALID) return 1; if (!msr_info->host_initiated) { if (old_mode == LAPIC_MODE_X2APIC && new_mode == LAPIC_MODE_XAPIC) return 1; if (old_mode == LAPIC_MODE_DISABLED && new_mode == LAPIC_MODE_X2APIC) return 1; } kvm_lapic_set_base(vcpu, msr_info->data); kvm_recalculate_apic_map(vcpu->kvm); return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_apic_base); ``` About the API being a mess that seems a little out of scope for this change. I am not changing the API surface at all here. Again happy to discuss improvements with you and Tom for follow up series. > > > + /* > > + * INIT command returned an integrity check failure > > + * status code, meaning that firmware load and > > + * validation of SEV related persistent data has > > + * failed and persistent state has been erased. > > + * Retrying INIT command here should succeed. > > + */ > > + dev_dbg(sev->dev, "SEV: retrying INIT command"); > > + rc = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_INIT, &data, error); > > + } > > + > > if (rc) > > return rc; > > > > @@ -1091,18 +1103,6 @@ void sev_pci_init(void) > > > > /* Initialize the platform */ > > rc = sev_platform_init(&error); > > - if (rc && (error == SEV_RET_SECURE_DATA_INVALID)) { > > - /* > > - * INIT command returned an integrity check failure > > - * status code, meaning that firmware load and > > - * validation of SEV related persistent data has > > - * failed and persistent state has been erased. > > - * Retrying INIT command here should succeed. > > - */ > > - dev_dbg(sev->dev, "SEV: retrying INIT command"); > > - rc = sev_platform_init(&error); > > - } > > - > > if (rc) { > > dev_err(sev->dev, "SEV: failed to INIT error %#x, rc %d\n", > > error, rc); > > -- > > 2.33.1.1089.g2158813163f-goog > >