Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 98861C433F5 for ; Sun, 21 Nov 2021 16:49:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S238298AbhKUQwv (ORCPT ); Sun, 21 Nov 2021 11:52:51 -0500 Received: from mo4-p04-ob.smtp.rzone.de ([85.215.255.122]:32404 "EHLO mo4-p04-ob.smtp.rzone.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230330AbhKUQwr (ORCPT ); Sun, 21 Nov 2021 11:52:47 -0500 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1637513322; s=strato-dkim-0002; d=chronox.de; h=References:In-Reply-To:Message-ID:Date:Subject:Cc:To:From:Cc:Date: From:Subject:Sender; bh=47kUu1gvgAojHM0onaJh5SkhZFTBbB8KzuQtaBIQ9qY=; b=atUCVNxlGUrFnRHw2CTPyCzwopzem+jcb9liL5DgIee6idGEKIvikkuIXqyMCgWaaY PmwHkrrAS90TY2Au2MPQJ3aFmLZTBGvXcaub2enxiBWoMziLo5tf4qUJFHvUPQRGw/tq 8xYrN1uWLhkKPjKWtFNJjcJ1yslEGr1115NAduwfOWKY0aeZdiQq4PzLc+8zvyk3Nt+Z fJtvP8NwziG1r6Xmre3AMCr2DoozcNT5TvvxlPPfet8iwJEuDOUmTJ//GKJ+ml0WtM2n tU+6TzVUpUPcYBQvcyukY2dosSOwYiNGVK5lPcotM7E8SR/f4KzoBKvBQlBc7KFMc3/G 9haQ== Authentication-Results: strato.com; dkim=none X-RZG-AUTH: ":P2ERcEykfu11Y98lp/T7+hdri+uKZK8TKWEqNyiHySGSa9k9xmwdNnzGHXPbJvSfE+K2" X-RZG-CLASS-ID: mo00 Received: from positron.chronox.de by smtp.strato.de (RZmta 47.34.5 DYNA|AUTH) with ESMTPSA id U02dfbxALGmf3Wn (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate); Sun, 21 Nov 2021 17:48:41 +0100 (CET) From: Stephan =?ISO-8859-1?Q?M=FCller?= To: Tso Ted , linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: Willy Tarreau , Nicolai Stange , LKML , Arnd Bergmann , Greg Kroah-Hartman , "Eric W. Biederman" , "Alexander E. Patrakov" , "Ahmed S. Darwish" , Matthew Garrett , Vito Caputo , Andreas Dilger , Jan Kara , Ray Strode , William Jon McCann , zhangjs , Andy Lutomirski , Florian Weimer , Lennart Poettering , Peter Matthias , Marcelo Henrique Cerri , Neil Horman , Randy Dunlap , Julia Lawall , Dan Carpenter , Andy Lavr , Eric Biggers , "Jason A. Donenfeld" , Petr Tesarik , John Haxby , Alexander Lobakin , Jirka Hladky Subject: [PATCH v43 02/15] LRNG - IRQ entropy source Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2021 17:40:27 +0100 Message-ID: <2154536.vFx2qVVIhK@positron.chronox.de> In-Reply-To: <2036923.9o76ZdvQCi@positron.chronox.de> References: <2036923.9o76ZdvQCi@positron.chronox.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7Bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org The interrupt entropy source hooks into the interrupt handler via the add_interrupt_randomness function callback. Every interrupt received by the kernel is also sent to the LRNG for processing. The IRQ entropy source performs the following processing: 1. Record a time stamp 2. Divide the time stamp by its greatest common divisor to eliminate fixed least significant bits. 3. Insert the 8 LSB of the result from step 2 into the collection pool. 4. When the collection pool is full, it is hashed into the per-CPU entropy pool (if continuous compression is enabled) or the latest time stamps overwrite the oldest entries in the collection pool. If entropy is requested from the IRQ entropy pool, a message digest over all per-CPU entropy pool digests is calculated. The GCD calculation is performed for the first 100 interupt time stamps. Until the GCD value is calculated, the full 32 bit time stamp is inserted into the collection pool. CC: Torsten Duwe CC: "Eric W. Biederman" CC: "Alexander E. Patrakov" CC: "Ahmed S. Darwish" CC: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" CC: Willy Tarreau CC: Matthew Garrett CC: Vito Caputo CC: Andreas Dilger CC: Jan Kara CC: Ray Strode CC: William Jon McCann CC: zhangjs CC: Andy Lutomirski CC: Florian Weimer CC: Lennart Poettering CC: Nicolai Stange Reviewed-by: Alexander Lobakin Tested-by: Alexander Lobakin Mathematical aspects Reviewed-by: "Peter, Matthias" Reviewed-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri Reviewed-by: Roman Drahtmueller Tested-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri Tested-by: Neil Horman Tested-by: Jirka Hladky Reviewed-by: Jirka Hladky Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller --- drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig | 162 +++++++ drivers/char/lrng/Makefile | 2 + drivers/char/lrng/lrng_es_irq.c | 823 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/char/lrng/lrng_es_irq.h | 71 +++ 4 files changed, 1058 insertions(+) create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_es_irq.c create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_es_irq.h diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig b/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig index 655d873480b0..a9ae35d9f648 100644 --- a/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig @@ -55,4 +55,166 @@ config LRNG_SEED_BUFFER_INIT_ADD_BITS endmenu # "Specific DRNG seeding strategies" +menu "Entropy Source Configuration" + +comment "Interrupt Entropy Source" + +config LRNG_IRQ + bool "Enable Interrupt Entropy Source as LRNG Seed Source" + default y + help + The LRNG models an entropy source based on the timing of the + occurrence of interrupts. Enable this option to enable this + IRQ entropy source. + + The IRQ entropy source is triggered every time an interrupt + arrives and thus causes the interrupt handler to execute + slightly longer. Disabling the IRQ entropy source implies + that the performance penalty on the interrupt handler added + by the LRNG is eliminated. Yet, this entropy source is + considered to be the internal entropy source of the LRNG. + Thus, only disable it if you ensured that other entropy + sources are available that supply the LRNG with entropy. + + If you disable the IRQ entropy source, you MUST ensure + one or more entropy sources collectively have the + capability to deliver sufficient entropy with one invocation + at a rate compliant to the security strength of the DRNG + (usually 256 bits of entropy). In addition, if those + entropy sources do not deliver sufficient entropy during + first request, the reseed must be triggered from user + space or kernel space when sufficient entropy is considered + to be present. + + If unsure, say Y. + +choice + prompt "Continuous entropy compression boot time setting" + default LRNG_CONTINUOUS_COMPRESSION_ENABLED + depends on LRNG_IRQ + help + Select the default behavior of the interrupt entropy source + continuous compression operation. + + The Linux RNG collects entropy data during each interrupt. + For performance reasons, a amount of entropy data defined by + the LRNG entropy collection pool size is concatenated into + an array. When that array is filled up, a hash is calculated + to compress the entropy. That hash is calculated in + interrupt context. + + In case such hash calculation in interrupt context is deemed + too time-consuming, the continuous compression operation + can be disabled. If disabled, the collection of entropy will + not trigger a hash compression operation in interrupt context. + The compression happens only when the DRNG is reseeded which is + in process context. This implies that old entropy data + collected after the last DRNG-reseed is overwritten with newer + entropy data once the collection pool is full instead of + retaining its entropy with the compression operation. + + config LRNG_CONTINUOUS_COMPRESSION_ENABLED + bool "Enable continuous compression (default)" + + config LRNG_CONTINUOUS_COMPRESSION_DISABLED + bool "Disable continuous compression" +endchoice + +config LRNG_ENABLE_CONTINUOUS_COMPRESSION + bool + default y if LRNG_CONTINUOUS_COMPRESSION_ENABLED + default n if LRNG_CONTINUOUS_COMPRESSION_DISABLED + +config LRNG_SWITCHABLE_CONTINUOUS_COMPRESSION + bool "Runtime-switchable continuous entropy compression" + depends on LRNG_IRQ + help + Per default, the interrupt entropy source continuous + compression operation behavior is hard-wired into the kernel. + Enable this option to allow it to be configurable at boot time. + + To modify the default behavior of the continuous + compression operation, use the kernel command line option + of lrng_sw_noise.lrng_pcpu_continuous_compression. + + If unsure, say N. + +choice + prompt "LRNG Entropy Collection Pool Size" + default LRNG_COLLECTION_SIZE_1024 + depends on LRNG_IRQ + help + Select the size of the LRNG entropy collection pool + storing data for the interrupt entropy source without + performing a compression operation. The larger the + collection size is, the faster the average interrupt + handling will be. The collection size represents the + number of bytes of the per-CPU memory used to batch + up entropy event data. + + The default value is good for regular operations. Choose + larger sizes for servers that have no memory limitations. + If runtime memory is precious, choose a smaller size. + + The collection size is unrelated to the entropy rate + or the amount of entropy the LRNG can process. + + config LRNG_COLLECTION_SIZE_32 + depends on LRNG_CONTINUOUS_COMPRESSION_ENABLED + depends on !LRNG_SWITCHABLE_CONTINUOUS_COMPRESSION + depends on !LRNG_OVERSAMPLE_ENTROPY_SOURCES + bool "32 interrupt events" + + config LRNG_COLLECTION_SIZE_256 + depends on !LRNG_OVERSAMPLE_ENTROPY_SOURCES + bool "256 interrupt events" + + config LRNG_COLLECTION_SIZE_512 + bool "512 interrupt events" + + config LRNG_COLLECTION_SIZE_1024 + bool "1024 interrupt events (default)" + + config LRNG_COLLECTION_SIZE_2048 + bool "2048 interrupt events" + + config LRNG_COLLECTION_SIZE_4096 + bool "4096 interrupt events" + + config LRNG_COLLECTION_SIZE_8192 + bool "8192 interrupt events" + +endchoice + +config LRNG_COLLECTION_SIZE + int + default 32 if LRNG_COLLECTION_SIZE_32 + default 256 if LRNG_COLLECTION_SIZE_256 + default 512 if LRNG_COLLECTION_SIZE_512 + default 1024 if LRNG_COLLECTION_SIZE_1024 + default 2048 if LRNG_COLLECTION_SIZE_2048 + default 4096 if LRNG_COLLECTION_SIZE_4096 + default 8192 if LRNG_COLLECTION_SIZE_8192 + +config LRNG_IRQ_ENTROPY_RATE + int "Interrupt Entropy Source Entropy Rate" + depends on LRNG_IRQ + range 256 4294967295 + default 256 + help + The LRNG will collect the configured number of interrupts to + obtain 256 bits of entropy. This value can be set to any between + 256 and 4294967295. The LRNG guarantees that this value is not + lower than 256. This lower limit implies that one interrupt event + is credited with one bit of entropy. This value is subject to the + increase by the oversampling factor, if no high-resolution timer + is found. + + In order to effectively disable the interrupt entropy source, + the option has to be set to 4294967295. In this case, the + interrupt entropy source will still deliver data but without + being credited with entropy. + +endmenu # "Entropy Source Configuration" + endif # LRNG diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile b/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile index 6f4603f897cd..d321d6d21a44 100644 --- a/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile +++ b/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile @@ -6,3 +6,5 @@ obj-y += lrng_es_mgr.o lrng_aux.o \ lrng_drng.o lrng_chacha20.o \ lrng_interfaces.o lrng_es_aux.o + +obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_IRQ) += lrng_es_irq.o diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_es_irq.c b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_es_irq.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..82a73b0426fb --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_es_irq.c @@ -0,0 +1,823 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause +/* + * LRNG Slow Entropy Source: Interrupt data collection + * + * Copyright (C) 2016 - 2021, Stephan Mueller + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "lrng_internal.h" +#include "lrng_es_irq.h" + +/* + * Number of interrupts to be recorded to assume that DRNG security strength + * bits of entropy are received. + * Note: a value below the DRNG security strength should not be defined as this + * may imply the DRNG can never be fully seeded in case other noise + * sources are unavailable. + */ +#define LRNG_IRQ_ENTROPY_BITS CONFIG_LRNG_IRQ_ENTROPY_RATE + + +/* Number of interrupts required for LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS entropy */ +static u32 lrng_irq_entropy_bits = LRNG_IRQ_ENTROPY_BITS; +/* Is high-resolution timer present? */ +static bool lrng_irq_highres_timer = false; + +static u32 irq_entropy __read_mostly = LRNG_IRQ_ENTROPY_BITS; +#ifdef CONFIG_LRNG_RUNTIME_ES_CONFIG +module_param(irq_entropy, uint, 0444); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(irq_entropy, + "How many interrupts must be collected for obtaining 256 bits of entropy\n"); +#endif + +/* Per-CPU array holding concatenated entropy events */ +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u32 [LRNG_DATA_ARRAY_SIZE], lrng_pcpu_array) + __aligned(LRNG_KCAPI_ALIGN); +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u32, lrng_pcpu_array_ptr) = 0; +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(atomic_t, lrng_pcpu_array_irqs) = ATOMIC_INIT(0); + +/* + * The entropy collection is performed by executing the following steps: + * 1. fill up the per-CPU array holding the time stamps + * 2. once the per-CPU array is full, a compression of the data into + * the entropy pool is performed - this happens in interrupt context + * + * If step 2 is not desired in interrupt context, the following boolean + * needs to be set to false. This implies that old entropy data in the + * per-CPU array collected since the last DRNG reseed is overwritten with + * new entropy data instead of retaining the entropy with the compression + * operation. + * + * Impact on entropy: + * + * If continuous compression is enabled, the maximum entropy that is collected + * per CPU between DRNG reseeds is equal to the digest size of the used hash. + * + * If continuous compression is disabled, the maximum number of entropy events + * that can be collected per CPU is equal to LRNG_DATA_ARRAY_SIZE. This amount + * of events is converted into an entropy statement which then represents the + * maximum amount of entropy collectible per CPU between DRNG reseeds. + */ +static bool lrng_pcpu_continuous_compression __read_mostly = + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_LRNG_ENABLE_CONTINUOUS_COMPRESSION); + +#ifdef CONFIG_LRNG_SWITCHABLE_CONTINUOUS_COMPRESSION +module_param(lrng_pcpu_continuous_compression, bool, 0444); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(lrng_pcpu_continuous_compression, + "Perform entropy compression if per-CPU entropy data array is full\n"); +#endif + +/* + * Per-CPU entropy pool with compressed entropy event + * + * The per-CPU entropy pool is defined as the hash state. New data is simply + * inserted into the entropy pool by performing a hash update operation. + * To read the entropy pool, a hash final must be invoked. However, before + * the entropy pool is released again after a hash final, the hash init must + * be performed. + */ +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u8 [LRNG_POOL_SIZE], lrng_pcpu_pool) + __aligned(LRNG_KCAPI_ALIGN); +/* + * Lock to allow other CPUs to read the pool - as this is only done during + * reseed which is infrequent, this lock is hardly contended. + */ +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(spinlock_t, lrng_pcpu_lock); +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(bool, lrng_pcpu_lock_init) = false; + +/* Number of time stamps analyzed to calculate a GCD */ +#define LRNG_GCD_WINDOW_SIZE 100 +static u32 lrng_gcd_history[LRNG_GCD_WINDOW_SIZE]; +static atomic_t lrng_gcd_history_ptr = ATOMIC_INIT(-1); + +/* The common divisor for all timestamps */ +static u32 lrng_gcd_timer = 0; + +static inline bool lrng_gcd_tested(void) +{ + return (lrng_gcd_timer != 0); +} + +/* Set the GCD for use in IRQ ES - if 0, the GCD calculation is restarted. */ +static inline void _lrng_gcd_set(u32 running_gcd) +{ + lrng_gcd_timer = running_gcd; + mb(); +} + +static void lrng_gcd_set(u32 running_gcd) +{ + if (!lrng_gcd_tested()) { + _lrng_gcd_set(running_gcd); + pr_debug("Setting GCD to %u\n", running_gcd); + } +} + +u32 lrng_gcd_analyze(u32 *history, size_t nelem) +{ + u32 running_gcd = 0; + size_t i; + + /* Now perform the analysis on the accumulated time data. */ + for (i = 0; i < nelem; i++) { + /* + * NOTE: this would be the place to add more analysis on the + * appropriateness of the timer like checking the presence + * of sufficient variations in the timer. + */ + + /* + * This calculates the gcd of all the time values. that is + * gcd(time_1, time_2, ..., time_nelem) + * + * Some timers increment by a fixed (non-1) amount each step. + * This code checks for such increments, and allows the library + * to output the number of such changes have occurred. + */ + running_gcd = (u32)gcd(history[i], running_gcd); + + /* Zeroize data */ + history[i] = 0; + } + + return running_gcd; +} + +static void lrng_gcd_add_value(u32 time) +{ + u32 ptr = (u32)atomic_inc_return_relaxed(&lrng_gcd_history_ptr); + + if (ptr < LRNG_GCD_WINDOW_SIZE) { + lrng_gcd_history[ptr] = time; + } else if (ptr == LRNG_GCD_WINDOW_SIZE) { + u32 gcd = lrng_gcd_analyze(lrng_gcd_history, + LRNG_GCD_WINDOW_SIZE); + + if (!gcd) + gcd = 1; + + /* + * Ensure that we have variations in the time stamp below the + * given value. This is just a safety measure to prevent the GCD + * becoming too large. + */ + if (gcd >= 1000) { + pr_warn("calculated GCD is larger than expected: %u\n", + gcd); + gcd = 1000; + } + + /* Adjust all deltas by the observed (small) common factor. */ + lrng_gcd_set(gcd); + atomic_set(&lrng_gcd_history_ptr, 0); + } +} + +/* Return boolean whether LRNG identified presence of high-resolution timer */ +static bool lrng_pool_highres_timer(void) +{ + return lrng_irq_highres_timer; +} + +/* Convert entropy in bits into number of IRQs with the same entropy content. */ +static inline u32 lrng_entropy_to_data(u32 entropy_bits) +{ + return ((entropy_bits * lrng_irq_entropy_bits) / + LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS); +} + +/* Convert number of IRQs into entropy value. */ +static inline u32 lrng_data_to_entropy(u32 irqnum) +{ + return ((irqnum * LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS) / + lrng_irq_entropy_bits); +} + +static inline bool lrng_pcpu_pool_online(int cpu) +{ + return per_cpu(lrng_pcpu_lock_init, cpu); +} + +static void lrng_pcpu_check_compression_state(void) +{ + /* One pool must hold sufficient entropy for disabled compression */ + if (!lrng_pcpu_continuous_compression) { + u32 max_ent = min_t(u32, lrng_get_digestsize(), + lrng_data_to_entropy(LRNG_DATA_NUM_VALUES)); + if (max_ent < lrng_security_strength()) { + pr_warn("Force continuous compression operation to ensure LRNG can hold enough entropy\n"); + lrng_pcpu_continuous_compression = true; + } + } +} + +static int __init lrng_init_time_source(void) +{ + /* Set a minimum number of interrupts that must be collected */ + irq_entropy = max_t(u32, LRNG_IRQ_ENTROPY_BITS, irq_entropy); + + if ((random_get_entropy() & LRNG_DATA_SLOTSIZE_MASK) || + (random_get_entropy() & LRNG_DATA_SLOTSIZE_MASK)) { + /* + * As the highres timer is identified here, previous interrupts + * obtained during boot time are treated like a lowres-timer + * would have been present. + */ + lrng_irq_highres_timer = true; + lrng_irq_entropy_bits = irq_entropy; + } else { + u32 new_entropy = irq_entropy * LRNG_IRQ_OVERSAMPLING_FACTOR; + + lrng_health_disable(); + lrng_irq_highres_timer = false; + lrng_irq_entropy_bits = (irq_entropy < new_entropy) ? + new_entropy : irq_entropy; + pr_warn("operating without high-resolution timer and applying IRQ oversampling factor %u\n", + LRNG_IRQ_OVERSAMPLING_FACTOR); + lrng_pcpu_check_compression_state(); + } + mb(); + + return 0; +} +core_initcall(lrng_init_time_source); + +/* + * Reset all per-CPU pools - reset entropy estimator but leave the pool data + * that may or may not have entropy unchanged. + */ +void lrng_pcpu_reset(void) +{ + int cpu; + + /* Trigger GCD calculation anew. */ + _lrng_gcd_set(0); + + for_each_online_cpu(cpu) + atomic_set(per_cpu_ptr(&lrng_pcpu_array_irqs, cpu), 0); +} + +u32 lrng_pcpu_avail_pool_size(void) +{ + u32 max_size = 0, max_pool = lrng_get_digestsize(); + int cpu; + + if (!lrng_pcpu_continuous_compression) + max_pool = min_t(u32, max_pool, LRNG_DATA_NUM_VALUES); + + for_each_online_cpu(cpu) { + if (lrng_pcpu_pool_online(cpu)) + max_size += max_pool; + } + + return max_size; +} + +/* Return entropy of unused IRQs present in all per-CPU pools. */ +u32 lrng_pcpu_avail_entropy(void) +{ + u32 digestsize_irqs, irq = 0; + int cpu; + + /* Obtain the cap of maximum numbers of IRQs we count */ + digestsize_irqs = lrng_entropy_to_data(lrng_get_digestsize()); + if (!lrng_pcpu_continuous_compression) { + /* Cap to max. number of IRQs the array can hold */ + digestsize_irqs = min_t(u32, digestsize_irqs, + LRNG_DATA_NUM_VALUES); + } + + for_each_online_cpu(cpu) { + if (!lrng_pcpu_pool_online(cpu)) + continue; + irq += min_t(u32, digestsize_irqs, + atomic_read_u32(per_cpu_ptr(&lrng_pcpu_array_irqs, + cpu))); + } + + /* Consider oversampling rate */ + return lrng_reduce_by_osr(lrng_data_to_entropy(irq)); +} + +/* + * Trigger a switch of the hash implementation for the per-CPU pool. + * + * For each per-CPU pool, obtain the message digest with the old hash + * implementation, initialize the per-CPU pool again with the new hash + * implementation and inject the message digest into the new state. + * + * Assumption: the caller must guarantee that the new_cb is available during the + * entire operation (e.g. it must hold the lock against pointer updating). + */ +int lrng_pcpu_switch_hash(int node, + const struct lrng_crypto_cb *new_cb, void *new_hash, + const struct lrng_crypto_cb *old_cb) +{ + u8 digest[LRNG_MAX_DIGESTSIZE]; + u32 digestsize_irqs, found_irqs; + int ret = 0, cpu; + + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_LRNG_DRNG_SWITCH)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + for_each_online_cpu(cpu) { + struct shash_desc *pcpu_shash; + + /* + * Only switch the per-CPU pools for the current node because + * the crypto_cb only applies NUMA-node-wide. + */ + if (cpu_to_node(cpu) != node || !lrng_pcpu_pool_online(cpu)) + continue; + + pcpu_shash = (struct shash_desc *)per_cpu_ptr(lrng_pcpu_pool, + cpu); + + digestsize_irqs = old_cb->lrng_hash_digestsize(pcpu_shash); + digestsize_irqs = lrng_entropy_to_data(digestsize_irqs << 3); + + if (pcpu_shash->tfm == new_hash) + continue; + + /* Get the per-CPU pool hash with old digest ... */ + ret = old_cb->lrng_hash_final(pcpu_shash, digest) ?: + /* ... re-initialize the hash with the new digest ... */ + new_cb->lrng_hash_init(pcpu_shash, new_hash) ?: + /* + * ... feed the old hash into the new state. We may feed + * uninitialized memory into the new state, but this is + * considered no issue and even good as we have some more + * uncertainty here. + */ + new_cb->lrng_hash_update(pcpu_shash, digest, + sizeof(digest)); + if (ret) + goto out; + + /* + * In case the new digest is larger than the old one, cap + * the available entropy to the old message digest used to + * process the existing data. + */ + found_irqs = atomic_xchg_relaxed( + per_cpu_ptr(&lrng_pcpu_array_irqs, cpu), 0); + found_irqs = min_t(u32, found_irqs, digestsize_irqs); + atomic_add_return_relaxed(found_irqs, + per_cpu_ptr(&lrng_pcpu_array_irqs, cpu)); + + pr_debug("Re-initialize per-CPU entropy pool for CPU %d on NUMA node %d with hash %s\n", + cpu, node, new_cb->lrng_hash_name()); + } + +out: + memzero_explicit(digest, sizeof(digest)); + return ret; +} + +/* + * When reading the per-CPU message digest, make sure we use the crypto + * callbacks defined for the NUMA node the per-CPU pool is defined for because + * the LRNG crypto switch support is only atomic per NUMA node. + */ +static inline u32 +lrng_pcpu_pool_hash_one(const struct lrng_crypto_cb *pcpu_crypto_cb, + void *pcpu_hash, int cpu, u8 *digest, u32 *digestsize) +{ + struct shash_desc *pcpu_shash = + (struct shash_desc *)per_cpu_ptr(lrng_pcpu_pool, cpu); + spinlock_t *lock = per_cpu_ptr(&lrng_pcpu_lock, cpu); + unsigned long flags; + u32 digestsize_irqs, found_irqs; + + /* Lock guarding against reading / writing to per-CPU pool */ + spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flags); + + *digestsize = pcpu_crypto_cb->lrng_hash_digestsize(pcpu_hash); + digestsize_irqs = lrng_entropy_to_data(*digestsize << 3); + + /* Obtain entropy statement like for the entropy pool */ + found_irqs = atomic_xchg_relaxed( + per_cpu_ptr(&lrng_pcpu_array_irqs, cpu), 0); + /* Cap to maximum amount of data we can hold in hash */ + found_irqs = min_t(u32, found_irqs, digestsize_irqs); + + /* Cap to maximum amount of data we can hold in array */ + if (!lrng_pcpu_continuous_compression) + found_irqs = min_t(u32, found_irqs, LRNG_DATA_NUM_VALUES); + + /* Store all not-yet compressed data in data array into hash, ... */ + if (pcpu_crypto_cb->lrng_hash_update(pcpu_shash, + (u8 *)per_cpu_ptr(lrng_pcpu_array, cpu), + LRNG_DATA_ARRAY_SIZE * sizeof(u32)) ?: + /* ... get the per-CPU pool digest, ... */ + pcpu_crypto_cb->lrng_hash_final(pcpu_shash, digest) ?: + /* ... re-initialize the hash, ... */ + pcpu_crypto_cb->lrng_hash_init(pcpu_shash, pcpu_hash) ?: + /* ... feed the old hash into the new state. */ + pcpu_crypto_cb->lrng_hash_update(pcpu_shash, digest, *digestsize)) + found_irqs = 0; + + spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags); + return found_irqs; +} + +/* + * Hash all per-CPU pools and return the digest to be used as seed data for + * seeding a DRNG. The caller must guarantee backtracking resistance. + * The function will only copy as much data as entropy is available into the + * caller-provided output buffer. + * + * This function handles the translation from the number of received interrupts + * into an entropy statement. The conversion depends on LRNG_IRQ_ENTROPY_BITS + * which defines how many interrupts must be received to obtain 256 bits of + * entropy. With this value, the function lrng_data_to_entropy converts a given + * data size (received interrupts, requested amount of data, etc.) into an + * entropy statement. lrng_entropy_to_data does the reverse. + * + * @outbuf: buffer to store data in with size requested_bits + * @requested_bits: Requested amount of entropy + * @fully_seeded: indicator whether LRNG is fully seeded + * @return: amount of entropy in outbuf in bits. + */ +u32 lrng_pcpu_pool_hash(u8 *outbuf, u32 requested_bits, bool fully_seeded) +{ + SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, NULL); + const struct lrng_crypto_cb *crypto_cb; + struct lrng_drng **lrng_drng = lrng_drng_instances(); + struct lrng_drng *drng = lrng_drng_init_instance(); + u8 digest[LRNG_MAX_DIGESTSIZE]; + unsigned long flags, flags2; + u32 found_irqs, collected_irqs = 0, collected_ent_bits, requested_irqs, + returned_ent_bits; + int ret, cpu; + void *hash; + + /* Lock guarding replacement of per-NUMA hash */ + lrng_hash_lock(drng, &flags); + + crypto_cb = drng->crypto_cb; + hash = drng->hash; + + /* The hash state of filled with all per-CPU pool hashes. */ + ret = crypto_cb->lrng_hash_init(shash, hash); + if (ret) + goto err; + + requested_irqs = lrng_entropy_to_data(requested_bits + + lrng_compress_osr()); + + /* + * Harvest entropy from each per-CPU hash state - even though we may + * have collected sufficient entropy, we will hash all per-CPU pools. + */ + for_each_online_cpu(cpu) { + struct lrng_drng *pcpu_drng = drng; + u32 digestsize, pcpu_unused_irqs = 0; + int node = cpu_to_node(cpu); + + /* If pool is not online, then no entropy is present. */ + if (!lrng_pcpu_pool_online(cpu)) + continue; + + if (lrng_drng && lrng_drng[node]) + pcpu_drng = lrng_drng[node]; + + if (pcpu_drng == drng) { + found_irqs = lrng_pcpu_pool_hash_one(crypto_cb, hash, + cpu, digest, + &digestsize); + } else { + lrng_hash_lock(pcpu_drng, &flags2); + found_irqs = + lrng_pcpu_pool_hash_one(pcpu_drng->crypto_cb, + pcpu_drng->hash, cpu, + digest, &digestsize); + lrng_hash_unlock(pcpu_drng, flags2); + } + + /* Inject the digest into the state of all per-CPU pools */ + ret = crypto_cb->lrng_hash_update(shash, digest, digestsize); + if (ret) + goto err; + + collected_irqs += found_irqs; + if (collected_irqs > requested_irqs) { + pcpu_unused_irqs = collected_irqs - requested_irqs; + atomic_add_return_relaxed(pcpu_unused_irqs, + per_cpu_ptr(&lrng_pcpu_array_irqs, cpu)); + collected_irqs = requested_irqs; + } + pr_debug("%u interrupts used from entropy pool of CPU %d, %u interrupts remain unused\n", + found_irqs - pcpu_unused_irqs, cpu, pcpu_unused_irqs); + } + + ret = crypto_cb->lrng_hash_final(shash, digest); + if (ret) + goto err; + + collected_ent_bits = lrng_data_to_entropy(collected_irqs); + /* Cap to maximum entropy that can ever be generated with given hash */ + collected_ent_bits = min_t(u32, collected_ent_bits, + crypto_cb->lrng_hash_digestsize(hash) << 3); + /* Apply oversampling: discount requested oversampling rate */ + returned_ent_bits = lrng_reduce_by_osr(collected_ent_bits); + + pr_debug("obtained %u bits by collecting %u bits of entropy from entropy pool noise source\n", + returned_ent_bits, collected_ent_bits); + + /* + * Truncate to available entropy as implicitly allowed by SP800-90B + * section 3.1.5.1.1 table 1 which awards truncated hashes full + * entropy. + * + * During boot time, we read requested_bits data with + * returned_ent_bits entropy. In case our conservative entropy + * estimate underestimates the available entropy we can transport as + * much available entropy as possible. + */ + memcpy(outbuf, digest, fully_seeded ? returned_ent_bits >> 3 : + requested_bits >> 3); + +out: + crypto_cb->lrng_hash_desc_zero(shash); + lrng_hash_unlock(drng, flags); + memzero_explicit(digest, sizeof(digest)); + return returned_ent_bits; + +err: + returned_ent_bits = 0; + goto out; +} + +/* Compress the lrng_pcpu_array array into lrng_pcpu_pool */ +static inline void lrng_pcpu_array_compress(void) +{ + struct shash_desc *shash = + (struct shash_desc *)this_cpu_ptr(lrng_pcpu_pool); + struct lrng_drng **lrng_drng = lrng_drng_instances(); + struct lrng_drng *drng = lrng_drng_init_instance(); + const struct lrng_crypto_cb *crypto_cb; + spinlock_t *lock = this_cpu_ptr(&lrng_pcpu_lock); + unsigned long flags, flags2; + int node = numa_node_id(); + void *hash; + bool init = false; + + /* Get NUMA-node local hash instance */ + if (lrng_drng && lrng_drng[node]) + drng = lrng_drng[node]; + + lrng_hash_lock(drng, &flags); + crypto_cb = drng->crypto_cb; + hash = drng->hash; + + if (unlikely(!this_cpu_read(lrng_pcpu_lock_init))) { + init = true; + spin_lock_init(lock); + this_cpu_write(lrng_pcpu_lock_init, true); + pr_debug("Initializing per-CPU entropy pool for CPU %d on NUMA node %d with hash %s\n", + raw_smp_processor_id(), node, + crypto_cb->lrng_hash_name()); + } + + spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flags2); + + if (unlikely(init) && crypto_cb->lrng_hash_init(shash, hash)) { + this_cpu_write(lrng_pcpu_lock_init, false); + pr_warn("Initialization of hash failed\n"); + } else if (lrng_pcpu_continuous_compression) { + /* Add entire per-CPU data array content into entropy pool. */ + if (crypto_cb->lrng_hash_update(shash, + (u8 *)this_cpu_ptr(lrng_pcpu_array), + LRNG_DATA_ARRAY_SIZE * sizeof(u32))) + pr_warn_ratelimited("Hashing of entropy data failed\n"); + } + + spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags2); + lrng_hash_unlock(drng, flags); +} + +/* Compress data array into hash */ +static inline void lrng_pcpu_array_to_hash(u32 ptr) +{ + u32 *array = this_cpu_ptr(lrng_pcpu_array); + + /* + * During boot time the hash operation is triggered more often than + * during regular operation. + */ + if (unlikely(!lrng_state_fully_seeded())) { + if ((ptr & 31) && (ptr < LRNG_DATA_WORD_MASK)) + return; + } else if (ptr < LRNG_DATA_WORD_MASK) { + return; + } + + if (lrng_raw_array_entropy_store(*array)) { + u32 i; + + /* + * If we fed even a part of the array to external analysis, we + * mark that the entire array and the per-CPU pool to have no + * entropy. This is due to the non-IID property of the data as + * we do not fully know whether the existing dependencies + * diminish the entropy beyond to what we expect it has. + */ + atomic_set(this_cpu_ptr(&lrng_pcpu_array_irqs), 0); + + for (i = 1; i < LRNG_DATA_ARRAY_SIZE; i++) + lrng_raw_array_entropy_store(*(array + i)); + } else { + lrng_pcpu_array_compress(); + /* Ping pool handler about received entropy */ + lrng_pool_add_entropy(); + } +} + +/* + * Concatenate full 32 bit word at the end of time array even when current + * ptr is not aligned to sizeof(data). + */ +static inline void _lrng_pcpu_array_add_u32(u32 data) +{ + /* Increment pointer by number of slots taken for input value */ + u32 pre_ptr, mask, ptr = this_cpu_add_return(lrng_pcpu_array_ptr, + LRNG_DATA_SLOTS_PER_UINT); + unsigned int pre_array; + + /* + * This function injects a unit into the array - guarantee that + * array unit size is equal to data type of input data. + */ + BUILD_BUG_ON(LRNG_DATA_ARRAY_MEMBER_BITS != (sizeof(data) << 3)); + + /* + * The following logic requires at least two units holding + * the data as otherwise the pointer would immediately wrap when + * injection an u32 word. + */ + BUILD_BUG_ON(LRNG_DATA_NUM_VALUES <= LRNG_DATA_SLOTS_PER_UINT); + + lrng_pcpu_split_u32(&ptr, &pre_ptr, &mask); + + /* MSB of data go into previous unit */ + pre_array = lrng_data_idx2array(pre_ptr); + /* zeroization of slot to ensure the following OR adds the data */ + this_cpu_and(lrng_pcpu_array[pre_array], ~(0xffffffff & ~mask)); + this_cpu_or(lrng_pcpu_array[pre_array], data & ~mask); + + /* Invoke compression as we just filled data array completely */ + if (unlikely(pre_ptr > ptr)) + lrng_pcpu_array_to_hash(LRNG_DATA_WORD_MASK); + + /* LSB of data go into current unit */ + this_cpu_write(lrng_pcpu_array[lrng_data_idx2array(ptr)], + data & mask); + + if (likely(pre_ptr <= ptr)) + lrng_pcpu_array_to_hash(ptr); +} + +/* Concatenate a 32-bit word at the end of the per-CPU array */ +void lrng_pcpu_array_add_u32(u32 data) +{ + /* + * Disregard entropy-less data without continuous compression to + * avoid it overwriting data with entropy when array ptr wraps. + */ + if (lrng_pcpu_continuous_compression) + _lrng_pcpu_array_add_u32(data); +} + +/* Concatenate data of max LRNG_DATA_SLOTSIZE_MASK at the end of time array */ +static inline void lrng_pcpu_array_add_slot(u32 data) +{ + /* Get slot */ + u32 ptr = this_cpu_inc_return(lrng_pcpu_array_ptr) & + LRNG_DATA_WORD_MASK; + unsigned int array = lrng_data_idx2array(ptr); + unsigned int slot = lrng_data_idx2slot(ptr); + + BUILD_BUG_ON(LRNG_DATA_ARRAY_MEMBER_BITS % LRNG_DATA_SLOTSIZE_BITS); + /* Ensure consistency of values */ + BUILD_BUG_ON(LRNG_DATA_ARRAY_MEMBER_BITS != + sizeof(lrng_pcpu_array[0]) << 3); + + /* zeroization of slot to ensure the following OR adds the data */ + this_cpu_and(lrng_pcpu_array[array], + ~(lrng_data_slot_val(0xffffffff & LRNG_DATA_SLOTSIZE_MASK, + slot))); + /* Store data into slot */ + this_cpu_or(lrng_pcpu_array[array], lrng_data_slot_val(data, slot)); + + lrng_pcpu_array_to_hash(ptr); +} + +static inline void +lrng_time_process_common(u32 time, void(*add_time)(u32 data)) +{ + enum lrng_health_res health_test; + + if (lrng_raw_hires_entropy_store(time)) + return; + + health_test = lrng_health_test(time); + if (health_test > lrng_health_fail_use) + return; + + if (health_test == lrng_health_pass) + atomic_inc_return(this_cpu_ptr(&lrng_pcpu_array_irqs)); + + add_time(time); +} + +/* + * Batching up of entropy in per-CPU array before injecting into entropy pool. + */ +static inline void lrng_time_process(void) +{ + u32 now_time = random_get_entropy(); + + if (unlikely(!lrng_gcd_tested())) { + /* When GCD is unknown, we process the full time stamp */ + lrng_time_process_common(now_time, _lrng_pcpu_array_add_u32); + lrng_gcd_add_value(now_time); + } else { + /* GCD is known and applied */ + lrng_time_process_common((now_time / lrng_gcd_timer) & + LRNG_DATA_SLOTSIZE_MASK, + lrng_pcpu_array_add_slot); + } + + lrng_perf_time(now_time); +} + +/* Hot code path - Callback for interrupt handler */ +void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flg) +{ + if (lrng_pool_highres_timer()) { + lrng_time_process(); + } else { + struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs(); + static atomic_t reg_idx = ATOMIC_INIT(0); + u64 ip; + u32 tmp; + + if (regs) { + u32 *ptr = (u32 *)regs; + int reg_ptr = atomic_add_return_relaxed(1, ®_idx); + size_t n = (sizeof(struct pt_regs) / sizeof(u32)); + + ip = instruction_pointer(regs); + tmp = *(ptr + (reg_ptr % n)); + tmp = lrng_raw_regs_entropy_store(tmp) ? 0 : tmp; + _lrng_pcpu_array_add_u32(tmp); + } else { + ip = _RET_IP_; + } + + lrng_time_process(); + + /* + * The XOR operation combining the different values is not + * considered to destroy entropy since the entirety of all + * processed values delivers the entropy (and not each + * value separately of the other values). + */ + tmp = lrng_raw_jiffies_entropy_store(jiffies) ? 0 : jiffies; + tmp ^= lrng_raw_irq_entropy_store(irq) ? 0 : irq; + tmp ^= lrng_raw_irqflags_entropy_store(irq_flg) ? 0 : irq_flg; + tmp ^= lrng_raw_retip_entropy_store(ip) ? 0 : ip; + tmp ^= ip >> 32; + _lrng_pcpu_array_add_u32(tmp); + } +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_interrupt_randomness); + +void lrng_irq_es_state(unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) +{ + const struct lrng_drng *lrng_drng_init = lrng_drng_init_instance(); + + /* Assume the lrng_drng_init lock is taken by caller */ + snprintf(buf, buflen, + "IRQ ES properties:\n" + " Hash for operating entropy pool: %s\n" + " per-CPU interrupt collection size: %u\n" + " Standards compliance: %s\n" + " High-resolution timer: %s\n" + " Continuous compression: %s\n", + lrng_drng_init->crypto_cb->lrng_hash_name(), + LRNG_DATA_NUM_VALUES, + lrng_sp80090b_compliant() ? "SP800-90B " : "", + lrng_pool_highres_timer() ? "true" : "false", + lrng_pcpu_continuous_compression ? "true" : "false"); +} diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_es_irq.h b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_es_irq.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..00b16b1aa45f --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_es_irq.h @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause */ +/* + * LRNG Slow Noise Source: Time stamp array handling + * + * Copyright (C) 2016 - 2021, Stephan Mueller + */ + +/* + * To limit the impact on the interrupt handling, the LRNG concatenates + * entropic LSB parts of the time stamps in a per-CPU array and only + * injects them into the entropy pool when the array is full. + */ + +/* Store multiple integers in one u32 */ +#define LRNG_DATA_SLOTSIZE_BITS (8) +#define LRNG_DATA_SLOTSIZE_MASK ((1 << LRNG_DATA_SLOTSIZE_BITS) - 1) +#define LRNG_DATA_ARRAY_MEMBER_BITS (4 << 3) /* ((sizeof(u32)) << 3) */ +#define LRNG_DATA_SLOTS_PER_UINT (LRNG_DATA_ARRAY_MEMBER_BITS / \ + LRNG_DATA_SLOTSIZE_BITS) + +/* + * Number of time values to store in the array - in small environments + * only one atomic_t variable per CPU is used. + */ +#define LRNG_DATA_NUM_VALUES (CONFIG_LRNG_COLLECTION_SIZE) +/* Mask of LSB of time stamp to store */ +#define LRNG_DATA_WORD_MASK (LRNG_DATA_NUM_VALUES - 1) + +#define LRNG_DATA_SLOTS_MASK (LRNG_DATA_SLOTS_PER_UINT - 1) +#define LRNG_DATA_ARRAY_SIZE (LRNG_DATA_NUM_VALUES / \ + LRNG_DATA_SLOTS_PER_UINT) + +/* Starting bit index of slot */ +static inline unsigned int lrng_data_slot2bitindex(unsigned int slot) +{ + return (LRNG_DATA_SLOTSIZE_BITS * slot); +} + +/* Convert index into the array index */ +static inline unsigned int lrng_data_idx2array(unsigned int idx) +{ + return idx / LRNG_DATA_SLOTS_PER_UINT; +} + +/* Convert index into the slot of a given array index */ +static inline unsigned int lrng_data_idx2slot(unsigned int idx) +{ + return idx & LRNG_DATA_SLOTS_MASK; +} + +/* Convert value into slot value */ +static inline unsigned int lrng_data_slot_val(unsigned int val, + unsigned int slot) +{ + return val << lrng_data_slot2bitindex(slot); +} + +/* + * Return the pointers for the previous and current units to inject a u32 into. + * Also return the mask which the u32 word is to be processed. + */ +static inline void lrng_pcpu_split_u32(u32 *ptr, u32 *pre_ptr, u32 *mask) +{ + /* ptr to previous unit */ + *pre_ptr = (*ptr - LRNG_DATA_SLOTS_PER_UINT) & LRNG_DATA_WORD_MASK; + *ptr &= LRNG_DATA_WORD_MASK; + + /* mask to split data into the two parts for the two units */ + *mask = ((1 << (*pre_ptr & (LRNG_DATA_SLOTS_PER_UINT - 1)) * + LRNG_DATA_SLOTSIZE_BITS)) - 1; +} -- 2.31.1