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Fri, 3 Dec 2021 19:11:35 +0000 (GMT) Message-ID: Date: Fri, 3 Dec 2021 14:11:35 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/91.2.0 Subject: Re: [RFC v2 19/19] ima: Setup securityfs for IMA namespace Content-Language: en-US To: jejb@linux.ibm.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, serge@hallyn.com, christian.brauner@ubuntu.com, containers@lists.linux.dev, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com, krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com, mpeters@redhat.com, lhinds@redhat.com, lsturman@redhat.com, puiterwi@redhat.com, jamjoom@us.ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com, rgb@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org References: <20211203023118.1447229-1-stefanb@linux.ibm.com> <20211203023118.1447229-20-stefanb@linux.ibm.com> <6306b4e5-f26d-1704-6344-354eb5387abf@linux.ibm.com> <11b557b58de74828b1c16334a5fb52c4d3f6ad0f.camel@linux.ibm.com> From: Stefan Berger In-Reply-To: <11b557b58de74828b1c16334a5fb52c4d3f6ad0f.camel@linux.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-GUID: brTutpzHVTiKJX_IbnV7N6xgla3vvqzC X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: uA7gP3kRgTYMePS4rPB0ZuCrAh2AgYRN X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.205,Aquarius:18.0.790,Hydra:6.0.425,FMLib:17.11.62.513 definitions=2021-12-03_07,2021-12-02_01,2021-12-02_01 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 adultscore=0 mlxscore=0 bulkscore=0 impostorscore=0 malwarescore=0 clxscore=1015 priorityscore=1501 spamscore=0 phishscore=0 lowpriorityscore=0 suspectscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2110150000 definitions=main-2112030122 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 12/3/21 13:50, James Bottomley wrote: > On Fri, 2021-12-03 at 13:06 -0500, Stefan Berger wrote: >> On 12/3/21 12:03, James Bottomley wrote: >>> On Thu, 2021-12-02 at 21:31 -0500, Stefan Berger wrote: >>> [...] >>>> static int securityfs_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc) >>>> { >>>> + int rc; >>>> + >>>> + if (fc->user_ns->ima_ns->late_fs_init) { >>>> + rc = fc->user_ns->ima_ns->late_fs_init(fc->user_ns); >>>> + if (rc) >>>> + return rc; >>>> + } >>>> fc->ops = &securityfs_context_ops; >>>> return 0; >>>> } >>> I know I suggested this, but to get this to work in general, it's >>> going to have to not be specific to IMA, so it's going to have to >>> become something generic like a notifier chain. The other problem >>> is it's only working still by accident: >> I had thought about this also but the rationale was: >> >> securityfs is compiled due to CONFIG_IMA_NS and the user namespace >> exists there and that has a pointer now to ima_namespace, which can >> have that callback. I assumed that other namespaced subsystems could >> also be reached then via such a callback, but I don't know. > Well securityfs is supposed to exist for LSMs. At some point each of > those is going to need to be namespaced, which may eventually be quite > a pile of callbacks, which is why I thought of a notifier. > >> I suppose any late filesystem init callchain would have to be >> connected to the user_namespace somehow? > I don't think so; I think just moving some securityfs entries into the > user_namespace and managing the notifier chain from within securityfs > will do for now. [although I'd have to spec this out in code before I > knew for sure]. It doesn't have to be right in the user_namespace. The IMA namespace is connected to the user namespace and holds the dentries now... Please spec it out... > >>>> +int ima_fs_ns_init(struct ima_namespace *ns) >>>> +{ >>>> + ns->mount = securityfs_ns_create_mount(ns->user_ns); >>> This actually triggers on the call to securityfs_init_fs_context, >>> but nothing happens because the callback is null. Every subsequent >>> use of fscontext will trigger this. The point of a keyed supeblock >>> is that fill_super is only called once per key, that's the place we >>> should be doing this. It should also probably be a blocking >>> notifier so anyconsumer of securityfs can be namespaced by >>> registering for this notifier. >> What I don't like about the fill_super is that it gets called too >> early: >> >> [ 67.058611] securityfs_ns_create_mount @ 102 target user_ns: >> ffff95c010698c80; nr_extents: 0 >> [ 67.059836] securityfs_fill_super @ 47 user_ns: >> ffff95c010698c80; >> nr_extents: 0 > Right, it's being activated by securityfs_ns_create_mount which is > called as soon as the user_ns is created. Well, that doesn't help us then... >> We are switching to the target user namespace in >> securityfs_ns_create_mount. The expected nr_extents at this point is >> 0, since user_ns hasn't been configured, yet. But then >> security_fill_super is also called with nr_extents 0. We cannot use >> that, it's too early! > Exactly, so I was thinking of not having a securityfs_ns_create_mount > at all. All the securityfs_ns_create.. calls would be in the notifier But we need to somehow have a call to get_tree_keyed() and have that user namespace switched out. I don't know how else to do this other than having some function that does that and that is now called securityfs_ns_create_mount(). get_tree_keyed() will also call the fill_super() which is called when securityfs_ns_create_mount() is called. [  196.739071] ima_fs_ns_init @ 639 before securityfs_ns_create_mount() [  196.740426] securityfs_init_fs_context @ 72  user_ns: ffffffff98a3cc60; nr_extents: 1 [  196.741519] securityfs_ns_create_mount @ 105 target user_ns: ffff9e239753eb80; nr_extents: 0 [  196.742657] securityfs_get_tree @ 60 before get_tree_keyed() [  196.743418] securityfs_fill_super @ 47  user_ns: ffff9e239753eb80; nr_extents: 0 [  196.744467] ima_fs_ns_init @ 641 after securityfs_ns_create_mount() [  196.745304] ima: Allocated hash algorithm: sha256 [  196.757650] securityfs_init_fs_context @ 72  user_ns: ffff9e239753eb80; nr_extents: 1 [  196.758759] securityfs_get_tree @ 60 before get_tree_keyed() You said it works by 'accident'. I know it works because the function securityfs_init_fs_context() that now populates the filesystem via the late_fs_init() is getting called twice. Does 'accident' here mean the call sequence could change? > >> Where would the vfsmount pointer reside? For now it's in >> ima_namespace, but it sounds like it should be in a more centralized >> place? Should it also be connected to the user_namespace so we can >> pick it up using get_user_ns()? > exactly. I think struct user_namespace should have two elements gated > by a #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITYFS which are the vfsmount and the > mount_count for passing into simple_pin_fs. Also that we can do for as long as it flies beyond the conversation here... :-) Anyone else have an opinion ?   Stefan > > James > >