Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932107AbXAVRwg (ORCPT ); Mon, 22 Jan 2007 12:52:36 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S932100AbXAVRwf (ORCPT ); Mon, 22 Jan 2007 12:52:35 -0500 Received: from 69-100-st.zelcom.ru ([80.92.100.69]:4543 "EHLO etherstorm.feelingofgreen.ru" rhost-flags-OK-FAIL-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S932107AbXAVRwf (ORCPT ); Mon, 22 Jan 2007 12:52:35 -0500 Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2007 20:52:31 +0300 Message-ID: <87sle3x82o.wl@betelheise.deep.net> From: Samium Gromoff <_deepfire@feelingofgreen.ru> To: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Samium Gromoff <_deepfire@feelingofgreen.ru>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Wagner Subject: Re: [PATCH] Undo some of the pseudo-security madness In-Reply-To: <1169426146.3055.1163.camel@laptopd505.fenrus.org> References: <87y7nxvk65.wl@betelheise.deep.net> <1169345764.3055.935.camel@laptopd505.fenrus.org> <87tzykuj49.wl@betelheise.deep.net> <1169426146.3055.1163.camel@laptopd505.fenrus.org> User-Agent: Wanderlust/2.15.5 (Almost Unreal) SEMI/1.14.6 (Maruoka) FLIM/1.14.8 (=?ISO-8859-4?Q?Shij=F2?=) APEL/10.6 Emacs/23.0.51 (i486-pc-linux-gnu) MULE/5.0 (SAKAKI) X-Face: "P-:w!.&Hdk.h~~pT`!Q%H6;/8Cce^m&%vIn"W-SXb4h88dCgwD\_}N5:\}lowY2gxg0u^wVO*L\$C@MvBDRTmh/=,468w{W{OTc$kfq5O9Y!`pd+N}SMHrN+Gs>jXe5}}EL`cRbc0^_0cZ-}M\b~55I;Qe$1uL8M`M`82<_%CQ(GwLk."M>zBLn:-u>n,$kjH`~Uo[pH`08#\G!GVMd`%7![m9]*w5PMts4@m>=;lX41Z90N MIME-Version: 1.0 (generated by SEMI 1.14.6 - "Maruoka") Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1540 Lines: 37 At Mon, 22 Jan 2007 01:35:46 +0100, Arjan van de Ven wrote: > > > > the core of the problem are the cores which are customarily > > dumped by lisps during the environment generation (or modification) stage, > > and then mapped back, every time the environment is invoked. > > > > > at the current step of evolution, those core files are not relocatable > > in certain natively compiling lisp systems. > > nor will they work if the sysadmin applies a security update and glibc > or another library changes one page in size. Or changes the stack rlimit > or .. or .. Now, i figured out, there is a certain reasonable safety gap which works for people, because the libraries depended on are well known. What happens with AS randomisation, is that the variance is simply too large. But what is more important, is that vendors do modifications which change the amount of randomisation, which means that potentially no MAP_FIXED is safe, generally. Yes, there is uncertainty in both cases -- library variance or AS randomisation, but the latter arguably crosses a practical manageability boundary. > -- > if you want to mail me at work (you don't), use arjan (at) linux.intel.com > Test the interaction between Linux and your BIOS via http://www.linuxfirmwarekit.org regards, Samium Gromoff - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/