Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E9910C433EF for ; Sun, 26 Dec 2021 13:31:44 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S233584AbhLZNbn (ORCPT ); Sun, 26 Dec 2021 08:31:43 -0500 Received: from mail.hallyn.com ([178.63.66.53]:50934 "EHLO mail.hallyn.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232345AbhLZNbm (ORCPT ); Sun, 26 Dec 2021 08:31:42 -0500 Received: by mail.hallyn.com (Postfix, from userid 1001) id E5E6B13F2; Sun, 26 Dec 2021 07:31:40 -0600 (CST) Date: Sun, 26 Dec 2021 07:31:40 -0600 From: "Serge E. Hallyn" To: Christian Brauner Cc: Serge Hallyn , Al Viro , Laurent Vivier , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Christoph Hellwig , Kees Cook , Sargun Dhillon , Jann Horn , Henning Schild , Andrei Vagin , Matthew Bobrowski , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, containers@lists.linux.dev, Christian Brauner Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts Message-ID: <20211226133140.GA8064@mail.hallyn.com> References: <20211216112659.310979-1-brauner@kernel.org> <20211216112659.310979-2-brauner@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20211216112659.310979-2-brauner@kernel.org> User-Agent: Mutt/1.9.4 (2018-02-28) Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Dec 16, 2021 at 12:26:59PM +0100, Christian Brauner wrote: > From: Christian Brauner > > Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts. > This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly > reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions. > > While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user > namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are > available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the > sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the > interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are > already delegated to sandboxes implicitly. > > However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in > binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types > in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were > already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with > this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample). > > Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces. > Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use > keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to > create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the > user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc > superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent > mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same > binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc > superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for > load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to > retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user > namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop. > > Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the > binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes > access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created > a separate binfmt_misc instance. > > Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general > will also allow to support and harden execution of another > architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the > unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and > configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the > binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its > binary type handlers. > > Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1]. > But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container > registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in > its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start > containers with a different architecture without affecting the host: > > root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1 > 1000000 \_ /sbin/init > 1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald > 1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd > 1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd > 1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved > 1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f > 1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only > 1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers > 1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE > 1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind > 1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220 > 1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste > 1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x > 1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init > 1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald > 1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f > 1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac > 1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers > 1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE > 1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind > 1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220 > 1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220 > 1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220 > 1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220 > 1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220 > 1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd > > [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu > [2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied > [3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters > [4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc > [5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11 > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin) > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1) > Cc: Sargun Dhillon > Cc: Serge Hallyn (one typo below) Acked-by: Serge Hallyn > Cc: Jann Horn > Cc: Henning Schild > Cc: Andrei Vagin > Cc: Al Viro > Cc: Laurent Vivier > Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier > Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner > --- > /* v2 */ > - Serge Hallyn : > - Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a > new binary type handler is registered. > - Christian Brauner : > - Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though > Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form. > But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to > blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here. > - Add more comments that explain what's going on. > - Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are > doing to make the code easier to understand. > - In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed > either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type > handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status > file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction. > That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While > that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a > bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has > already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be > safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take > the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already > happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove > the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the > write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns > the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger > guarantees to the user. > --- > fs/binfmt_misc.c | 202 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ > include/linux/binfmts.h | 10 ++ > include/linux/user_namespace.h | 8 ++ > kernel/user.c | 13 +++ > kernel/user_namespace.c | 3 + > 5 files changed, 202 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/fs/binfmt_misc.c b/fs/binfmt_misc.c > index 3fd99a20694b..40b74751ecfd 100644 > --- a/fs/binfmt_misc.c > +++ b/fs/binfmt_misc.c > @@ -40,9 +40,6 @@ enum { > VERBOSE_STATUS = 1 /* make it zero to save 400 bytes kernel memory */ > }; > > -static LIST_HEAD(entries); > -static int enabled = 1; > - > enum {Enabled, Magic}; > #define MISC_FMT_PRESERVE_ARGV0 (1 << 31) > #define MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY (1 << 30) > @@ -63,7 +60,6 @@ typedef struct { > refcount_t users; /* sync removal with load_misc_binary() */ > } Node; > > -static DEFINE_RWLOCK(entries_lock); > static struct file_system_type bm_fs_type; > > /* > @@ -90,13 +86,14 @@ static struct file_system_type bm_fs_type; > * > * Return: binary type list entry on success, NULL on failure > */ > -static Node *search_binfmt_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm) > +static Node *search_binfmt_handler(struct binfmt_misc *misc, > + struct linux_binprm *bprm) > { > char *p = strrchr(bprm->interp, '.'); > Node *e; > > /* Walk all the registered handlers. */ > - list_for_each_entry(e, &entries, list) { > + list_for_each_entry(e, &misc->entries, list) { > char *s; > int j; > > @@ -138,15 +135,16 @@ static Node *search_binfmt_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm) > * > * Return: binary type list entry on success, NULL on failure > */ > -static Node *get_binfmt_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm) > +static Node *get_binfmt_handler(struct binfmt_misc *misc, > + struct linux_binprm *bprm) > { > Node *e; > > - read_lock(&entries_lock); > - e = search_binfmt_handler(bprm); > + read_lock(&misc->entries_lock); > + e = search_binfmt_handler(misc, bprm); > if (e) > refcount_inc(&e->users); > - read_unlock(&entries_lock); > + read_unlock(&misc->entries_lock); > return e; > } > > @@ -167,6 +165,35 @@ static void put_binfmt_handler(Node *e) > } > } > > +/** > + * load_binfmt_misc - load the binfmt_misc of the caller's user namespace > + * > + * To be called in load_misc_binary() to load the relevant struct binfmt_misc. > + * If a user namespace doesn't have its own binfmt_misc mount it can make use > + * of its ancestor's binfmt_misc handlers. This mimicks the behavior of > + * pre-namespaced binfmt_misc where all registered binfmt_misc handlers where > + * available to all user and user namespaces on the system. > + * > + * Return: the binfmt_misc instance of the caller's user namespace > + */ > +static struct binfmt_misc *load_binfmt_misc(void) > +{ > + const struct user_namespace *user_ns; > + struct binfmt_misc *misc; > + > + user_ns = current_user_ns(); > + while (user_ns) { > + /* Pairs with smp_store_release() in bm_fill_super(). */ > + misc = smp_load_acquire(&user_ns->binfmt_misc); > + if (misc) > + return misc; > + > + user_ns = user_ns->parent; > + } > + > + return &init_binfmt_misc; > +} > + > /* > * the loader itself > */ > @@ -174,13 +201,14 @@ static int load_misc_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) > { > Node *fmt; > struct file *interp_file = NULL; > - int retval; > + int retval = -ENOEXEC; > + struct binfmt_misc *misc; > > - retval = -ENOEXEC; > - if (!enabled) > + misc = load_binfmt_misc(); > + if (!misc->enabled) > return retval; > > - fmt = get_binfmt_handler(bprm); > + fmt = get_binfmt_handler(misc, bprm); > if (!fmt) > return retval; > > @@ -238,9 +266,9 @@ static int load_misc_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) > /* > * If we actually put the node here all concurrent calls to > * load_misc_binary() will have finished. We also know > - * that for the refcount to be zero ->evict_inode() must have removed > - * the node to be deleted from the list. All that is left for us is to > - * close and free. > + * that for the refcount to be zero someone must have concurently (typo) concurrently > + * removed the binary type handler from the list and it's our job to > + * free it. > */ > put_binfmt_handler(fmt); > > @@ -332,7 +360,7 @@ static Node *create_entry(const char __user *buffer, size_t count) > > err = -ENOMEM; > memsize = sizeof(Node) + count + 8; > - e = kmalloc(memsize, GFP_KERNEL); > + e = kmalloc(memsize, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); > if (!e) > goto out; > > @@ -444,7 +472,7 @@ static Node *create_entry(const char __user *buffer, size_t count) > > if (e->mask) { > int i; > - char *masked = kmalloc(e->size, GFP_KERNEL); > + char *masked = kmalloc(e->size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); > > print_hex_dump_bytes( > KBUILD_MODNAME ": register: mask[decoded]: ", > @@ -598,6 +626,22 @@ static struct inode *bm_get_inode(struct super_block *sb, int mode) > return inode; > } > > +/** > + * i_binfmt_misc - retrieve struct binfmt_misc from a binfmt_misc inode > + * @inode: inode of the relevant binfmt_misc instance > + * > + * This helper retrieves struct binfmt_misc from a binfmt_misc inode. This can > + * be done without any memory barriers because we are guaranteed that > + * user_ns->binfmt_misc is fully initialized. It was fully initialized when the > + * binfmt_misc mount was first created. > + * > + * Return: struct binfmt_misc of the relevant binfmt_misc instance > + */ > +static struct binfmt_misc *i_binfmt_misc(struct inode *inode) > +{ > + return inode->i_sb->s_user_ns->binfmt_misc; > +} > + > /** > * bm_evict_inode - cleanup data associated with @inode > * @inode: inode to which the data is attached > @@ -618,10 +662,13 @@ static void bm_evict_inode(struct inode *inode) > clear_inode(inode); > > if (e) { > - write_lock(&entries_lock); > + struct binfmt_misc *misc; > + > + misc = i_binfmt_misc(inode); > + write_lock(&misc->entries_lock); > if (!list_empty(&e->list)) > list_del_init(&e->list); > - write_unlock(&entries_lock); > + write_unlock(&misc->entries_lock); > put_binfmt_handler(e); > } > } > @@ -675,11 +722,11 @@ static void unlink_binfmt_dentry(struct dentry *dentry) > * to use writes to files in order to delete binary type handlers. But it has > * worked for so long that it's not a pressing issue. > */ > -static void remove_binfmt_handler(Node *e) > +static void remove_binfmt_handler(struct binfmt_misc *misc, Node *e) > { > - write_lock(&entries_lock); > + write_lock(&misc->entries_lock); > list_del_init(&e->list); > - write_unlock(&entries_lock); > + write_unlock(&misc->entries_lock); > unlink_binfmt_dentry(e->dentry); > } > > @@ -735,7 +782,7 @@ static ssize_t bm_entry_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer, > * actually remove the entry from the list. > */ > if (!list_empty(&e->list)) > - remove_binfmt_handler(e); > + remove_binfmt_handler(i_binfmt_misc(inode), e); > > inode_unlock(inode); > break; > @@ -761,6 +808,7 @@ static ssize_t bm_register_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer, > struct inode *inode; > struct super_block *sb = file_inode(file)->i_sb; > struct dentry *root = sb->s_root, *dentry; > + struct binfmt_misc *misc; > int err = 0; > struct file *f = NULL; > > @@ -770,7 +818,18 @@ static ssize_t bm_register_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer, > return PTR_ERR(e); > > if (e->flags & MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE) { > + const struct cred *old_cred; > + > + /* > + * Now that we support unprivileged binfmt_misc mounts make > + * sure we use the credentials that the register @file was > + * opened with to also open the interpreter. Before that this > + * didn't matter much as only a privileged process could open > + * the register file. > + */ > + old_cred = override_creds(file->f_cred); > f = open_exec(e->interpreter); > + revert_creds(old_cred); > if (IS_ERR(f)) { > pr_notice("register: failed to install interpreter file %s\n", > e->interpreter); > @@ -802,9 +861,10 @@ static ssize_t bm_register_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer, > inode->i_fop = &bm_entry_operations; > > d_instantiate(dentry, inode); > - write_lock(&entries_lock); > - list_add(&e->list, &entries); > - write_unlock(&entries_lock); > + misc = i_binfmt_misc(inode); > + write_lock(&misc->entries_lock); > + list_add(&e->list, &misc->entries); > + write_unlock(&misc->entries_lock); > > err = 0; > out2: > @@ -831,26 +891,31 @@ static const struct file_operations bm_register_operations = { > static ssize_t > bm_status_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) > { > - char *s = enabled ? "enabled\n" : "disabled\n"; > + struct binfmt_misc *misc; > + char *s; > > + misc = i_binfmt_misc(file_inode(file)); > + s = misc->enabled ? "enabled\n" : "disabled\n"; > return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, nbytes, ppos, s, strlen(s)); > } > > static ssize_t bm_status_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer, > size_t count, loff_t *ppos) > { > + struct binfmt_misc *misc; > int res = parse_command(buffer, count); > Node *e, *next; > struct inode *inode; > > + misc = i_binfmt_misc(file_inode(file)); > switch (res) { > case 1: > /* Disable all handlers. */ > - enabled = 0; > + misc->enabled = false; > break; > case 2: > /* Enable all handlers. */ > - enabled = 1; > + misc->enabled = true; > break; > case 3: > /* Delete all handlers. */ > @@ -866,8 +931,8 @@ static ssize_t bm_status_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer, > * read-only. So we only need to take the write lock when we > * actually remove the entry from the list. > */ > - list_for_each_entry_safe(e, next, &entries, list) > - remove_binfmt_handler(e); > + list_for_each_entry_safe(e, next, &misc->entries, list) > + remove_binfmt_handler(misc, e); > > inode_unlock(inode); > break; > @@ -886,32 +951,100 @@ static const struct file_operations bm_status_operations = { > > /* Superblock handling */ > > +static void bm_put_super(struct super_block *sb) > +{ > + struct user_namespace *user_ns = sb->s_fs_info; > + > + sb->s_fs_info = NULL; > + put_user_ns(user_ns); > +} > + > static const struct super_operations s_ops = { > .statfs = simple_statfs, > .evict_inode = bm_evict_inode, > + .put_super = bm_put_super, > }; > > static int bm_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc) > { > int err; > + struct user_namespace *user_ns = sb->s_user_ns; > + struct binfmt_misc *misc; > static const struct tree_descr bm_files[] = { > [2] = {"status", &bm_status_operations, S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO}, > [3] = {"register", &bm_register_operations, S_IWUSR}, > /* last one */ {""} > }; > > + if (WARN_ON(user_ns != current_user_ns())) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + /* > + * Lazily allocate a new binfmt_misc instance for this namespace, i.e. > + * do it here during the first mount of binfmt_misc. We don't need to > + * waste memory for every user namespace allocation. It's likely much > + * more common to not mount a separate binfmt_misc instance than it is > + * to mount one. > + * > + * While multiple superblocks can exist they are keyed by userns in > + * s_fs_info for binfmt_misc. Hence, the vfs guarantees that > + * bm_fill_super() is called exactly once whenever a binfmt_misc > + * superblock for a userns is created. This in turn lets us conclude > + * that when a binfmt_misc superblock is created for the first time for > + * a userns there's no one racing us. Therefore we don't need any > + * barriers when we dereference binfmt_misc. > + */ > + misc = user_ns->binfmt_misc; > + if (!misc) { > + /* > + * If it turns out that most user namespaces actually want to > + * register their own binary type handler and therefore all > + * create their own separate binfm_misc mounts we should > + * consider turning this into a kmem cache. > + */ > + misc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct binfmt_misc), GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!misc) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&misc->entries); > + rwlock_init(&misc->entries_lock); > + > + /* Pairs with smp_load_acquire() in load_binfmt_misc(). */ > + smp_store_release(&user_ns->binfmt_misc, misc); > + } > + > + /* > + * When the binfmt_misc superblock for this userns is shutdown > + * ->enabled might have been set to false and we don't reinitialize > + * ->enabled again in put_super() as someone might already be mounting > + * binfmt_misc again. It also would be pointless since by the time > + * ->put_super() is called we know that the binary type list for this > + * bintfmt_misc mount is empty making load_misc_binary() return > + * -ENOEXEC independent of whether ->enabled is true. Instead, if > + * someone mounts binfmt_misc for the first time or again we simply > + * reset ->enabled to true. > + */ > + misc->enabled = true; > + > err = simple_fill_super(sb, BINFMTFS_MAGIC, bm_files); > if (!err) > sb->s_op = &s_ops; > return err; > } > > +static void bm_free(struct fs_context *fc) > +{ > + if (fc->s_fs_info) > + put_user_ns(fc->s_fs_info); > +} > + > static int bm_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc) > { > - return get_tree_single(fc, bm_fill_super); > + return get_tree_keyed(fc, bm_fill_super, get_user_ns(fc->user_ns)); > } > > static const struct fs_context_operations bm_context_ops = { > + .free = bm_free, > .get_tree = bm_get_tree, > }; > > @@ -930,6 +1063,7 @@ static struct file_system_type bm_fs_type = { > .owner = THIS_MODULE, > .name = "binfmt_misc", > .init_fs_context = bm_init_fs_context, > + .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT, > .kill_sb = kill_litter_super, > }; > MODULE_ALIAS_FS("binfmt_misc"); > diff --git a/include/linux/binfmts.h b/include/linux/binfmts.h > index 049cf9421d83..42efcefc56c7 100644 > --- a/include/linux/binfmts.h > +++ b/include/linux/binfmts.h > @@ -102,6 +102,16 @@ struct linux_binfmt { > unsigned long min_coredump; /* minimal dump size */ > } __randomize_layout; > > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC) > +struct binfmt_misc { > + struct list_head entries; > + rwlock_t entries_lock; > + bool enabled; > +} __randomize_layout; > + > +extern struct binfmt_misc init_binfmt_misc; > +#endif > + > extern void __register_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt *fmt, int insert); > > /* Registration of default binfmt handlers */ > diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h > index 33a4240e6a6f..a49f8f121fc4 100644 > --- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h > +++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h > @@ -63,6 +63,10 @@ enum ucount_type { > > #define MAX_PER_NAMESPACE_UCOUNTS UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC > > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC) > +struct binfmt_misc; > +#endif > + > struct user_namespace { > struct uid_gid_map uid_map; > struct uid_gid_map gid_map; > @@ -99,6 +103,10 @@ struct user_namespace { > #endif > struct ucounts *ucounts; > long ucount_max[UCOUNT_COUNTS]; > + > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC) > + struct binfmt_misc *binfmt_misc; > +#endif > } __randomize_layout; > > struct ucounts { > diff --git a/kernel/user.c b/kernel/user.c > index e2cf8c22b539..d2e7575dbfa2 100644 > --- a/kernel/user.c > +++ b/kernel/user.c > @@ -18,8 +18,18 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > #include > > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC) > +struct binfmt_misc init_binfmt_misc = { > + .entries = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_binfmt_misc.entries), > + .enabled = true, > + .entries_lock = __RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED(init_binfmt_misc.entries_lock), > +}; > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(init_binfmt_misc); > +#endif > + > /* > * userns count is 1 for root user, 1 for init_uts_ns, > * and 1 for... ? > @@ -67,6 +77,9 @@ struct user_namespace init_user_ns = { > .keyring_name_list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_user_ns.keyring_name_list), > .keyring_sem = __RWSEM_INITIALIZER(init_user_ns.keyring_sem), > #endif > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC) > + .binfmt_misc = &init_binfmt_misc, > +#endif > }; > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(init_user_ns); > > diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c > index 6b2e3ca7ee99..2bdf2ff69148 100644 > --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c > +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c > @@ -196,6 +196,9 @@ static void free_user_ns(struct work_struct *work) > kfree(ns->projid_map.forward); > kfree(ns->projid_map.reverse); > } > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC) > + kfree(ns->binfmt_misc); > +#endif > retire_userns_sysctls(ns); > key_free_user_ns(ns); > ns_free_inum(&ns->ns); > -- > 2.30.2