Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0C0FEC433FE for ; Tue, 28 Dec 2021 14:56:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234793AbhL1O4a (ORCPT ); Tue, 28 Dec 2021 09:56:30 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:34228 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229480AbhL1O43 (ORCPT ); Tue, 28 Dec 2021 09:56:29 -0500 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4601:e00::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F336CC061574; Tue, 28 Dec 2021 06:56:28 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BE8CBB8121D; Tue, 28 Dec 2021 14:56:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id E57EFC36AE7; Tue, 28 Dec 2021 14:56:25 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1640703386; bh=68SW6igvPac0oGZ2kyZiUl7boukGMKxOfU08sgJpOQI=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=AbHPsAh6D52WeCzvedsBFfmcDF5zt7Odg2SjiB/N7nfqsnchElooP6egi2VdNnq91 cRgCa3zz+B0PhorGfyqoj9lzaR1RFLqTxwyG0bDO/m6o1ZEA01lKeNbTEZZ/wGAoWK KrlMmWeXtaU2F8CPU/9+hscyrFJOG8fsdu2+/jka5ilKO06s8lkkAfj2Vfk/5fU9Rg 8puTNw3H/PjQ8JHE2TmqX+jvFKypfObpGDIC8mArNnT1W8sSWBlPOcKY62+SOh/uYT K5jr54Snu7U+4Hd5bUOLkSpnj/1WyAsjLRPmELETHtduLnGENpGRhUE7Arwo3lGo5h eQirB661zq8nw== Date: Tue, 28 Dec 2021 16:56:29 +0200 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Reinette Chatre Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 10/25] x86/sgx: Support enclave page permission changes Message-ID: References: <44fe170cfd855760857660b9f56cae8c4747cc15.1638381245.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com> <407c12ed28b105a055c6ab6152c0458a31052963.camel@kernel.org> <8fc271bf-548f-969d-96db-ca78b21578f4@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <8fc271bf-548f-969d-96db-ca78b21578f4@intel.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Mon, Dec 13, 2021 at 02:12:44PM -0800, Reinette Chatre wrote: > Hi Jarkko, > > On 12/10/2021 11:57 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > On Mon, 2021-12-06 at 13:42 -0800, Reinette Chatre wrote: > > > Hi Jarkko, > > > > > > On 12/4/2021 3:08 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > > On Wed, Dec 01, 2021 at 11:23:08AM -0800, Reinette Chatre wrote: > > > > > In the initial (SGX1) version of SGX, pages in an enclave need to be > > > > > created with permissions that support all usages of the pages, from the > > > > > time the enclave is initialized until it is unloaded. For example, > > > > > pages used by a JIT compiler or when code needs to otherwise be > > > > > relocated need to always have RWX permissions. > > > > > > > > > > SGX2 includes two functions that can be used to modify the enclave page > > > > > permissions of regular enclave pages within an initialized enclave. > > > > > ENCLS[EMODPR] is run from the OS and used to restrict enclave page > > > > > permissions while ENCLU[EMODPE] is run from within the enclave to > > > > > extend enclave page permissions. > > > > > > > > > > Enclave page permission changes need to be approached with care and > > > > > for this reason this initial support is to allow enclave page > > > > > permission changes _only_ if the new permissions are the same or > > > > > more restrictive that the permissions originally vetted at the time the > > > > > pages were added to the enclave. Support for extending enclave page > > > > > permissions beyond what was originally vetted is deferred. > > > > > > > > This paragraph is out-of-scope for a commit message. You could have > > > > this in the cover letter but not here. I would just remove it. > > > > > > I think this is essential information that is mentioned in the cover > > > letter _and_ in this changelog. I will follow Dave's guidance and avoid > > > "deferred" by just removing that last sentence. > > > > > > > > > > > > Whether enclave page permissions are restricted or extended it > > > > > is necessary to ensure that the page table entries and enclave page > > > > > permissions are in sync. Introduce a new ioctl, SGX_IOC_PAGE_MODP, to > > > > > > > > SGX_IOC_PAGE_MODP does not match the naming convetion of these: > > > > > > > > * SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE > > > > * SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES > > > > * SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT > > > > > > ah - my understanding was that the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE prefix related to > > > operations related to the entire enclave and thus I introduced the > > > prefix SGX_IOC_PAGE to relate to operations on pages within an enclave. > > > > SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES is also operation working on pages within an > > enclave. > > > > Also, to be aligned with SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES, the new operations > > should also take secinfo as input. > > ok, will do. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > A better name would be SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MOD_PROTECTIONS. It doesn't > > > > do harm to be a more verbose. > > > > > > Will do. I see later you propose SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE - would you > > > like them to be consistent wrt MOD/MODIFY? > > > > I would considering introducing just one new ioctl: > > > > SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_PAGES > > > > and choose either operations based on e.g. a flag > > (see flags field SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES). > > > > There seems to be different opinion about the single ioctl() as per:https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/0fb14185-5cc3-a963-253d-2e119b4a52bb@intel.com/ > > I thus plan to proceed with the two ioctls, both taking secinfo as input. > Would that be ok with you? Yeah, let's continue with two ioctls for now, I agree. /Jarkko