From:   Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To:     linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     zohar@linux.ibm.com, serge@hallyn.com,
        christian.brauner@ubuntu.com, containers@lists.linux.dev,
        dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
        krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com,
        mpeters@redhat.com, lhinds@redhat.com, lsturman@redhat.com,
        puiterwi@redhat.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, jamjoom@us.ibm.com,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com, rgb@redhat.com,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org,
        Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>,
        James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Subject: [PATCH v8 17/19] ima: Setup securityfs for IMA namespace
Date:   Tue,  4 Jan 2022 12:04:14 -0500
Message-Id: <20220104170416.1923685-18-stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
In-Reply-To: <20220104170416.1923685-1-stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
References: <20220104170416.1923685-1-stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
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From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>

Setup securityfs with symlinks, directories, and files for IMA
namespacing support. The same directory structure that IMA uses on the
host is also created for the namespacing case.

The securityfs file and directory ownerships cannot be set when the
IMA namespace is initialized. Therefore, delay the setup of the file
system to a later point when securityfs is in securityfs_fill_super.

This filesystem can now be mounted as follows:

mount -t securityfs /sys/kernel/security/ /sys/kernel/security/

The following directories, symlinks, and files are available
when IMA namespacing is enabled, otherwise it will be empty:

$ ls -l sys/kernel/security/
total 0
lr--r--r--. 1 root root 0 Dec  2 00:18 ima -> integrity/ima
drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 0 Dec  2 00:18 integrity

$ ls -l sys/kernel/security/ima/
total 0
-r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec  2 00:18 ascii_runtime_measurements
-r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec  2 00:18 binary_runtime_measurements
-rw-------. 1 root root 0 Dec  2 00:18 policy
-r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec  2 00:18 runtime_measurements_count
-r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec  2 00:18 violations

Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
---
 include/linux/ima.h             | 13 +++++++++++
 security/inode.c                |  6 ++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h    |  1 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 4 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index e236eef5b486..5354e83d1694 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ extern int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
 				     const char *event_name,
 				     const void *buf, size_t buf_len,
 				     bool hash, u8 *digest, size_t digest_len);
+extern int ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct dentry *root);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
 extern void ima_appraise_parse_cmdline(void);
@@ -234,12 +235,24 @@ void free_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *ns);
 extern void ima_free_ns_status_list(struct list_head *head,
 				    rwlock_t *ns_list_lock);
 
+static inline int ima_securityfs_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+				      struct dentry *root)
+{
+	return ima_fs_ns_init(user_ns, root);
+}
+
 #else
 
 static inline void free_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns)
 {
 }
 
+static inline int ima_securityfs_init(struct user_namespace *ns,
+				      struct dentry *root)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */
diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
index e525ba960063..cdb08520151c 100644
--- a/security/inode.c
+++ b/security/inode.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs_context.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/namei.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
@@ -81,7 +82,10 @@ static int securityfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
 	sb->s_op = &securityfs_super_operations;
 	sb->s_root->d_inode->i_op = &securityfs_dir_inode_operations;
 
-	return 0;
+	if (ns != &init_user_ns)
+		error = ima_securityfs_init(ns, sb->s_root);
+
+	return error;
 }
 
 static int securityfs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 1d7f140138be..344c8c4bd030 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ struct ima_namespace {
 	int valid_policy;
 
 	struct dentry *policy_dentry;
+	bool policy_dentry_removed;
 } __randomize_layout;
 extern struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns;
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 71302bb5427f..468508f6a7e8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
 #include <linux/parser.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
 
 #include "ima.h"
 
@@ -431,6 +432,7 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 #if !defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) && !defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY)
 	securityfs_remove(ns->policy_dentry);
 	ns->policy_dentry = NULL;
+	ns->policy_dentry_removed = true;
 #elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY)
 	clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ns->ima_fs_flags);
 #elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY)
@@ -447,20 +449,30 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = {
 	.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
-static int __init ima_fs_ns_init(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+int ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct dentry *root)
 {
-	struct dentry *ima_dir;
+	struct ima_namespace *ns = ima_ns_from_user_ns(user_ns);
+	struct dentry *int_dir;
+	struct dentry *ima_dir = NULL;
 	struct dentry *ima_symlink = NULL;
 	struct dentry *binary_runtime_measurements = NULL;
 	struct dentry *ascii_runtime_measurements = NULL;
 	struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count = NULL;
 	struct dentry *violations = NULL;
 
-	ima_dir = securityfs_create_dir("ima", integrity_dir);
+	/* FIXME: update when evm and integrity are namespaced */
+	if (user_ns != &init_user_ns) {
+		int_dir = securityfs_create_dir("integrity", root);
+		if (IS_ERR(int_dir))
+			return PTR_ERR(int_dir);
+	} else
+		int_dir = integrity_dir;
+
+	ima_dir = securityfs_create_dir("ima", int_dir);
 	if (IS_ERR(ima_dir))
-		return -1;
+		goto out;
 
-	ima_symlink = securityfs_create_symlink("ima", NULL, "integrity/ima",
+	ima_symlink = securityfs_create_symlink("ima", root, "integrity/ima",
 						NULL);
 	if (IS_ERR(ima_symlink))
 		goto out;
@@ -492,11 +504,15 @@ static int __init ima_fs_ns_init(struct ima_namespace *ns)
 	if (IS_ERR(violations))
 		goto out;
 
-	ns->policy_dentry = securityfs_create_file("policy", POLICY_FILE_FLAGS,
-					    ima_dir, NULL,
-					    &ima_measure_policy_ops);
-	if (IS_ERR(ns->policy_dentry))
-		goto out;
+
+	if (!ns->policy_dentry_removed) {
+		ns->policy_dentry =
+		    securityfs_create_file("policy", POLICY_FILE_FLAGS,
+					   ima_dir, NULL,
+					   &ima_measure_policy_ops);
+		if (IS_ERR(ns->policy_dentry))
+			goto out;
+	}
 
 	return 0;
 out:
@@ -507,10 +523,13 @@ static int __init ima_fs_ns_init(struct ima_namespace *ns)
 	securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements);
 	securityfs_remove(ima_symlink);
 	securityfs_remove(ima_dir);
+	if (user_ns != &init_user_ns)
+		securityfs_remove(int_dir);
+
 	return -1;
 }
 
 int __init ima_fs_init(void)
 {
-	return ima_fs_ns_init(&init_ima_ns);
+	return ima_fs_ns_init(&init_user_ns, NULL);
 }
-- 
2.31.1