Date:   Thu, 6 Jan 2022 18:24:45 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To:     David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Cc:     Wedson Almeida Filho <wedsonaf@google.com>,
        Rob Herring <robh+dt@kernel.org>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
        Frank Rowand <frowand.list@gmail.com>,
        Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
        Andrew Scull <ascull@google.com>, devicetree@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 2/2] misc: open-dice: Add driver to expose DICE data
 to userspace
Message-ID: <Ydcl3XjGhVh33Txi@kroah.com>
References: <20211221174502.63891-1-dbrazdil@google.com>
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 <YdbJgf+IWnlCHQA7@google.com>
 <YdbSi+ANXw1JRkUj@kroah.com>
 <Ydch333UxlCKO8Wa@google.com>
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On Thu, Jan 06, 2022 at 05:07:43PM +0000, David Brazdil wrote:
> Hi Greg,
> 
> On Thu, Jan 06, 2022 at 12:29:15PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > On Thu, Jan 06, 2022 at 10:50:41AM +0000, David Brazdil wrote:
> > > Hi Wedson,
> > > 
> > > On Wed, Jan 05, 2022 at 04:52:51PM +0000, Wedson Almeida Filho wrote:
> > > > On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 05:45:02PM +0000, David Brazdil wrote:
> > > > > Open Profile for DICE is an open protocol for measured boot compatible
> > > > > with the Trusted Computing Group's Device Identifier Composition
> > > > > Engine (DICE) specification. The generated Compound Device Identifier
> > > > > (CDI) certificates represent the hardware/software combination measured
> > > > > by DICE, and can be used for remote attestation and sealing.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Add a driver that exposes reserved memory regions populated by firmware
> > > > > with DICE CDIs and exposes them to userspace via a character device.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Userspace obtains the memory region's size from read() and calls mmap()
> > > > > to create a mapping of the memory region in its address space. The
> > > > > mapping is not allowed to be write+shared, giving userspace a guarantee
> > > > > that the data were not overwritten by another process.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Userspace can also call write(), which triggers a wipe of the DICE data
> > > > > by the driver. Because both the kernel and userspace mappings use
> > > > > write-combine semantics, all clients observe the memory as zeroed after
> > > > > the syscall has returned.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Cc: Andrew Scull <ascull@google.com>
> > > > > Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
> > > > > Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
> > > > > ---
> > > > >  drivers/misc/Kconfig     |  12 +++
> > > > >  drivers/misc/Makefile    |   1 +
> > > > >  drivers/misc/open-dice.c | 188 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > > > >  drivers/of/platform.c    |   1 +
> > > > >  4 files changed, 202 insertions(+)
> > > > >  create mode 100644 drivers/misc/open-dice.c
> > > > > 
> > > > > diff --git a/drivers/misc/Kconfig b/drivers/misc/Kconfig
> > > > > index 0f5a49fc7c9e..a2b26426efba 100644
> > > > > --- a/drivers/misc/Kconfig
> > > > > +++ b/drivers/misc/Kconfig
> > > > > @@ -470,6 +470,18 @@ config HISI_HIKEY_USB
> > > > >  	  switching between the dual-role USB-C port and the USB-A host ports
> > > > >  	  using only one USB controller.
> > > > >  
> > > > > +config OPEN_DICE
> > > > > +	tristate "Open Profile for DICE driver"
> > > > > +	depends on OF_RESERVED_MEM
> > > > > +	help
> > > > > +	  This driver exposes a DICE reserved memory region to userspace via
> > > > > +	  a character device. The memory region contains Compound Device
> > > > > +	  Identifiers (CDIs) generated by firmware as an output of DICE
> > > > > +	  measured boot flow. Userspace can use CDIs for remote attestation
> > > > > +	  and sealing.
> > > > > +
> > > > > +	  If unsure, say N.
> > > > > +
> > > > >  source "drivers/misc/c2port/Kconfig"
> > > > >  source "drivers/misc/eeprom/Kconfig"
> > > > >  source "drivers/misc/cb710/Kconfig"
> > > > > diff --git a/drivers/misc/Makefile b/drivers/misc/Makefile
> > > > > index a086197af544..70e800e9127f 100644
> > > > > --- a/drivers/misc/Makefile
> > > > > +++ b/drivers/misc/Makefile
> > > > > @@ -59,3 +59,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UACCE)		+= uacce/
> > > > >  obj-$(CONFIG_XILINX_SDFEC)	+= xilinx_sdfec.o
> > > > >  obj-$(CONFIG_HISI_HIKEY_USB)	+= hisi_hikey_usb.o
> > > > >  obj-$(CONFIG_HI6421V600_IRQ)	+= hi6421v600-irq.o
> > > > > +obj-$(CONFIG_OPEN_DICE)		+= open-dice.o
> > > > > diff --git a/drivers/misc/open-dice.c b/drivers/misc/open-dice.c
> > > > > new file mode 100644
> > > > > index 000000000000..f1819f951173
> > > > > --- /dev/null
> > > > > +++ b/drivers/misc/open-dice.c
> > > > > @@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
> > > > > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> > > > > +/*
> > > > > + * Copyright (C) 2021 - Google LLC
> > > > > + * Author: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
> > > > > + *
> > > > > + * Driver for Open Profile for DICE.
> > > > > + *
> > > > > + * This driver takes ownership of a reserved memory region containing data
> > > > > + * generated by the Open Profile for DICE measured boot protocol. The memory
> > > > > + * contents are not interpreted by the kernel but can be mapped into a userspace
> > > > > + * process via a misc device. Userspace can also request a wipe of the memory.
> > > > > + *
> > > > > + * Userspace can access the data with (w/o error handling):
> > > > > + *
> > > > > + *     fd = open("/dev/open-dice0", O_RDWR);
> > > > > + *     read(fd, &size, sizeof(unsigned long));
> > > > > + *     data = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
> > > > > + *     write(fd, NULL, 0); // wipe
> > > > > + *     close(fd);
> > > > > + */
> > > > > +
> > > > > +#include <linux/io.h>
> > > > > +#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
> > > > > +#include <linux/mm.h>
> > > > > +#include <linux/module.h>
> > > > > +#include <linux/of_reserved_mem.h>
> > > > > +#include <linux/platform_device.h>
> > > > > +
> > > > > +#define DRIVER_NAME "open-dice"
> > > > > +
> > > > > +struct open_dice_drvdata {
> > > > > +	spinlock_t lock;
> > > > > +	char name[16];
> > > > > +	struct reserved_mem *rmem;
> > > > > +	struct miscdevice misc;
> > > > > +};
> > > > > +
> > > > > +static inline struct open_dice_drvdata *to_open_dice_drvdata(struct file *filp)
> > > > > +{
> > > > > +	return container_of(filp->private_data, struct open_dice_drvdata, misc);
> > > > > +}
> > > > > +
> > > > > +static int open_dice_wipe(struct open_dice_drvdata *drvdata)
> > > > > +{
> > > > > +	void *kaddr;
> > > > > +
> > > > > +	spin_lock(&drvdata->lock);
> > > > > +	kaddr = devm_memremap(drvdata->misc.this_device, drvdata->rmem->base,
> > > > > +			      drvdata->rmem->size, MEMREMAP_WC);
> > > > > +	if (IS_ERR(kaddr)) {
> > > > > +		spin_unlock(&drvdata->lock);
> > > > > +		return PTR_ERR(kaddr);
> > > > > +	}
> > > > > +
> > > > > +	memset(kaddr, 0, drvdata->rmem->size);
> > > > > +	devm_memunmap(drvdata->misc.this_device, kaddr);
> > > > > +	spin_unlock(&drvdata->lock);
> > > > > +	return 0;
> > > > > +}
> > > > > +
> > > > > +/*
> > > > > + * Copies the size of the reserved memory region to the user-provided buffer.
> > > > > + */
> > > > > +static ssize_t open_dice_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ptr, size_t len,
> > > > > +			      loff_t *off)
> > > > > +{
> > > > > +	unsigned long val = to_open_dice_drvdata(filp)->rmem->size;
> > > > 
> > > > There's a UAF issue here (and in all file operations that call
> > > > to_open_dice_drvdata) when the platform device in unbounded from the driver
> > > > while userspace has an instance of the misc device open: after open_dice_remove
> > > > is called, all managed resources are freed (which includes this
> > > > open_dice_drvdata allocation).
> > > > 
> > > > No new miscdev files can be created, but the existing ones continue to exist
> > > > with a now dangling pointer stored in private_data. So read/write/mmap syscalls
> > > > from userspace will lead to dereferencing this dangling pointer.
> > > 
> > > Please correct me if I'm wrong, but I don't think this can happen
> > > without tainting the kernel.
> > > 
> > > To call open_dice_remove, we have to remove the module. And any process
> > > holding an FD of the misc device will increase the module's refcounter,
> > > which is zero-checked in SYS_delete_module. The only way to get past
> > > that check is by compiling the kernel with CONFIG_MODULE_FORCE_UNLOAD,
> > > which changes the implementation of try_force_unload (kernel/module.c)
> > > and adds taint. Otherwise SYS_delete_module returns an error.
> > > 
> > > Unless there is another way how to trigger this situation, I think the
> > > existing protection is sufficient. The user cannot force the removal of
> > > the module without agreeing to the consequences.
> > 
> > You can remove the driver from the device by writing to the "unbind"
> > file in sysfs for this driver.
> > 
> > Otherwise, yes, you are correct, you can not remove the module from the
> > system if the file is open, but that does not prevent the driver from
> > being unbound from the device.
> > 
> > Yes, it is rare, and only able to be done by root, and even then is
> > something that many drivers fail at.  But for new ones, when we notice
> > it, it should be fixed up before merging just to prevent any future
> > problems.
> 
> Ah, I see. I'd opt for just setting 'suppress_bind_attrs=true' to
> prevent that, unless you think unbinding needs to be supported. I don't
> see a use for that on our side and would prefer to keep the code simple.

No objection from me, that solves it easily :)

> > > > > +	/* Create write-combine mapping so all clients observe a wipe. */
> > > > > +	vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_writecombine(vma->vm_page_prot);
> > > > > +	vma->vm_flags |= VM_DONTCOPY | VM_DONTDUMP;
> > > > > +	return vm_iomap_memory(vma, drvdata->rmem->base, drvdata->rmem->size);
> > > > > +}
> > > > 
> > > > Is there a reason for mapping this memory instead of, say, copying it to
> > > > userspace via read?
> > > 
> > > The data should be treated as secret, so the idea is that avoiding
> > > reading it in the kernel means we don't need to worry about it leakage
> > > via the stack, etc. The reason for this is that the DICE derivation
> > > chain may continue in userspace, so we want to minimize the chance of
> > > a child process getting the parent secret from the kernel.
> > 
> > The kernel stack is already secret, this should not be an issue.  And
> > even then, you can always erase it before the call returns to ensure
> > that it does not stick around, like many crypto functions do.
> 
> I can rewrite it and memzero_explicit the memory if you or Wedson feel
> strongly about this, but I actually really like mmap() because it avoids
> the need for dealing with that.

I think if we remove the ability for userspace to unbind the device from
the driver with the file handle open like above, all should be ok to
keep this as a mmap thing.

Wedson, any objection?

David, I pointed Wedson as this driver as an example of maybe something
that might be possible to write in Rust instead, which is why he looked
at it.  I don't recommend doing that just now, but we are feeling out
what types of drivers would be good examples in that language.

thanks,

greg k-h