Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1D330C433FE for ; Fri, 7 Jan 2022 11:56:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1347327AbiAGL4R (ORCPT ); Fri, 7 Jan 2022 06:56:17 -0500 Received: from smtp-out1.suse.de ([195.135.220.28]:42352 "EHLO smtp-out1.suse.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1347369AbiAGLzw (ORCPT ); Fri, 7 Jan 2022 06:55:52 -0500 Received: from relay2.suse.de (relay2.suse.de [149.44.160.134]) by smtp-out1.suse.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id 82A79212BD; Fri, 7 Jan 2022 11:55:50 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=suse.de; s=susede2_rsa; t=1641556550; h=from:from:reply-to:date:date:message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc: mime-version:mime-version: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=YagoF4rvyErQa17K5Sd0ImBwrc4k6YzwTfC9+keJqp8=; b=xzHLeJi2kYp0GmPUU+ubT+fTYppTSj3FbgyUhzxL+e5CfMIE5KtlD9T/227XwFvRBPH07n tYbYhqXUtH3SQ4nks0Veu00G9ITkwjAv3fAbFUh04MLAGLCxAgOom5YFJ3n3dOim8WS/ac NTfL60o+JYpbfl9GZongWSAp3maMCm0= DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=suse.de; s=susede2_ed25519; t=1641556550; h=from:from:reply-to:date:date:message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc: mime-version:mime-version: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=YagoF4rvyErQa17K5Sd0ImBwrc4k6YzwTfC9+keJqp8=; b=wmtDgBPCFEpWlZUOofVt1JL/fyNQCNhskMyPt/qx04OZXhkeCbcR7pxzPHQQ65E+ILjvCu KFaHJ/lKsfWx6tBw== Received: from kitsune.suse.cz (kitsune.suse.cz [10.100.12.127]) by relay2.suse.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id 36229A3B95; Fri, 7 Jan 2022 11:55:50 +0000 (UTC) From: Michal Suchanek To: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Michal Suchanek , kexec@lists.infradead.org, Philipp Rudo , Mimi Zohar , Nayna , Rob Herring , linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, Vasily Gorbik , Lakshmi Ramasubramanian , Heiko Carstens , Jessica Yu , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Howells , Christian Borntraeger , Luis Chamberlain , Paul Mackerras , Hari Bathini , Alexander Gordeev , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, Frank van der Linden , Thiago Jung Bauermann , Daniel Axtens , buendgen@de.ibm.com, Michael Ellerman , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Christian Borntraeger , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Dmitry Kasatkin , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Sven Schnelle , Baoquan He , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 5/6] module: Use key_being_used_for for log messages in verify_appended_signature Date: Fri, 7 Jan 2022 12:53:49 +0100 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.31.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Add value for kexec appended signature and pass in key_being_used_for enum rather than a string to verify_appended_signature to produce log messages about the signature. Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek --- arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 2 +- arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 2 +- crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 1 + include/linux/verification.h | 3 ++- kernel/module.c | 3 ++- kernel/module_signing.c | 11 ++++++----- 6 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c index e8dff6b23ac5..3aa5269f6e0f 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long length) size_t kernel_len = length; return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING, - "kexec_file"); + VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE); } #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */ diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c index 3e3bc7bcae86..18ba6df31d68 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long length) return 0; return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING, - "kexec_file"); + VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE); } #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */ diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c index ad8af3d70ac0..6fd20eec3882 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR] = { [VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE] = "kexec PE sig", [VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE] = "key sig", [VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE] = "key self sig", + [VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE] = "kexec appended sig", [VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE] = "unspec sig", }; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_being_used_for); diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h index c1cf0582012a..23748feb9e03 100644 --- a/include/linux/verification.h +++ b/include/linux/verification.h @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ enum key_being_used_for { VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE, VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE, VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE, + VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE, VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR }; @@ -61,7 +62,7 @@ extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen, #endif int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, size_t *len, struct key *trusted_keys, - const char *what); + enum key_being_used_for purpose); #endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */ #endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */ diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index d91ca0f93a40..0a359dc6b690 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -2891,7 +2891,8 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags) */ if (flags == 0) { err = verify_appended_signature(mod, &info->len, - VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, "module"); + VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, + VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE); if (!err) { info->sig_ok = true; return 0; diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c index 4c28cb55275f..cef72a6f6b5d 100644 --- a/kernel/module_signing.c +++ b/kernel/module_signing.c @@ -19,17 +19,18 @@ * @data: The data to be verified * @len: Size of @data. * @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification - * @what: Informational string for log messages + * @purpose: The use to which the key is being put */ int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, size_t *len, - struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what) + struct key *trusted_keys, + enum key_being_used_for purpose) { const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1; struct module_signature ms; size_t sig_len, modlen = *len; int ret; - pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, modlen); + pr_devel("==>%s %s(,%zu)\n", __func__, key_being_used_for[purpose], modlen); if (markerlen > modlen) return -ENODATA; @@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, size_t *len, memcpy(&ms, data + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms)); - ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, what); + ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, key_being_used_for[purpose]); if (ret) return ret; @@ -54,6 +55,6 @@ int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, size_t *len, return verify_pkcs7_signature(data, modlen, data + modlen, sig_len, trusted_keys, - VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE, + purpose, NULL, NULL); } -- 2.31.1