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    Fri, 14 Jan 2022 13:35:13 +0100 (CET)
From:   Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
To:     Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc:     "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
        Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>, Torsten Duwe <duwe@suse.de>,
        Zaibo Xu <xuzaibo@huawei.com>,
        Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
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        Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>, Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
Subject: Re: [v2 PATCH] crypto: api - Disallow sha1 in FIPS-mode while allowing hmac(sha1)
Date:   Fri, 14 Jan 2022 13:35:12 +0100
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Am Freitag, 14. Januar 2022, 11:55:26 CET schrieb Herbert Xu:

Hi Herbert,

> > On an unrelated note, this will break trusted_key_tpm_ops->init() in
> > FIPS mode, because trusted_shash_alloc() would fail to get a hold of
> > sha1. AFAICT, this could potentially make the init_trusted() module_init
> > to fail, and, as encrypted-keys.ko imports key_type_trusted, prevent the
> > loading of that one as well. Not sure that's desired...
> 
> Well if sha1 is supposed to be forbidden in FIPS mode why should

SHA-1 is approved in all use cases except signatures.

Ciao
Stephan