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Date:   Mon, 24 Jan 2022 18:16:19 +0100
From:   Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To:     "Liang, Kan" <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc:     Kyle Huey <me@kylehuey.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
        x86@kernel.org, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
        Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
        Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
        Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
        Robert O'Callahan <rocallahan@gmail.com>,
        Keno Fischer <keno@juliacomputing.com>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/perf: Default freeze_on_smi on for Comet Lake and
 later.
Message-ID: <Ye7e49ln8mfCELqy@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
References: <20220122072644.92292-1-khuey@kylehuey.com>
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 <3bfa617e-007c-ebc3-8c71-0bcb83b24794@linux.intel.com>
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On Mon, Jan 24, 2022 at 12:03:10PM -0500, Liang, Kan wrote:
> 
> 
> On 1/24/2022 11:30 AM, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > On Mon, Jan 24, 2022 at 11:00:56AM -0500, Liang, Kan wrote:
> > > 
> > > 
> > > On 1/24/2022 7:21 AM, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > > > On Fri, Jan 21, 2022 at 11:26:44PM -0800, Kyle Huey wrote:
> > > > > Beginning in Comet Lake, Intel extended the concept of privilege rings to
> > > > > SMM.[0] A side effect of this is that events caused by execution of code
> > > > > in SMM are now visible to performance counters with IA32_PERFEVTSELx.USR
> > > > > set.
> > > > > 
> > > > > rr[1] depends on exact counts of performance events for the user space
> > > > > tracee, so this change in behavior is fatal for us. It is, however, easily
> > > > > corrected by setting IA32_DEBUGCTL.FREEZE_WHILE_SMM to 1 (visible in sysfs
> > > > > as /sys/devices/cpu/freeze_on_smi). While we can and will tell our users to
> > > > > set freeze_on_smi manually when appropriate, because observing events in
> > > > > SMM is rarely useful to anyone, we propose to change the default value of
> > > > > this switch.
> > > 
> > > + Andi
> > > 
> > >  From we heard many times from sophisticated customers, they really hate
> > > blind spots. They want to see everything. That's why we set freeze_on_smi to
> > > 0 as default. I think the patch breaks the principle.
> > 
> > Well, USR really, as in *REALLY* should not be counting SMM. That's just
> > plain broken.
> > 
> 
> For the USR only case, the bit could be set.
> 
> > There's maybe an argument to include it in OS, but USR is ring-3.
> 
> But we don't have an option for the USR only case. The changing will impact
> the SYS case as well. Personally, maybe it's better to let the user apace
> app control the bit as needed rather than changing the default kernel value
> for all cases.

The bit is system wide, you can't sanely control it per counter. The
change that made USR include SMM is insane and broken.