Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1422822AbXBHB6k (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Feb 2007 20:58:40 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1422864AbXBHB6j (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Feb 2007 20:58:39 -0500 Received: from ebiederm.dsl.xmission.com ([166.70.28.69]:34572 "EHLO ebiederm.dsl.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1422822AbXBHB6j (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Feb 2007 20:58:39 -0500 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: Stephen Smalley Cc: Andrew Morton , Ingo Molnar , tglx@linutronix.de, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, jmorris@namei.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] sysctl: Restore the selinux path based label lookup for sysctls. References: <200701280106.l0S16CG3019873@shell0.pdx.osdl.net> <20070127172410.2b041952.akpm@osdl.org> <1169972718.17469.164.camel@localhost.localdomain> <20070128003549.2ca38dc8.akpm@osdl.org> <20070128093358.GA2071@elte.hu> <20070128095712.GA6485@elte.hu> <20070128100627.GA8416@elte.hu> <20070128104548.a835d859.akpm@osdl.org> <1170075866.8720.15.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> <1170872654.11912.87.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> <1170882738.11912.144.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> Date: Wed, 07 Feb 2007 18:57:34 -0700 In-Reply-To: <1170882738.11912.144.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> (Stephen Smalley's message of "Wed, 07 Feb 2007 16:12:18 -0500") Message-ID: User-Agent: Gnus/5.110006 (No Gnus v0.6) Emacs/21.4 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1597 Lines: 37 Stephen Smalley writes: > > One related but separate issue is that the /proc/sys inode labeling is > also affected by the sysctl patch series. Those inodes used to be > labeled by selinux_proc_get_sid (from selinux_d_instantiate), but that > no longer works, so they now fall back to the superblock SID (generic > proc label). That changes the inode permission checks on an attempt to > access a /proc/sys node and will likely cause denials under current > policy for confined domains since one wouldn't generally be writing to > the generic proc label. If you always called sysctl_perm from the proc > sysctl code, we could possibly dispense with inode permission checking > on those inodes, e.g. marking them private. Like this? It seems a little weird but I'm happy with it if you are. Eric diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c index b9d59c0..7d6f7c7 100644 --- a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c +++ b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ static struct inode *proc_sys_make_inode(struct inode *dir, struct ctl_table *ta inode->i_mtime = inode->i_atime = inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME; inode->i_op = &proc_sys_inode_operations; inode->i_fop = &proc_sys_file_operations; + inode->i_flags |= S_PRIVATE; /* tell selinux to ignore this inode */ proc_sys_refresh_inode(inode, table); out: return inode; - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/