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[2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id c18si1852865plg.131.2022.02.04.03.43.04; Fri, 04 Feb 2022 03:43:16 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=k20201202 header.b=o8iht2n8; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1353187AbiBCSH4 (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 3 Feb 2022 13:07:56 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:52902 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1353131AbiBCSHy (ORCPT ); Thu, 3 Feb 2022 13:07:54 -0500 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4601:e00::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A254FC061714; Thu, 3 Feb 2022 10:07:54 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3570BB8351A; Thu, 3 Feb 2022 18:07:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D5256C340E8; Thu, 3 Feb 2022 18:07:44 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1643911672; bh=YUZr7XbeIyN08iazuMzS2G23rEaa9Gbz97J61hHim+Q=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=o8iht2n8UHL+kEAb+gtG0oxtkBVpcCEPiQ/35xD3MyqOOg11qMUEwuCAnAG5p+ZhV 00Q26tjpbetSchpxqplcJnNGgknS7lpliwiApV27x+9v8EMTB0A3wSkWwXl9XvNAeL eKuXcTEN7YTu8+eL+nzWMRB1osbE4eYqJ8rDBHMCiOCZaVZ7LZZah/ZQ9oJzfguu3/ qilaWa30TIygTPRP+NhERY7z6y9mKXFTJmc7Mh463vgkdiaSIHMOe/7XE+AHgDdgnp SmC75UrQ6K5cGE1VYnRiVJtJy9M3R59AOQpGNpo39DtYOI+9BdgkjKnfxuaEZ8/WK3 rWz+jwwDldV2A== Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2022 20:07:38 +0200 From: Mike Rapoport To: Martin Fernandez Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org, dvhart@infradead.org, andy@infradead.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, rafael@kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, daniel.gutson@eclypsium.com, hughsient@gmail.com, alex.bazhaniuk@eclypsium.com, alison.schofield@intel.com, keescook@chromium.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 1/6] mm/memblock: Tag memblocks with crypto capabilities Message-ID: References: <20220203164328.203629-1-martin.fernandez@eclypsium.com> <20220203164328.203629-2-martin.fernandez@eclypsium.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20220203164328.203629-2-martin.fernandez@eclypsium.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Feb 03, 2022 at 01:43:23PM -0300, Martin Fernandez wrote: > Add the capability to mark regions of the memory memory_type able of > hardware memory encryption. > > Also add the capability to query if all regions of a memory node are > able to do hardware memory encryption to call it when initializing the > nodes. Warn the user if a node has both encryptable and > non-encryptable regions. > > Signed-off-by: Martin Fernandez > --- > include/linux/memblock.h | 15 ++++++---- > mm/memblock.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 2 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/memblock.h b/include/linux/memblock.h > index 9dc7cb239d21..73edcce165a5 100644 > --- a/include/linux/memblock.h > +++ b/include/linux/memblock.h > @@ -41,13 +41,15 @@ extern unsigned long long max_possible_pfn; > * via a driver, and never indicated in the firmware-provided memory map as > * system RAM. This corresponds to IORESOURCE_SYSRAM_DRIVER_MANAGED in the > * kernel resource tree. > + * @MEMBLOCK_CRYPTO_CAPABLE: capable of hardware encryption > */ > enum memblock_flags { > - MEMBLOCK_NONE = 0x0, /* No special request */ > - MEMBLOCK_HOTPLUG = 0x1, /* hotpluggable region */ > - MEMBLOCK_MIRROR = 0x2, /* mirrored region */ > - MEMBLOCK_NOMAP = 0x4, /* don't add to kernel direct mapping */ > - MEMBLOCK_DRIVER_MANAGED = 0x8, /* always detected via a driver */ > + MEMBLOCK_NONE = 0x0, /* No special request */ > + MEMBLOCK_HOTPLUG = 0x1, /* hotpluggable region */ > + MEMBLOCK_MIRROR = 0x2, /* mirrored region */ > + MEMBLOCK_NOMAP = 0x4, /* don't add to kernel direct mapping */ > + MEMBLOCK_DRIVER_MANAGED = 0x8, /* always detected via a driver */ > + MEMBLOCK_CRYPTO_CAPABLE = 0x10, /* capable of hardware encryption */ Please keep the comment indentation. > }; > > /** > @@ -121,6 +123,9 @@ int memblock_physmem_add(phys_addr_t base, phys_addr_t size); > void memblock_trim_memory(phys_addr_t align); > bool memblock_overlaps_region(struct memblock_type *type, > phys_addr_t base, phys_addr_t size); > +bool memblock_node_is_crypto_capable(int nid); > +int memblock_mark_crypto_capable(phys_addr_t base, phys_addr_t size); > +int memblock_clear_crypto_capable(phys_addr_t base, phys_addr_t size); > int memblock_mark_hotplug(phys_addr_t base, phys_addr_t size); > int memblock_clear_hotplug(phys_addr_t base, phys_addr_t size); > int memblock_mark_mirror(phys_addr_t base, phys_addr_t size); > diff --git a/mm/memblock.c b/mm/memblock.c > index 1018e50566f3..fcf79befeab3 100644 > --- a/mm/memblock.c > +++ b/mm/memblock.c > @@ -191,6 +191,42 @@ bool __init_memblock memblock_overlaps_region(struct memblock_type *type, > return i < type->cnt; > } > > +/** > + * memblock_node_is_crypto_capable - get if whole node is capable > + * of encryption > + * @nid: number of node > + * > + * Iterate over all memory memblock_type and find if all regions under > + * node @nid are capable of hardware encryption. > + * > + * Return: > + * true if every region in memory memblock_type is capable of > + * encryption, false otherwise. > + */ > +bool __init_memblock memblock_node_is_crypto_capable(int nid) > +{ > + struct memblock_region *region; > + bool crypto_capable = false; > + bool not_crypto_capable = false; > + > + for_each_mem_region(region) { > + if (memblock_get_region_node(region) == nid) { > + crypto_capable = > + crypto_capable || > + (region->flags & MEMBLOCK_CRYPTO_CAPABLE); > + not_crypto_capable = > + not_crypto_capable || > + !(region->flags & MEMBLOCK_CRYPTO_CAPABLE); Isn't if (region->flags & MEMBLOCK_CRYPTO_CAPABLE) crypto_capable++; else not_crypto_capable++; simpler and clearer? (of course s/bool/int in the declaration) > + } > + } > + > + if (crypto_capable && not_crypto_capable) > + pr_warn_once("Node %d has regions that are encryptable and regions that aren't", > + nid); This will print only the first node with mixed regions. With a single caller of memblock_node_is_crypto_capable() I think pr_warn() is ok. > + > + return !not_crypto_capable; > +} > + > /** > * __memblock_find_range_bottom_up - find free area utility in bottom-up > * @start: start of candidate range > @@ -885,6 +921,34 @@ static int __init_memblock memblock_setclr_flag(phys_addr_t base, > return 0; > } > > +/** > + * memblock_mark_crypto_capable - Mark memory regions capable of hardware > + * encryption with flag MEMBLOCK_CRYPTO_CAPABLE. > + * @base: the base phys addr of the region > + * @size: the size of the region > + * > + * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure. > + */ > +int __init_memblock memblock_mark_crypto_capable(phys_addr_t base, > + phys_addr_t size) > +{ > + return memblock_setclr_flag(base, size, 1, MEMBLOCK_CRYPTO_CAPABLE); > +} > + > +/** > + * memblock_clear_crypto_capable - Clear flag MEMBLOCK_CRYPTO for a > + * specified region. > + * @base: the base phys addr of the region > + * @size: the size of the region > + * > + * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure. > + */ > +int __init_memblock memblock_clear_crypto_capable(phys_addr_t base, > + phys_addr_t size) > +{ > + return memblock_setclr_flag(base, size, 0, MEMBLOCK_CRYPTO_CAPABLE); > +} > + > /** > * memblock_mark_hotplug - Mark hotpluggable memory with flag MEMBLOCK_HOTPLUG. > * @base: the base phys addr of the region > -- > 2.30.2 > -- Sincerely yours, Mike.