Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1750841AbXBMQxK (ORCPT ); Tue, 13 Feb 2007 11:53:10 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1750843AbXBMQxK (ORCPT ); Tue, 13 Feb 2007 11:53:10 -0500 Received: from mx2.mail.elte.hu ([157.181.151.9]:50238 "EHLO mx2.mail.elte.hu" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1750841AbXBMQxJ (ORCPT ); Tue, 13 Feb 2007 11:53:09 -0500 Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2007 17:49:39 +0100 From: Ingo Molnar To: Andi Kleen Cc: Alan , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Linus Torvalds , Arjan van de Ven , Christoph Hellwig , Andrew Morton , Ulrich Drepper , Zach Brown , Evgeniy Polyakov , "David S. Miller" , Benjamin LaHaise , Suparna Bhattacharya , Davide Libenzi , Thomas Gleixner Subject: Re: [patch 00/11] ANNOUNCE: "Syslets", generic asynchronous system call support Message-ID: <20070213164939.GA16394@elte.hu> References: <20060529212109.GA2058@elte.hu> <20070213142010.GA638@elte.hu> <20070213150019.4b4d4827@localhost.localdomain> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.4.2.2i X-ELTE-VirusStatus: clean X-ELTE-SpamScore: -0.8 X-ELTE-SpamLevel: X-ELTE-SpamCheck: no X-ELTE-SpamVersion: ELTE 2.0 X-ELTE-SpamCheck-Details: score=-0.8 required=5.9 tests=ALL_TRUSTED,BAYES_50 autolearn=no SpamAssassin version=3.1.7 -1.8 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP 1.0 BAYES_50 BODY: Bayesian spam probability is 40 to 60% [score: 0.5000] Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1154 Lines: 27 * Andi Kleen wrote: > > sys_exec and other security boundaries must be synchronous > > only and not allow async "spill over" (consider setuid async binary > > patching) > > He probably would need some generalization of Andrea's seccomp work. > Perhaps using bitmaps? For paranoia I would suggest to white list, not > black list calls. what i've implemented in my tree is sys_async_call_table[] which is a copy of sys_call_table[] with certain entries modified (by architecture level code, not by kernel/async.c) to sys_ni_syscall(). It's up to the architecture to decide which syscalls are allowed. but i could use a bitmap too - whatever linear construct. [ I'm not sure there's much connection to seccomp - seccomp uses a NULL terminated whitelist - while syslets would use most of the entries (and would not want to have the overhead of checking a blacklist). ] Ingo - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/