Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20;
Date:   Tue, 15 Feb 2022 12:55:38 +0100
From:   Michal =?iso-8859-1?Q?Koutn=FD?= <mkoutny@suse.com>
To:     Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Cc:     Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
        Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
        Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
        Ran Xiaokai <ran.xiaokai@zte.com.cn>,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
        Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/6] set_user: Perform RLIMIT_NPROC capability check
 against new user credentials
Message-ID: <20220215115538.GJ21589@blackbody.suse.cz>
References: <20220207121800.5079-1-mkoutny@suse.com>
 <20220207121800.5079-2-mkoutny@suse.com>
 <20220210011405.GA17076@openwall.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <20220210011405.GA17076@openwall.com>
User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13)
Precedence: bulk

On Thu, Feb 10, 2022 at 02:14:05AM +0100, Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com> wrote:
> However, I think you need to drop the negations of the return value from
> security_capable().
> security_capable() returns 0 or -EPERM, while capable() returns a
> bool, in kernel/capability.c: ns_capable_common():

Oops. Yeah, I only blindly applied replacement with a predicate for
(new) cred and overlooked this inverse semantics. Thanks for pointing
that out to me!

Nevertheless, this will likely be incorporated via Eric's series
anyway.


Michal