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        "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCHv4 30/30] Documentation/x86: Document TDX kernel architecture
Date:   Thu, 24 Feb 2022 18:56:30 +0300
Message-Id: <20220224155630.52734-31-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
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From: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>

Document the TDX guest architecture details like #VE support,
shared memory, etc.

Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
 Documentation/x86/index.rst |   1 +
 Documentation/x86/tdx.rst   | 196 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 197 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/tdx.rst

diff --git a/Documentation/x86/index.rst b/Documentation/x86/index.rst
index f498f1d36cd3..382e53ca850a 100644
--- a/Documentation/x86/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/x86/index.rst
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ x86-specific Documentation
    intel-iommu
    intel_txt
    amd-memory-encryption
+   tdx
    pti
    mds
    microcode
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/tdx.rst b/Documentation/x86/tdx.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a0b603ac49ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/x86/tdx.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+=====================================
+Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX)
+=====================================
+
+Intel's Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) protect confidential guest VMs
+from the host and physical attacks by isolating the guest register
+state and by encrypting the guest memory. In TDX, a special TDX module
+sits between the host and the guest, and runs in a special mode and
+manages the guest/host separation.
+
+Since the host cannot directly access guest registers or memory, much
+normal functionality of a hypervisor (such as trapping MMIO, some MSRs,
+some CPUIDs, and some other instructions) has to be moved into the
+guest. This is implemented using a Virtualization Exception (#VE) that
+is handled by the guest kernel. Some #VEs are handled inside the guest
+kernel, but some require the hypervisor (VMM) to be involved. The TD
+hypercall mechanism allows TD guests to call TDX module or hypervisor
+function.
+
+#VE Exceptions:
+===============
+
+In TDX guests, #VE Exceptions are delivered to TDX guests in following
+scenarios:
+
+* Execution of certain instructions (see list below)
+* Certain MSR accesses.
+* CPUID usage (only for certain leaves)
+* Shared memory access (including MMIO)
+
+#VE due to instruction execution
+---------------------------------
+
+Intel TDX dis-allows execution of certain instructions in non-root
+mode. Execution of these instructions would lead to #VE or #GP.
+
+Details are,
+
+List of instructions that can cause a #VE is,
+
+* String I/O (INS, OUTS), IN, OUT
+* HLT
+* MONITOR, MWAIT
+* WBINVD, INVD
+* VMCALL
+
+List of instructions that can cause a #GP is,
+
+* All VMX instructions: INVEPT, INVVPID, VMCLEAR, VMFUNC, VMLAUNCH,
+  VMPTRLD, VMPTRST, VMREAD, VMRESUME, VMWRITE, VMXOFF, VMXON
+* ENCLS, ENCLV
+* GETSEC
+* RSM
+* ENQCMD
+
+#VE due to MSR access
+----------------------
+
+In TDX guest, MSR access behavior can be categorized as,
+
+* Native supported (also called "context switched MSR")
+  No special handling is required for these MSRs in TDX guests.
+* #GP triggered
+  Dis-allowed MSR read/write would lead to #GP.
+* #VE triggered
+  All MSRs that are not natively supported or dis-allowed
+  (triggers #GP) will trigger #VE. To support access to
+  these MSRs, it needs to be emulated using TDCALL.
+
+Look Intel TDX Module Specification, sec "MSR Virtualization" for the complete
+list of MSRs that fall under the categories above.
+
+#VE due to CPUID instruction
+----------------------------
+
+In TDX guests, most of CPUID leaf/sub-leaf combinations are virtualized by
+the TDX module while some trigger #VE. Whether the leaf/sub-leaf triggers #VE
+defined in the TDX spec.
+
+VMM during the TD initialization time (using TDH.MNG.INIT) configures if
+a feature bits in specific leaf-subleaf are exposed to TD guest or not.
+
+#VE on Memory Accesses
+----------------------
+
+A TD guest is in control of whether its memory accesses are treated as
+private or shared.  It selects the behavior with a bit in its page table
+entries.
+
+#VE on Shared Pages
+-------------------
+
+Access to shared mappings can cause a #VE. The hypervisor controls whether
+access of shared mapping causes a #VE, so the guest must be careful to only
+reference shared pages it can safely handle a #VE, avoid nested #VEs.
+
+Content of shared mapping is not trusted since shared memory is writable
+by the hypervisor. Shared mappings are never used for sensitive memory content
+like stacks or kernel text, only for I/O buffers and MMIO regions. The kernel
+will not encounter shared mappings in sensitive contexts like syscall entry
+or NMIs.
+
+#VE on Private Pages
+--------------------
+
+Some accesses to private mappings may cause #VEs.  Before a mapping is
+accepted (AKA in the SEPT_PENDING state), a reference would cause a #VE.
+But, after acceptance, references typically succeed.
+
+The hypervisor can cause a private page reference to fail if it chooses
+to move an accepted page to a "blocked" state.  However, if it does
+this, page access will not generate a #VE.  It will, instead, cause a
+"TD Exit" where the hypervisor is required to handle the exception.
+
+Linux #VE handler
+-----------------
+
+Both user/kernel #VE exceptions are handled by the tdx_handle_virt_exception()
+handler. If successfully handled, the instruction pointer is incremented to
+complete the handling process. If failed to handle, it is treated as a regular
+exception and handled via fixup handlers.
+
+In TD guests, #VE nesting (a #VE triggered before handling the current one
+or AKA syscall gap issue) problem is handled by TDX module ensuring that
+interrupts, including NMIs, are blocked. The hardware blocks interrupts
+starting with #VE delivery until TDGETVEINFO is called.
+
+The kernel must avoid triggering #VE in entry paths: do not touch TD-shared
+memory, including MMIO regions, and do not use #VE triggering MSRs,
+instructions, or CPUID leaves that might generate #VE.
+
+MMIO handling:
+==============
+
+In non-TDX VMs, MMIO is usually implemented by giving a guest access to a
+mapping which will cause a VMEXIT on access, and then the VMM emulates the
+access. That's not possible in TDX guests because VMEXIT will expose the
+register state to the host. TDX guests don't trust the host and can't have
+their state exposed to the host.
+
+In TDX the MMIO regions are instead configured to trigger a #VE
+exception in the guest. The guest #VE handler then emulates the MMIO
+instructions inside the guest and converts them into a controlled TDCALL
+to the host, rather than completely exposing the state to the host.
+
+MMIO addresses on x86 are just special physical addresses. They can be
+accessed with any instruction that accesses memory. However, the
+introduced instruction decoding method is limited. It is only designed
+to decode instructions like those generated by io.h macros.
+
+MMIO access via other means (like structure overlays) may result in
+MMIO_DECODE_FAILED and an oops.
+
+Shared memory:
+==============
+
+Intel TDX doesn't allow the VMM to access guest private memory. Any
+memory that is required for communication with VMM must be shared
+explicitly by setting the bit in the page table entry. The shared bit
+can be enumerated with TDX_GET_INFO.
+
+After setting the shared bit, the conversion must be completed with
+MapGPA hypercall. The call informs the VMM about the conversion between
+private/shared mappings.
+
+set_memory_decrypted() converts a range of pages to shared.
+set_memory_encrypted() converts memory back to private.
+
+Device drivers are the primary user of shared memory, but there's no
+need in touching every driver. DMA buffers and ioremap()'ed regions are
+converted to shared automatically.
+
+TDX uses SWIOTLB for most DMA allocations. The SWIOTLB buffer is
+converted to shared on boot.
+
+For coherent DMA allocation, the DMA buffer gets converted on the
+allocation. Check force_dma_unencrypted() for details.
+
+References
+==========
+
+More details about TDX module (and its response for MSR, memory access,
+IO, CPUID etc) can be found at,
+
+https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-module-1.0-public-spec-v0.931.pdf
+
+More details about TDX hypercall and TDX module call ABI can be found
+at,
+
+https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/intel-tdx-guest-hypervisor-communication-interface-1.0-344426-002.pdf
+
+More details about TDVF requirements can be found at,
+
+https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-virtual-firmware-design-guide-rev-1.01.pdf
-- 
2.34.1