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Fri, 25 Feb 2022 02:42:46 -0800 (PST) X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:aa8e:b0:14f:fa5e:fe80 with SMTP id d14-20020a170902aa8e00b0014ffa5efe80mr7092777plr.84.1645785765782; Fri, 25 Feb 2022 02:42:45 -0800 (PST) Received: from [10.72.12.114] ([209.132.188.80]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id y191-20020a6264c8000000b004e1bf2f580csm2658942pfb.78.2022.02.25.02.42.42 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Fri, 25 Feb 2022 02:42:45 -0800 (PST) Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] ceph: add support for encrypted snapshot names To: =?UTF-8?Q?Lu=c3=ads_Henriques?= Cc: Jeff Layton , Ilya Dryomov , ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org References: <20220224112142.18052-1-lhenriques@suse.de> <7d2a798d-ce32-4bf7-b184-267bb79f44e3@redhat.com> <87h78ni8ed.fsf@brahms.olymp> From: Xiubo Li Message-ID: <1945dae6-9c0d-4cf7-49d8-843ba15e1710@redhat.com> Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2022 18:42:40 +0800 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/78.10.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <87h78ni8ed.fsf@brahms.olymp> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Language: en-US X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.8 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,NICE_REPLY_A, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW,RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H5,RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL,SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_NONE,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 2/25/22 5:48 PM, Luís Henriques wrote: > Xiubo Li writes: > >> On 2/24/22 7:21 PM, Luís Henriques wrote: >>> Since filenames in encrypted directories are already encrypted and shown >>> as a base64-encoded string when the directory is locked, snapshot names >>> should show a similar behaviour. >>> >>> Signed-off-by: Luís Henriques >>> --- >>> fs/ceph/dir.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ >>> fs/ceph/inode.c | 10 +++++++++- >>> 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >>> >>> Support on the MDS for names that'll be > MAX_NAME when base64 encoded is >>> still TBD. I thought it would be something easy to do, but snapshots >>> don't seem to make use of the CDir/CDentry (which is where alternate_name >>> is stored on the MDS). I'm still looking into this, but I may need some >>> help there :-( >>> >>> Cheers, >>> -- >>> Luís >>> >>> diff --git a/fs/ceph/dir.c b/fs/ceph/dir.c >>> index a449f4a07c07..20ae600ee7cd 100644 >>> --- a/fs/ceph/dir.c >>> +++ b/fs/ceph/dir.c >>> @@ -1065,6 +1065,13 @@ static int ceph_mkdir(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir, >>> op = CEPH_MDS_OP_MKSNAP; >>> dout("mksnap dir %p snap '%pd' dn %p\n", dir, >>> dentry, dentry); >>> + /* XXX missing support for alternate_name in snapshots */ >>> + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir) && (dentry->d_name.len >= 189)) { >>> + dout("encrypted snapshot name too long: %pd len: %d\n", >>> + dentry, dentry->d_name.len); >>> + err = -ENAMETOOLONG; >>> + goto out; >>> + } >>> } else if (ceph_snap(dir) == CEPH_NOSNAP) { >>> dout("mkdir dir %p dn %p mode 0%ho\n", dir, dentry, mode); >>> op = CEPH_MDS_OP_MKDIR; >>> @@ -1109,6 +1116,14 @@ static int ceph_mkdir(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir, >>> !req->r_reply_info.head->is_target && >>> !req->r_reply_info.head->is_dentry) >>> err = ceph_handle_notrace_create(dir, dentry); >>> + >>> + /* >>> + * If we have created a snapshot we need to clear the cache, otherwise >>> + * snapshot will show encrypted filenames in readdir. >>> + */ >> Do you mean dencrypted filenames ? > What I see without this d_drop() is that, if I run an 'ls' in a snapshot > directory immediately after creating it, the filenames in that snapshot > will be encrypted. Maybe there's a bug somewhere else and this d_drop() > isn't the right fix...? Maybe should fix this in ceph_fill_trace() in        } else if ((req->r_op == CEPH_MDS_OP_LOOKUPSNAP ||... {        } ? I still haven't gotten where will encrypt it yet in mksnap case. Because the MDS will set the 'rinfo->head->is_target' but won't set the 'rinfo->head->is_dentry', so in this case the dentry should keep the human readable name. - Xiubo > Cheers,