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From:   cgel.zte@gmail.com
To:     krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com
Cc:     davem@davemloft.net, kuba@kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        "Minghao Chi (CGEL ZTE)" <chi.minghao@zte.com.cn>,
        Zeal Robot <zealci@zte.com.cn>
Subject: [PATCH V2] net/nfc/nci: fix infoleak in struct nci_set_config_param
Date:   Wed,  2 Mar 2022 03:33:07 +0000
Message-Id: <20220302033307.2054766-1-chi.minghao@zte.com.cn>
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From: "Minghao Chi (CGEL ZTE)" <chi.minghao@zte.com.cn>

On 64-bit systems, struct nci_set_config_param has
an added padding of 7 bytes between struct members
id and len. Even though all struct members are initialized,
the 7-byte hole will contain data from the kernel stack.
This patch zeroes out struct nci_set_config_param before
usage, preventing infoleaks to userspace.

v1->v2:
  -Modify the title.
  -Add explanatory information.

Reported-by: Zeal Robot <zealci@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Minghao Chi (CGEL ZTE) <chi.minghao@zte.com.cn>
---
 net/nfc/nci/core.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/net/nfc/nci/core.c b/net/nfc/nci/core.c
index d2537383a3e8..32be42be1152 100644
--- a/net/nfc/nci/core.c
+++ b/net/nfc/nci/core.c
@@ -641,6 +641,7 @@ int nci_set_config(struct nci_dev *ndev, __u8 id, size_t len, const __u8 *val)
 	if (!val || !len)
 		return 0;
 
+	memset(&param, 0x0, sizeof(param));
 	param.id = id;
 	param.len = len;
 	param.val = val;
-- 
2.25.1