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Date:   Sat, 5 Mar 2022 03:59:56 +0200
From:   Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To:     Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Cc:     linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org,
        Nathaniel McCallum <nathaniel@profian.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
        "maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)" <x86@kernel.org>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
        "open list:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)" 
        <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] x86/sgx: Do not limit EAUG'd pages by
 pre-initialization policy
Message-ID: <YiLEHBlXAz+sUheO@kernel.org>
References: <20220304033918.361495-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
 <684930a2-a247-7d5e-90e8-6e80db618c4c@intel.com>
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On Fri, Mar 04, 2022 at 11:09:36AM -0800, Reinette Chatre wrote:
> Hi Jarkko,
> 
> On 3/3/2022 7:39 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > Pre-initialization policy is meant for EADD'd pages because they are
> > part of the enclave identity. It's a good practice to not let touch the
> > permissions after initialization, and does provide guarantees to e.g.
> > LSM's about the enclave.
> 
> I disagree. There are scenarios where it is indeed good practice to
> modify the permissions after initialization.  For example, pages that
> may be used for relocatable code can start with RWX permissions but once
> the pages have been populated with the code they should be able to restrict
> permissions to RX only. It is not good practice to require RWX permission
> over their entire lifetime. Ideally pages should only have the lowest
> permissions possible. 

The only permissions kernel has real control is PTE permissions when
the enclave has been initialized.

You are introducing an artificial limitation with vm_run_prot_bits
that makes e.g. EMODPE more costly for no good reason, and in-kernel
variable has nothing to do with the permissions. They are located
in EPCM.

> Supporting the modification of permissions after initialization enables
> the security conscious enclave owner to support the security
> principle of least privilege.

1. Kernel has the control of PTE permissions.
2. Enclave has the control of EPCM permissions.

vm_run_prot_bits does not help making anything more secure.

BR, Jarkko