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From:   Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
To:     linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
        Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
        Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
        Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com>,
        Nick Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>, x86@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 1/5] x86: Detection of Knights Landing A/D leak
Date:   Tue,  8 Mar 2022 20:10:39 -0800
Message-Id: <20220309041043.302261-2-namit@vmware.com>
In-Reply-To: <20220309041043.302261-1-namit@vmware.com>
References: <20220309041043.302261-1-namit@vmware.com>
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From: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>

Knights Landing has a issue that a thread setting A or D bits may not do
so atomically against checking the present bit.  A thread which is going
to page fault may still set those bits, even though the present bit was
already atomically cleared.

This implies that when the kernel clears present atomically, some time
later the supposed to be zero entry could be corrupted with stray A or D
bits.

Since the PTE could be already used for storing a swap index, or a NUMA
migration index, this cannot be tolerated. Most of the time the kernel
detects the problem, but in some rare cases it may not.

This patch adds an interface to detect the bug, which will be used in a
following patch.

Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1465919919-2093-1-git-send-email-lukasz.anaczkowski@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c        | 5 +++++
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 67ef0e81c7dc..184b299dbf12 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -442,5 +442,6 @@
 #define X86_BUG_TAA			X86_BUG(22) /* CPU is affected by TSX Async Abort(TAA) */
 #define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT		X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
 #define X86_BUG_SRBDS			X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
+#define X86_BUG_PTE_LEAK		X86_BUG(25) /* PTE may leak A/D bits after clear */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
index 8321c43554a1..74780fef3f12 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -296,6 +296,11 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 		}
 	}
 
+	if (c->x86_model == INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL) {
+		pr_info_once("Enabling PTE leaking workaround\n");
+		set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_PTE_LEAK);
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * Intel Quark Core DevMan_001.pdf section 6.4.11
 	 * "The operating system also is required to invalidate (i.e., flush)
-- 
2.25.1