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Date:   Mon, 14 Mar 2022 04:50:50 +0200
From:   Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To:     Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Cc:     Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@linux.intel.com>,
        "Dhanraj, Vijay" <vijay.dhanraj@intel.com>,
        "dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
        "tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        "bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>,
        "Lutomirski, Andy" <luto@kernel.org>,
        "mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
        "linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org" <linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org>,
        "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
        "Christopherson,, Sean" <seanjc@google.com>,
        "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>,
        "Zhang, Cathy" <cathy.zhang@intel.com>,
        "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@intel.com>,
        "Huang, Haitao" <haitao.huang@intel.com>,
        "Shanahan, Mark" <mark.shanahan@intel.com>,
        "hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
        "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        nathaniel@profian.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page
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On Mon, Mar 14, 2022 at 04:49:37AM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 11, 2022 at 09:53:29AM -0800, Reinette Chatre wrote:
> 
> > I saw Haitao's note that EMODPE requires "Read access permitted by enclave".
> > This motivates that EMODPR->PROT_NONE should not be allowed since it would
> > not be possible to relax permissions (run EMODPE) after that. Even so, I
> > also found in the SDM that EACCEPT has the note "Read access permitted
> > by enclave". That seems to indicate that EMODPR->PROT_NONE is not practical
> > from that perspective either since the enclave will not be able to
> > EACCEPT the change. Does that match your understanding?
> 
> Yes, PROT_NONE should not be allowed.
> 
> This is however the real problem.
> 
> The current kernel patch set has inconsistent API and EMODPR ioctl is
> simply unacceptable. It  also requires more concurrency management from
> user space run-time, which would be heck a lot easier to do in the kernel.
> 
> If you really want EMODPR as ioctl, then for consistencys sake, then EAUG
> should be too. Like this when things go opposite directions, this patch set
> plain and simply will not work out.
> 
> I would pick EAUG's strategy from these two as it requires half the back
> calls to host from an enclave. I.e. please combine mprotect() and EMODPR,
> either in the #PF handler or as part of mprotect(), which ever suits you
> best.
> 
> I'll try demonstrate this with two examples.
> 
> mmap() could go something like this() (simplified):
> 1. Execution #UD's to SYSCALL.
> 2. Host calls enclave's mmap() handler with mmap() parameters.
> 3. Enclave up-calls host's mmap().
> 4. Loops the range with EACCEPTCOPY.
> 
> mprotect() has to be done like this:
> 1. Execution #UD's to SYSCALL.
> 2. Host calls enclave's mprotect() handler.
> 3. Enclave up-calls host's mprotect().
> 4. Enclave up-calls host's ioctl() to SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PERMISSIONS.
> 3. Loops the range with EACCEPT.
  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  5. Loops the range with EACCEPT + EMODPE.

> This is just terrible IMHO. I hope these examples bring some insight.

BR, Jarkko