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[2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id a14-20020a170902ecce00b00153b2d164a6si3484833plh.174.2022.03.18.08.33.20; Fri, 18 Mar 2022 08:33:34 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=k20201202 header.b=IQhWcI5N; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234768AbiCRJ6c (ORCPT + 99 others); Fri, 18 Mar 2022 05:58:32 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:60838 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234755AbiCRJ6a (ORCPT ); Fri, 18 Mar 2022 05:58:30 -0400 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [145.40.68.75]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 55AB7ECDA9; Fri, 18 Mar 2022 02:57:11 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BCAF7B8219B; Fri, 18 Mar 2022 09:57:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D9340C340E8; Fri, 18 Mar 2022 09:57:07 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1647597428; bh=D5yL6aigNRSuu9Nw9+2aNnSCJodwLJ084CZML4FZyEU=; h=Subject:From:To:Cc:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=IQhWcI5NP2e9FCiAUwBBRl8Y7EFEGfkgNnY9hnL02Yd+1upTcZv6XupSeJbNGOBYU dfax+tBUwexkfwxzrj45DhdIzY+Ot0Ya8jZU3bl1cWxCPvHcO3RaN9waDRu02z2ymF PmoiM7gurSAoEZQnjqTO5a8t6wfEKRuMxpBdX/DsLg6s45O2XrncS6yrXN3D/c7oW4 f0undDwD5GnBfZ8axENbEUUHWaINsa/xFUcbT0IJ5Ke/r7jSIYr5macgcd2gqn//gh 0Pxz04LBz7UTD/+86PTO+f4vUUHREoahCl/dks/VVFzw9jH44MMr1FJ74TYFBqRq0/ MZ3oRiFezoXgw== Message-ID: <6f7a8581c24b09c2fe7c167f68d0f9d12a0b1427.camel@kernel.org> Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 2/4] ceph: handle encrypted snapshot names in subdirectories From: Jeff Layton To: Xiubo Li , =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Lu=EDs?= Henriques , Ilya Dryomov Cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Date: Fri, 18 Mar 2022 05:57:06 -0400 In-Reply-To: <61d831de-1589-3a19-8f46-a162099e75df@redhat.com> References: <20220317154521.6615-1-lhenriques@suse.de> <20220317154521.6615-3-lhenriques@suse.de> <61d831de-1589-3a19-8f46-a162099e75df@redhat.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-15" User-Agent: Evolution 3.42.4 (3.42.4-1.fc35) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Fri, 2022-03-18 at 12:57 +0800, Xiubo Li wrote: > On 3/17/22 11:45 PM, Lu?s Henriques wrote: > > When creating a snapshot, the .snap directories for every subdirectory will > > show the snapshot name in the "long format": > > > > # mkdir .snap/my-snap > > # ls my-dir/.snap/ > > _my-snap_1099511627782 > > > > Encrypted snapshots will need to be able to handle these snapshot names by > > encrypting/decrypting only the snapshot part of the string ('my-snap'). > > > > Also, since the MDS prevents snapshot names to be bigger than 240 characters > > it is necessary to adapt CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX to accommodate this extra > > limitation. > > > > Signed-off-by: Lu?s Henriques > > --- > > fs/ceph/crypto.c | 189 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- > > fs/ceph/crypto.h | 11 ++- > > 2 files changed, 169 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.c b/fs/ceph/crypto.c > > index beb73bbdd868..caa9863dee93 100644 > > --- a/fs/ceph/crypto.c > > +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.c > > @@ -128,16 +128,100 @@ void ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req(struct ceph_mds_request *req, struct ceph_acl_se > > swap(req->r_fscrypt_auth, as->fscrypt_auth); > > } > > > > -int ceph_encode_encrypted_dname(const struct inode *parent, struct qstr *d_name, char *buf) > > +/* > > + * User-created snapshots can't start with '_'. Snapshots that start with this > > + * character are special (hint: there aren't real snapshots) and use the > > + * following format: > > + * > > + * __ > > + * > > + * where: > > + * - - the real snapshot name that may need to be decrypted, > > + * - - the inode number for the actual snapshot > > + * > > + * This function parses these snapshot names and returns the inode > > + * . 'name_len' will also bet set with the > > + * length. > > + */ > > +static struct inode *parse_longname(const struct inode *parent, const char *name, > > + int *name_len) > > { > > + struct inode *dir = NULL; > > + struct ceph_vino vino = { .snap = CEPH_NOSNAP }; > > + char *inode_number; > > + char *name_end; > > + int orig_len = *name_len; > > + int ret = -EIO; > > + > > + /* Skip initial '_' */ > > + name++; > > + name_end = strrchr(name, '_'); > > + if (!name_end) { > > + dout("Failed to parse long snapshot name: %s\n", name); > > + return ERR_PTR(-EIO); > > + } > > + *name_len = (name_end - name); > > + if (*name_len <= 0) { > > + pr_err("Failed to parse long snapshot name\n"); > > + return ERR_PTR(-EIO); > > + } > > + > > + /* Get the inode number */ > > + inode_number = kmemdup_nul(name_end + 1, > > + orig_len - *name_len - 2, > > + GFP_KERNEL); > > + if (!inode_number) > > + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); > > + ret = kstrtou64(inode_number, 0, &vino.ino); > > + if (ret) { > > + dout("Failed to parse inode number: %s\n", name); > > + dir = ERR_PTR(ret); > > + goto out; > > + } > > + > > + /* And finally the inode */ > > + dir = ceph_find_inode(parent->i_sb, vino); > > + if (!dir) { > > + /* This can happen if we're not mounting cephfs on the root */ > > + dir = ceph_get_inode(parent->i_sb, vino, NULL); > > In this case IMO you should lookup the inode from MDS instead create it > in the cache, which won't setup the encryption info needed. > > So later when you try to use this to dencrypt the snapshot names, you > will hit errors ? And also the case Jeff mentioned in previous thread > could happen. > > I figured out another approach could resolve this more gracefully: > > For all the subdirs just let them inherit the encryption info from the > same ancestor, which is initially encrypted, then in ceph_new_inode() > you can just skip setting up the encryption info for all the subdirs and > in MDS side will send back the parent's encryption info and fill it in > handle_reply(), this is just what the .snap does. > > Then here you can use current inode to do the dencryption for all the > snapshots including the long snapshot names. > > I have raise one PR and send a kclient patch for the above basic > framework [1][2]. But there still need a little more work you need to do > based them: > > When lssnap you need to add one flag in LeaseStat to tell the kclient > whether the long snap names are encrypted, this is very easy in MDS > side. Then in kclient side you can just skip dencrypting the long snap > names which are from none-encyrpted parents and for all the other just > use current inode to do the dencryption. No need to search the parent > inodes for long snaps. > > And when lookuping a long snap name, which could be encyrpted and could > be not, then you need to parse the inode out and lookup the inode from > MDS if it does not exist in cache. > > > [1] https://github.com/ceph/ceph/pull/45516 > > [2] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/ceph-devel/list/?series=624492 > So basically all directories and parents would share the same nonce? That doesn't sound very secure. Doing that for snapshots is one thing, but I think having a different nonce for each directories is generally a better outcome. Can we not just do this sort of inheritance for snapshot directories? > > > + if (!dir) > > + dir = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); > > + } > > + if (IS_ERR(dir)) > > + dout("Can't find inode %s (%s)\n", inode_number, name); > > + > > +out: > > + kfree(inode_number); > > + return dir; > > +} > > + > > +int ceph_encode_encrypted_dname(struct inode *parent, struct qstr *d_name, char *buf) > > +{ > > + struct inode *dir = parent; > > + struct qstr iname; > > u32 len; > > + int name_len; > > int elen; > > int ret; > > - u8 *cryptbuf; > > + u8 *cryptbuf = NULL; > > + > > + iname.name = d_name->name; > > + name_len = d_name->len; > > + > > + /* Handle the special case of snapshot names that start with '_' */ > > + if ((ceph_snap(dir) == CEPH_SNAPDIR) && (name_len > 0) && > > + (iname.name[0] == '_')) { > > + dir = parse_longname(parent, iname.name, &name_len); > > + if (IS_ERR(dir)) > > + return PTR_ERR(dir); > > + iname.name++; /* skip initial '_' */ > > + } > > + iname.len = name_len; > > > > - if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(parent)) { > > + if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) { > > memcpy(buf, d_name->name, d_name->len); > > - return d_name->len; > > + elen = d_name->len; > > + goto out; > > } > > > > /* > > @@ -146,18 +230,22 @@ int ceph_encode_encrypted_dname(const struct inode *parent, struct qstr *d_name, > > * > > * See: fscrypt_setup_filename > > */ > > - if (!fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(parent, d_name->len, NAME_MAX, &len)) > > - return -ENAMETOOLONG; > > + if (!fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(dir, iname.len, NAME_MAX, &len)) { > > + elen = -ENAMETOOLONG; > > + goto out; > > + } > > > > /* Allocate a buffer appropriate to hold the result */ > > cryptbuf = kmalloc(len > CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX ? NAME_MAX : len, GFP_KERNEL); > > - if (!cryptbuf) > > - return -ENOMEM; > > + if (!cryptbuf) { > > + elen = -ENOMEM; > > + goto out; > > + } > > > > - ret = fscrypt_fname_encrypt(parent, d_name, cryptbuf, len); > > + ret = fscrypt_fname_encrypt(dir, &iname, cryptbuf, len); > > if (ret) { > > - kfree(cryptbuf); > > - return ret; > > + elen = ret; > > + goto out; > > } > > > > /* hash the end if the name is long enough */ > > @@ -173,12 +261,29 @@ int ceph_encode_encrypted_dname(const struct inode *parent, struct qstr *d_name, > > > > /* base64 encode the encrypted name */ > > elen = fscrypt_base64url_encode(cryptbuf, len, buf); > > - kfree(cryptbuf); > > dout("base64-encoded ciphertext name = %.*s\n", elen, buf); > > + > > + WARN_ON(elen > (CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)); > > + if ((elen > 0) && (dir != parent)) { > > + char tmp_buf[NAME_MAX]; > > + > > + elen = snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf), "_%.*s_%ld", > > + elen, buf, dir->i_ino); > > + memcpy(buf, tmp_buf, elen); > > + } > > + > > +out: > > + kfree(cryptbuf); > > + if (dir != parent) { > > + if ((dir->i_state & I_NEW)) > > + discard_new_inode(dir); > > + else > > + iput(dir); > > + } > > return elen; > > } > > > > -int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(const struct inode *parent, struct dentry *dentry, char *buf) > > +int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(struct inode *parent, struct dentry *dentry, char *buf) > > { > > WARN_ON_ONCE(!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(parent)); > > > > @@ -203,29 +308,42 @@ int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(const struct inode *parent, struct dentry *dentr > > int ceph_fname_to_usr(const struct ceph_fname *fname, struct fscrypt_str *tname, > > struct fscrypt_str *oname, bool *is_nokey) > > { > > - int ret; > > + struct inode *dir = fname->dir; > > struct fscrypt_str _tname = FSTR_INIT(NULL, 0); > > struct fscrypt_str iname; > > - > > - if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(fname->dir)) { > > - oname->name = fname->name; > > - oname->len = fname->name_len; > > - return 0; > > - } > > + char *name = fname->name; > > + int name_len = fname->name_len; > > + int ret; > > > > /* Sanity check that the resulting name will fit in the buffer */ > > if (fname->name_len > NAME_MAX || fname->ctext_len > NAME_MAX) > > return -EIO; > > > > - ret = __fscrypt_prepare_readdir(fname->dir); > > + /* Handle the special case of snapshot names that start with '_' */ > > + if ((ceph_snap(dir) == CEPH_SNAPDIR) && (name_len > 0) && > > + (name[0] == '_')) { > > + dir = parse_longname(dir, name, &name_len); > > + if (IS_ERR(dir)) > > + return PTR_ERR(dir); > > + name++; /* skip initial '_' */ > > + } > > + > > + if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) { > > + oname->name = fname->name; > > + oname->len = fname->name_len; > > + ret = 0; > > + goto out_inode; > > + } > > + > > + ret = __fscrypt_prepare_readdir(dir); > > if (ret) > > - return ret; > > + goto out_inode; > > > > /* > > * Use the raw dentry name as sent by the MDS instead of > > * generating a nokey name via fscrypt. > > */ > > - if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(fname->dir)) { > > + if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) { > > if (fname->no_copy) > > oname->name = fname->name; > > else > > @@ -233,7 +351,8 @@ int ceph_fname_to_usr(const struct ceph_fname *fname, struct fscrypt_str *tname, > > oname->len = fname->name_len; > > if (is_nokey) > > *is_nokey = true; > > - return 0; > > + ret = 0; > > + goto out_inode; > > } > > > > if (fname->ctext_len == 0) { > > @@ -242,11 +361,11 @@ int ceph_fname_to_usr(const struct ceph_fname *fname, struct fscrypt_str *tname, > > if (!tname) { > > ret = fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer(NAME_MAX, &_tname); > > if (ret) > > - return ret; > > + goto out_inode; > > tname = &_tname; > > } > > > > - declen = fscrypt_base64url_decode(fname->name, fname->name_len, tname->name); > > + declen = fscrypt_base64url_decode(name, name_len, tname->name); > > if (declen <= 0) { > > ret = -EIO; > > goto out; > > @@ -258,9 +377,25 @@ int ceph_fname_to_usr(const struct ceph_fname *fname, struct fscrypt_str *tname, > > iname.len = fname->ctext_len; > > } > > > > - ret = fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(fname->dir, 0, 0, &iname, oname); > > + ret = fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(dir, 0, 0, &iname, oname); > > + if (!ret && (dir != fname->dir)) { > > + char tmp_buf[FSCRYPT_BASE64URL_CHARS(NAME_MAX)]; > > + > > + name_len = snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf), "_%.*s_%ld", > > + oname->len, oname->name, dir->i_ino); > > + memcpy(oname->name, tmp_buf, name_len); > > + oname->len = name_len; > > + } > > + > > out: > > fscrypt_fname_free_buffer(&_tname); > > +out_inode: > > + if ((dir != fname->dir) && !IS_ERR(dir)) { > > + if ((dir->i_state & I_NEW)) > > + discard_new_inode(dir); > > + else > > + iput(dir); > > + } > > return ret; > > } > > > > diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.h b/fs/ceph/crypto.h > > index 62f0ddd30dee..3273d076a9e5 100644 > > --- a/fs/ceph/crypto.h > > +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.h > > @@ -82,13 +82,16 @@ static inline u32 ceph_fscrypt_auth_len(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth *fa) > > * struct fscrypt_ceph_nokey_name { > > * u8 bytes[157]; > > * u8 sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; > > - * }; // 189 bytes => 252 bytes base64-encoded, which is <= NAME_MAX (255) > > + * }; // 180 bytes => 240 bytes base64-encoded, which is <= NAME_MAX (255) > > + * > > + * (240 bytes is the maximum size allowed for snapshot names to take into > > + * account the format: '__'.) > > * > > * Note that for long names that end up having their tail portion hashed, we > > * must also store the full encrypted name (in the dentry's alternate_name > > * field). > > */ > > -#define CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX (189 - SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) > > +#define CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX (180 - SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) > > > > void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops(struct super_block *sb); > > > > @@ -97,8 +100,8 @@ void ceph_fscrypt_free_dummy_policy(struct ceph_fs_client *fsc); > > int ceph_fscrypt_prepare_context(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, > > struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as); > > void ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req(struct ceph_mds_request *req, struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as); > > -int ceph_encode_encrypted_dname(const struct inode *parent, struct qstr *d_name, char *buf); > > -int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(const struct inode *parent, struct dentry *dentry, char *buf); > > +int ceph_encode_encrypted_dname(struct inode *parent, struct qstr *d_name, char *buf); > > +int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(struct inode *parent, struct dentry *dentry, char *buf); > > > > static inline int ceph_fname_alloc_buffer(struct inode *parent, struct fscrypt_str *fname) > > { > > > -- Jeff Layton