Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20;
Message-ID: <4de651adc35341c5fa99db54b9295d4845648563.camel@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] rxrpc: fix some null-ptr-deref bugs in server_key.c
From:   Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
To:     David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     Xiaolong Huang <butterflyhuangxx@gmail.com>,
        Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>,
        linux-afs@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Date:   Thu, 31 Mar 2022 12:43:56 +0200
In-Reply-To: <164865013439.2941502.8966285221215590921.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
References: <164865013439.2941502.8966285221215590921.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
User-Agent: Evolution 3.42.4 (3.42.4-1.fc35) 
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Precedence: bulk

On Wed, 2022-03-30 at 15:22 +0100, David Howells wrote:
> From: Xiaolong Huang <butterflyhuangxx@gmail.com>
> 
> Some function calls are not implemented in rxrpc_no_security, there are
> preparse_server_key, free_preparse_server_key and destroy_server_key.
> When rxrpc security type is rxrpc_no_security, user can easily trigger a
> null-ptr-deref bug via ioctl. So judgment should be added to prevent it
> 
> The crash log:
> user@syzkaller:~$ ./rxrpc_preparse_s
> [   37.956878][T15626] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
> [   37.957645][T15626] #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
> [   37.958229][T15626] #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
> [   37.958762][T15626] PGD 4aadf067 P4D 4aadf067 PUD 4aade067 PMD 0
> [   37.959321][T15626] Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
> [   37.959739][T15626] CPU: 0 PID: 15626 Comm: rxrpc_preparse_ Not tainted 5.17.0-01442-gb47d5a4f6b8d #43
> [   37.960588][T15626] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
> [   37.961474][T15626] RIP: 0010:0x0
> [   37.961787][T15626] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffffffffd6.
> [   37.962480][T15626] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d9abdc0 EFLAGS: 00010286
> [   37.963018][T15626] RAX: ffffffff84335200 RBX: ffff888012a1ce80 RCX: 0000000000000000
> [   37.963727][T15626] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff84a736dc RDI: ffffc9000d9abe48
> [   37.964425][T15626] RBP: ffffc9000d9abe48 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000002
> [   37.965118][T15626] R10: 000000000000000a R11: f000000000000000 R12: ffff888013145680
> [   37.965836][T15626] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffffffffffffec R15: ffff8880432aba80
> [   37.966441][T15626] FS:  00007f2177907700(0000) GS:ffff88803ec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> [   37.966979][T15626] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> [   37.967384][T15626] CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 000000004aaf1000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
> [   37.967864][T15626] Call Trace:
> [   37.968062][T15626]  <TASK>
> [   37.968240][T15626]  rxrpc_preparse_s+0x59/0x90
> [   37.968541][T15626]  key_create_or_update+0x174/0x510
> [   37.968863][T15626]  __x64_sys_add_key+0x139/0x1d0
> [   37.969165][T15626]  do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0
> [   37.969451][T15626]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
> [   37.969824][T15626] RIP: 0033:0x43a1f9
> 
> Signed-off-by: Xiaolong Huang <butterflyhuangxx@gmail.com>
> Tested-by: Xiaolong Huang <butterflyhuangxx@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Acked-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
> Link: http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-afs/2022-March/005069.html

It looks like we can add a couple of fixes tag to help stable teams:

Fixes: d5953f6543b5 ("rxrpc: Allow security classes to give more info on server keys")
Fixes: 12da59fcab5a ("xrpc: Hand server key parsing off to the security class")

Does the above looks good to you?

Thanks!

Paolo