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On Fri, Apr 01, 2022 at 12:16:41AM +1300, Kai Huang wrote: > On Fri, 2022-03-04 at 11:48 -0800, isaku.yamahata@intel.com wrote: > > From: Rick Edgecombe > > > > Add support in KVM's MMU for aliasing multiple GPAs (from a hardware > > perspective) to a single GPA (from a memslot perspective). GPA aliasing > > will be used to repurpose GPA bits as attribute bits, e.g. to expose an > > execute-only permission bit to the guest. To keep the implementation > > simple (relatively speaking), GPA aliasing is only supported via TDP. > > > > Today KVM assumes two things that are broken by GPA aliasing. > > 1. GPAs coming from hardware can be simply shifted to get the GFNs. > > 2. GPA bits 51:MAXPHYADDR are reserved to zero. > > > > With GPA aliasing, translating a GPA to GFN requires masking off the > > repurposed bit, and a repurposed bit may reside in 51:MAXPHYADDR. > > > > To support GPA aliasing, introduce the concept of per-VM GPA stolen bits, > > that is, bits stolen from the GPA to act as new virtualized attribute > > bits. A bit in the mask will cause the MMU code to create aliases of the > > GPA. It can also be used to find the GFN out of a GPA coming from a tdp > > fault. > > > > To handle case (1) from above, retain any stolen bits when passing a GPA > > in KVM's MMU code, but strip them when converting to a GFN so that the > > GFN contains only the "real" GFN, i.e. never has repurposed bits set. > > > > GFNs (without stolen bits) continue to be used to: > > - Specify physical memory by userspace via memslots > > - Map GPAs to TDP PTEs via RMAP > > - Specify dirty tracking and write protection > > - Look up MTRR types > > - Inject async page faults > > > > Since there are now multiple aliases for the same aliased GPA, when > > userspace memory backing the memslots is paged out, both aliases need to be > > modified. Fortunately, this happens automatically. Since rmap supports > > multiple mappings for the same GFN for PTE shadowing based paging, by > > adding/removing each alias PTE with its GFN, kvm_handle_hva() based > > operations will be applied to both aliases. > > > > In the case of the rmap being removed in the future, the needed > > information could be recovered by iterating over the stolen bits and > > walking the TDP page tables. > > > > For TLB flushes that are address based, make sure to flush both aliases > > in the case of stolen bits. > > > > Only support stolen bits in 64 bit guest paging modes (long, PAE). > > Features that use this infrastructure should restrict the stolen bits to > > exclude the other paging modes. Don't support stolen bits for shadow EPT. > > > > Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe > > Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata > > --- > > arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++ > > arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 19 ++++++++++-- > > arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 25 +++++++++------- > > 4 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h > > index 208b29b0e637..d8b78d6abc10 100644 > > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h > > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h > > @@ -1235,7 +1235,9 @@ struct kvm_arch { > > spinlock_t hv_root_tdp_lock; > > #endif > > > > +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_MMU_PRIVATE > > gfn_t gfn_shared_mask; > > +#endif > > }; > > > > struct kvm_vm_stat { > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h > > index e9fbb2c8bbe2..3fb530359f81 100644 > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h > > @@ -365,4 +365,55 @@ static inline gpa_t kvm_translate_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, > > return gpa; > > return translate_nested_gpa(vcpu, gpa, access, exception); > > } > > + > > +static inline gfn_t kvm_gfn_stolen_mask(struct kvm *kvm) > > +{ > > +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_MMU_PRIVATE > > + return kvm->arch.gfn_shared_mask; > > +#else > > + return 0; > > +#endif > > +} > > + > > +static inline gpa_t kvm_gpa_stolen_mask(struct kvm *kvm) > > +{ > > + return gfn_to_gpa(kvm_gfn_stolen_mask(kvm)); > > +} > > + > > +static inline gpa_t kvm_gpa_unalias(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa) > > +{ > > + return gpa & ~kvm_gpa_stolen_mask(kvm); > > +} > > + > > +static inline gfn_t kvm_gfn_unalias(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn) > > +{ > > + return gfn & ~kvm_gfn_stolen_mask(kvm); > > +} > > + > > +static inline gfn_t kvm_gfn_shared(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn) > > +{ > > + return gfn | kvm_gfn_stolen_mask(kvm); > > +} > > + > > +static inline gfn_t kvm_gfn_private(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn) > > +{ > > + return gfn & ~kvm_gfn_stolen_mask(kvm); > > +} > > + > > +static inline gpa_t kvm_gpa_private(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa) > > +{ > > + return gpa & ~kvm_gpa_stolen_mask(kvm); > > +} > > + > > +static inline bool kvm_is_private_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn) > > +{ > > + gfn_t mask = kvm_gfn_stolen_mask(kvm); > > + > > + return mask && !(gfn & mask); > > +} > > + > > +static inline bool kvm_is_private_gpa(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa) > > +{ > > + return kvm_is_private_gfn(kvm, gpa_to_gfn(gpa)); > > +} > > The patch title and commit message say nothing about private/shared, but only > mention stolen bits in general. It's weird to introduce those *private* related > helpers here. > > I think you can just ditch the concept of stolen bit infrastructure, but just > adopt what TDX needs. Sure, this patch heavily changed from the original patch Now. One suggestion is that private/shared is characteristic to kvm page fault, not gpa/gfn. It's TDX specific. - Add a helper function to check if KVM MMU is TD or VM. Right now kvm_gfn_stolen_mask() is used. Probably kvm_mmu_has_private_bit(). (any better name?) - Let's keep address conversion functions: address => unalias/shared/private - Add struct kvm_page_fault.is_private see how kvm_is_private_{gpa, gfn}() can be removed (or reduced). > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c > > index 8e24f73bf60b..b68191aa39bf 100644 > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c > > @@ -276,11 +276,24 @@ static inline bool kvm_available_flush_tlb_with_range(void) > > static void kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_with_range(struct kvm *kvm, > > struct kvm_tlb_range *range) > > { > > - int ret = -ENOTSUPP; > > + int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; > > Change doesn't belong to this patch. Will fix it. > > + u64 gfn_stolen_mask; > > > > - if (range && kvm_x86_ops.tlb_remote_flush_with_range) > > + /* > > + * Fall back to the big hammer flush if there is more than one > > + * GPA alias that needs to be flushed. > > + */ > > + gfn_stolen_mask = kvm_gfn_stolen_mask(kvm); > > + if (hweight64(gfn_stolen_mask) > 1) > > + goto generic_flush; > > + > > + if (range && kvm_available_flush_tlb_with_range()) { > > + /* Callback should flush both private GFN and shared GFN. */ > > + range->start_gfn = kvm_gfn_unalias(kvm, range->start_gfn); > > This seems wrong. It seems the intention of this function is to flush TLB for > all aliases for a given GFN range. Here it seems you are unconditionally change > to range to always exclude the stolen bits. Ooh, right. This alias knowledge is in TDX. This unalias should be dropped and put it in tdx.c. I'll fix it. > > ret = static_call(kvm_x86_tlb_remote_flush_with_range)(kvm, range); > > + } > > And you always fall through to do big hammer flush, which is obviously not > intended. Please notice "if (ret)". If it succeeded, big hammer flush is skipped. > > +generic_flush: > > if (ret) > > kvm_flush_remote_tlbs(kvm); > > } > > @@ -4010,7 +4023,7 @@ static int direct_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault > > unsigned long mmu_seq; > > int r; > > > > - fault->gfn = fault->addr >> PAGE_SHIFT; > > + fault->gfn = kvm_gfn_unalias(vcpu->kvm, gpa_to_gfn(fault->addr)); > > fault->slot = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(vcpu, fault->gfn); > > > > if (page_fault_handle_page_track(vcpu, fault)) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h > > index 5b5bdac97c7b..70aec31dee06 100644 > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h > > @@ -25,7 +25,8 @@ > > #define guest_walker guest_walker64 > > #define FNAME(name) paging##64_##name > > #define PT_BASE_ADDR_MASK GUEST_PT64_BASE_ADDR_MASK > > - #define PT_LVL_ADDR_MASK(lvl) PT64_LVL_ADDR_MASK(lvl) > > + #define PT_LVL_ADDR_MASK(vcpu, lvl) (~kvm_gpa_stolen_mask(vcpu->kvm) & \ > > + PT64_LVL_ADDR_MASK(lvl)) > > #define PT_LVL_OFFSET_MASK(lvl) PT64_LVL_OFFSET_MASK(lvl) > > #define PT_INDEX(addr, level) PT64_INDEX(addr, level) > > #define PT_LEVEL_BITS PT64_LEVEL_BITS > > @@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ > > #define guest_walker guest_walker32 > > #define FNAME(name) paging##32_##name > > #define PT_BASE_ADDR_MASK PT32_BASE_ADDR_MASK > > - #define PT_LVL_ADDR_MASK(lvl) PT32_LVL_ADDR_MASK(lvl) > > + #define PT_LVL_ADDR_MASK(vcpu, lvl) PT32_LVL_ADDR_MASK(lvl) > > #define PT_LVL_OFFSET_MASK(lvl) PT32_LVL_OFFSET_MASK(lvl) > > #define PT_INDEX(addr, level) PT32_INDEX(addr, level) > > #define PT_LEVEL_BITS PT32_LEVEL_BITS > > @@ -58,7 +59,7 @@ > > #define guest_walker guest_walkerEPT > > #define FNAME(name) ept_##name > > #define PT_BASE_ADDR_MASK GUEST_PT64_BASE_ADDR_MASK > > - #define PT_LVL_ADDR_MASK(lvl) PT64_LVL_ADDR_MASK(lvl) > > + #define PT_LVL_ADDR_MASK(vcpu, lvl) PT64_LVL_ADDR_MASK(lvl) > > #define PT_LVL_OFFSET_MASK(lvl) PT64_LVL_OFFSET_MASK(lvl) > > #define PT_INDEX(addr, level) PT64_INDEX(addr, level) > > #define PT_LEVEL_BITS PT64_LEVEL_BITS > > @@ -75,7 +76,7 @@ > > #define PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_MASK (1 << PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_SHIFT) > > > > #define gpte_to_gfn_lvl FNAME(gpte_to_gfn_lvl) > > -#define gpte_to_gfn(pte) gpte_to_gfn_lvl((pte), PG_LEVEL_4K) > > +#define gpte_to_gfn(vcpu, pte) gpte_to_gfn_lvl(vcpu, pte, PG_LEVEL_4K) > > > > /* > > * The guest_walker structure emulates the behavior of the hardware page > > @@ -96,9 +97,9 @@ struct guest_walker { > > struct x86_exception fault; > > }; > > > > -static gfn_t gpte_to_gfn_lvl(pt_element_t gpte, int lvl) > > +static gfn_t gpte_to_gfn_lvl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, pt_element_t gpte, int lvl) > > { > > - return (gpte & PT_LVL_ADDR_MASK(lvl)) >> PAGE_SHIFT; > > + return (gpte & PT_LVL_ADDR_MASK(vcpu, lvl)) >> PAGE_SHIFT; > > } > > > > static inline void FNAME(protect_clean_gpte)(struct kvm_mmu *mmu, unsigned *access, > > @@ -395,7 +396,7 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker, > > --walker->level; > > > > index = PT_INDEX(addr, walker->level); > > - table_gfn = gpte_to_gfn(pte); > > + table_gfn = gpte_to_gfn(vcpu, pte); > > offset = index * sizeof(pt_element_t); > > pte_gpa = gfn_to_gpa(table_gfn) + offset; > > > > @@ -460,7 +461,7 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker, > > if (unlikely(errcode)) > > goto error; > > > > - gfn = gpte_to_gfn_lvl(pte, walker->level); > > + gfn = gpte_to_gfn_lvl(vcpu, pte, walker->level); > > gfn += (addr & PT_LVL_OFFSET_MASK(walker->level)) >> PAGE_SHIFT; > > > > if (PTTYPE == 32 && walker->level > PG_LEVEL_4K && is_cpuid_PSE36()) > > @@ -555,12 +556,14 @@ FNAME(prefetch_gpte)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, > > gfn_t gfn; > > kvm_pfn_t pfn; > > > > + WARN_ON(gpte & kvm_gpa_stolen_mask(vcpu->kvm)); > > + > > if (FNAME(prefetch_invalid_gpte)(vcpu, sp, spte, gpte)) > > return false; > > > > pgprintk("%s: gpte %llx spte %p\n", __func__, (u64)gpte, spte); > > > > - gfn = gpte_to_gfn(gpte); > > + gfn = gpte_to_gfn(vcpu, gpte); > > pte_access = sp->role.access & FNAME(gpte_access)(gpte); > > FNAME(protect_clean_gpte)(vcpu->arch.mmu, &pte_access, gpte); > > > > @@ -656,6 +659,8 @@ static int FNAME(fetch)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault, > > WARN_ON_ONCE(gw->gfn != base_gfn); > > direct_access = gw->pte_access; > > > > + WARN_ON(fault->addr & kvm_gpa_stolen_mask(vcpu->kvm)); > > + > > top_level = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_level; > > if (top_level == PT32E_ROOT_LEVEL) > > top_level = PT32_ROOT_LEVEL; > > @@ -1080,7 +1085,7 @@ static int FNAME(sync_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp) > > continue; > > } > > > > - gfn = gpte_to_gfn(gpte); > > + gfn = gpte_to_gfn(vcpu, gpte); > > pte_access = sp->role.access; > > pte_access &= FNAME(gpte_access)(gpte); > > FNAME(protect_clean_gpte)(vcpu->arch.mmu, &pte_access, gpte); > > In commit message you mentioned "Don't support stolen bits for shadow EPT" (you > actually mean shadow MMU I suppose), yet there's bunch of code change to shadow > MMU. Those are not needed. I'll drop them. -- Isaku Yamahata