Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S965638AbXEAH6y (ORCPT ); Tue, 1 May 2007 03:58:54 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S965641AbXEAH6y (ORCPT ); Tue, 1 May 2007 03:58:54 -0400 Received: from ug-out-1314.google.com ([66.249.92.175]:22116 "EHLO ug-out-1314.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S965638AbXEAH6x (ORCPT ); Tue, 1 May 2007 03:58:53 -0400 DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=beta; h=received:message-id:date:from:user-agent:mime-version:to:cc:subject:references:in-reply-to:x-enigmail-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding; b=EFCFLUHKlFgpXOpyIfac+TN9n3PHzQhaYJ/CpxF6klRHyStfc9j5JOYBIXstmxo73B0hdDCC8nwzBgBRPU3hgD0sQrP79HqvALMdKFfWxtBebnDNDLAvEjF8wwJCoxVAG8lLON8zWOIaBAjoxCP0nfNMcAh5frqhncaws8ui8Wg= Message-ID: <4636F337.3060702@gmail.com> Date: Tue, 01 May 2007 09:58:47 +0200 From: Jiri Slaby User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.0 (X11/20070326) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Alan Cox CC: dann frazier , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, support@moxa.com.tw, dilinger@debian.org Subject: Re: old buffer overflow in moxa driver References: <20070430224829.GI31283@krebs.dannf> <20070501000455.2173b1e2@the-village.bc.nu> In-Reply-To: <20070501000455.2173b1e2@the-village.bc.nu> X-Enigmail-Version: 0.95b Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1333 Lines: 37 Alan Cox napsal(a): >> I noticed that the moxa input checking security bug described by >> CVE-2005-0504 appears to remain unfixed upstream. >> >> The issue is described here: >> http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-0504 >> >> Debian has been shipping the following patch from Andres Salomon. I >> tried contacting the listed maintainer a few months ago but received >> no response. > > > case MOXA_LOAD_BIOS: > case MOXA_FIND_BOARD: > case MOXA_LOAD_C320B: > case MOXA_LOAD_CODE: > if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) > return -EPERM; > break; > > At the point you abuse these calls you can already just load arbitary > data from userspace anyway. The problem is that we BUG_ON, when len < 0 in copy_from_user which is unlikely something we want to cause? regards, -- http://www.fi.muni.cz/~xslaby/ Jiri Slaby faculty of informatics, masaryk university, brno, cz e-mail: jirislaby gmail com, gpg pubkey fingerprint: B674 9967 0407 CE62 ACC8 22A0 32CC 55C3 39D4 7A7E - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/