Received: by 2002:a05:6a10:2726:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id ib38csp3494109pxb; Mon, 4 Apr 2022 18:47:03 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJwxAQMn/Mr9pPvgZQbWorpnsHBhJP5W560CcJP9pX2Dy5yyAI72zhjtBnrz2TBsqCZcB341 X-Received: by 2002:a63:2b8b:0:b0:398:a502:f41f with SMTP id r133-20020a632b8b000000b00398a502f41fmr868886pgr.17.1649123223619; Mon, 04 Apr 2022 18:47:03 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1649123223; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=Y71fcRBo12cf9EROkaIWjdn7GZ60f2GasSJeHIfcUusfgEnr+aNkdmCldHSwv4+O6T IreMlixJd01nv7jOl4NPks29HCBxTq9E1pGgYYe3DhyDmuMOwZB4PdWl38UccUJtgJg6 dqVKHzYI16sKuvIxythFbAK5ygVGjd1hwqjjFYRmVeKh5WyepSgCsP+dbNmHHH4tCceQ Qv6BO7UfnhoTLJ2aAJLoO6+v1bFjA0PLDbOcVBQgRevpHsaaeaJ0mCMFRnNMnIJhfnRE jAUriDNQzRE5PYdeaK2YSVZYe8qH6uDo9D27evNBMzqEUIirgK+lcp3l4iAiZBrtf6Te dp6A== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:in-reply-to:content-disposition:mime-version :references:message-id:subject:cc:to:from:date:dkim-signature; bh=Z1niaxx1tk5iaYOpyUwKb+7ihoIBIoE+g3zT8abXH64=; b=uJDNTX++PK0vyrW2DqDZL+McrQdYm5QDHIsmAYGiV9gpu5z0u8TU+OSgXUl1caa5/a CogPdNoGaFH0od/Jh9bQMgR+xjvzJt7loH/F6Iu7wuajlvpThr0ZMBfUs4ePETzPjsJA V8gETH/vKyYKiqQFqVRc9snrqu0HyZ1TsQoyIRi1IHEvomBtc5vg6uiq/aleC8rakh0R iXpLt6tinGvy0rWyfKzRL95Tv2dqzj15hsY2Dbj9M9zMDSmIipaUu+S5Q+YEqF6RJw1Y KcYX9zwid9PCA/DVCY5S6AmZHgxWBz9FS6bmiG0Y4Y5vqm4M6dDg3sPvsuip+RFsR1pG WqBQ== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@redhat.com header.s=mimecast20190719 header.b=LHfLNfuz; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=redhat.com Return-Path: Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (lindbergh.monkeyblade.net. [2620:137:e000::1:18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id p28-20020a63741c000000b0039815687f74si12191121pgc.839.2022.04.04.18.47.03 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 04 Apr 2022 18:47:03 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:18 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@redhat.com header.s=mimecast20190719 header.b=LHfLNfuz; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=redhat.com Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 839EB40E9E7; Mon, 4 Apr 2022 17:47:10 -0700 (PDT) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1356651AbiDDQBE (ORCPT + 99 others); Mon, 4 Apr 2022 12:01:04 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:59180 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1350761AbiDDQBB (ORCPT ); Mon, 4 Apr 2022 12:01:01 -0400 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com (us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com [170.10.133.124]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8EB4B1E3C5 for ; Mon, 4 Apr 2022 08:59:04 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1649087943; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=Z1niaxx1tk5iaYOpyUwKb+7ihoIBIoE+g3zT8abXH64=; b=LHfLNfuzn/czJWhFEjlFCj8TiA/b1cmUxdp8gUqx4en7Ia6h+P7FVqLynAA/lrjrjPBiNP w+JBPfl/lUSOQhWkKjVx9rYM8M6zpcYBb/SnssGdqmSAQOB5hSni1TC1BfjIf9mxAYBJ70 m4QtIsmhXLYRaKGXqvBq0XEmsbktZvg= Received: from mimecast-mx02.redhat.com (mx3-rdu2.redhat.com [66.187.233.73]) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP with STARTTLS (version=TLSv1.2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id us-mta-396-eIAxkngwN7uHJSKc0iO7bA-1; Mon, 04 Apr 2022 11:59:02 -0400 X-MC-Unique: eIAxkngwN7uHJSKc0iO7bA-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx07.intmail.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com [10.11.54.7]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx02.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 731E71C068C4; Mon, 4 Apr 2022 15:59:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: from madcap2.tricolour.ca (ovpn-0-8.rdu2.redhat.com [10.22.0.8]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1EF141457F04; Mon, 4 Apr 2022 15:58:53 +0000 (UTC) Date: Mon, 4 Apr 2022 11:58:50 -0400 From: Richard Guy Briggs To: CGEL Cc: Paul Moore , kbuild-all@lists.01.org, Zeal Robot , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com, dai.shixin@zte.com.cn, Yang Yang , linux-audit@redhat.com, ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru, huang.junhua@zte.com.cn, guo.xiaofeng@zte.com.cn, mattst88@gmail.com Subject: Re: [PATCH] audit: do a quick exit when syscall number is invalid Message-ID: References: <20220326094654.2361956-1-yang.yang29@zte.com.cn> <62465bf3.1c69fb81.d5424.365e@mx.google.com> <2777189.mvXUDI8C0e@x2> <624803f7.1c69fb81.972da.2dd0@mx.google.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <624803f7.1c69fb81.972da.2dd0@mx.google.com> X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.85 on 10.11.54.7 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.0 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RDNS_NONE,SPF_HELO_NONE,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 2022-04-02 08:06, CGEL wrote: > On Fri, Apr 01, 2022 at 10:16:45AM -0400, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Fri, Apr 1, 2022 at 9:39 AM Steve Grubb wrote: > > > On Thursday, March 31, 2022 9:57:05 PM EDT CGEL wrote: > > > > On Thu, Mar 31, 2022 at 10:16:23AM -0400, Paul Moore wrote: > > > > > On Wed, Mar 30, 2022 at 10:29 PM CGEL wrote: > > > > > > On Wed, Mar 30, 2022 at 10:48:12AM -0400, Paul Moore wrote: > > > > > > > If audit is not generating SYSCALL records, even for invalid/ENOSYS > > > > > > > syscalls, I would consider that a bug which should be fixed. > > > > > > > > > > > > If we fix this bug, do you think audit invalid/ENOSYS syscalls better > > > > > > be forcible or be a rule that can be configure? I think configure is > > > > > > better. > > > > > > > > > > It isn't clear to me exactly what you are asking, but I would expect > > > > > the existing audit syscall filtering mechanism to work regardless if > > > > > the syscall is valid or not. > > > > > > > > Thanks, I try to make it more clear. We found that auditctl would only > > > > set rule with syscall number (>=0 && <2047) ... > > > > That is exactly why I wrote the warning below in my response ... > > > I think the question is more clear now. > > 1) libaudit.c wants to forbid setting invalid syscall, but inconsistent > Currently way(>=0 && <2047) is inconsistent, syscall with number 2000 and > syscall with number 3000 are both invalid syscall. But 2000 can be set by > auditctl, and 3000 cannot be set by auditctl. > A better way to do this forbidden is to use __NR_syscalls(asm-generic/unistd.h). > > 2) if libaudit.c do the right forbidden, kernel better ignore invalid syscall > See this patch. > > If we want audit invalid syscall as you said before. libaudit.c should not > do the forbidden, auditctl should allow setting syscall rule with 'any' number. > So do you think we should fix libaudit.c? I'm having a bit of trouble understanding what you've said above. The kernel ultimately must protect itself from malice and mistakes, so it must verify all data sent to it. Userspace can help by knowing what that kernel policy is so it can avoid violating that policy or provide useful feedback if it can't. Userspace can be used to make things more efficient, but the kernel is the last step for security. If userspace and the kernel are mismatched or out of sync, then the kernel enforces policy to protect itself. > > > > > Beware that there are some limitations > > > > > to the audit syscall filter, which are unfortunately baked into the > > > > > current design/implementation, which may affect this to some extent. > > > > -- > > paul-moore.com - RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada IRC: rgb, SunRaycer Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635