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[2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id e11-20020a50e00b000000b00418d80a5fb9si10059086edl.358.2022.04.05.17.40.16; Tue, 05 Apr 2022 17:40:42 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.s=korg header.b=jehgB2ia; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=linuxfoundation.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1346504AbiDELBW (ORCPT + 99 others); Tue, 5 Apr 2022 07:01:22 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:49634 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S235746AbiDEIkX (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 Apr 2022 04:40:23 -0400 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [145.40.68.75]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6B62CC01; Tue, 5 Apr 2022 01:33:39 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 117EDB81C69; Tue, 5 Apr 2022 08:33:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 50C32C385A1; Tue, 5 Apr 2022 08:33:36 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1649147616; bh=eg+x736kktKum9CLjZaUEIRNFMQuDWNp3YHLcTRCvkk=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=jehgB2iaAFEflElXCOu1C+0SEvaZCKInHUMDWYDnXRt0Gy1E1mANVyM04Z44z5HHa bewmI3n7ASOclkfN5TQ2rElfYTQocnvfDA7Bx8VmOSnsvPFkb//K+l+uw6G11SqHLT sdlOMNlqREedpYzBLts3utXczOWQ/Ud9fLH7oYNg= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Stefan Berger , Tianjia Zhang , Eric Biggers , Vitaly Chikunov , Jarkko Sakkinen Subject: [PATCH 5.16 0059/1017] KEYS: asymmetric: properly validate hash_algo and encoding Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2022 09:16:12 +0200 Message-Id: <20220405070355.937059245@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.35.1 In-Reply-To: <20220405070354.155796697@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220405070354.155796697@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Biggers commit 590bfb57b2328951d5833979e7ca1d5fde2e609a upstream. It is insecure to allow arbitrary hash algorithms and signature encodings to be used with arbitrary signature algorithms. Notably, ECDSA, ECRDSA, and SM2 all sign/verify raw hash values and don't disambiguate between different hash algorithms like RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 padding does. Therefore, they need to be restricted to certain sets of hash algorithms (ideally just one, but in practice small sets are used). Additionally, the encoding is an integral part of modern signature algorithms, and is not supposed to vary. Therefore, tighten the checks of hash_algo and encoding done by software_key_determine_akcipher(). Also rearrange the parameters to software_key_determine_akcipher() to put the public_key first, as this is the most important parameter and it often determines everything else. Fixes: 299f561a6693 ("x509: Add support for parsing x509 certs with ECDSA keys") Fixes: 215525639631 ("X.509: support OSCCA SM2-with-SM3 certificate verification") Fixes: 0d7a78643f69 ("crypto: ecrdsa - add EC-RDSA (GOST 34.10) algorithm") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Tested-by: Stefan Berger Tested-by: Tianjia Zhang Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 111 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 76 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c @@ -60,39 +60,83 @@ static void public_key_destroy(void *pay } /* - * Determine the crypto algorithm name. + * Given a public_key, and an encoding and hash_algo to be used for signing + * and/or verification with that key, determine the name of the corresponding + * akcipher algorithm. Also check that encoding and hash_algo are allowed. */ -static -int software_key_determine_akcipher(const char *encoding, - const char *hash_algo, - const struct public_key *pkey, - char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]) +static int +software_key_determine_akcipher(const struct public_key *pkey, + const char *encoding, const char *hash_algo, + char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]) { int n; - if (strcmp(encoding, "pkcs1") == 0) { - /* The data wangled by the RSA algorithm is typically padded - * and encoded in some manner, such as EMSA-PKCS1-1_5 [RFC3447 - * sec 8.2]. + if (!encoding) + return -EINVAL; + + if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "rsa") == 0) { + /* + * RSA signatures usually use EMSA-PKCS1-1_5 [RFC3447 sec 8.2]. + */ + if (strcmp(encoding, "pkcs1") == 0) { + if (!hash_algo) + n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, + "pkcs1pad(%s)", + pkey->pkey_algo); + else + n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, + "pkcs1pad(%s,%s)", + pkey->pkey_algo, hash_algo); + return n >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME ? -EINVAL : 0; + } + if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0) + return -EINVAL; + /* + * Raw RSA cannot differentiate between different hash + * algorithms. + */ + if (hash_algo) + return -EINVAL; + } else if (strncmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecdsa", 5) == 0) { + if (strcmp(encoding, "x962") != 0) + return -EINVAL; + /* + * ECDSA signatures are taken over a raw hash, so they don't + * differentiate between different hash algorithms. That means + * that the verifier should hard-code a specific hash algorithm. + * Unfortunately, in practice ECDSA is used with multiple SHAs, + * so we have to allow all of them and not just one. */ if (!hash_algo) - n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, - "pkcs1pad(%s)", - pkey->pkey_algo); - else - n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, - "pkcs1pad(%s,%s)", - pkey->pkey_algo, hash_algo); - return n >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME ? -EINVAL : 0; - } - - if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") == 0 || - strcmp(encoding, "x962") == 0) { - strcpy(alg_name, pkey->pkey_algo); - return 0; + return -EINVAL; + if (strcmp(hash_algo, "sha1") != 0 && + strcmp(hash_algo, "sha224") != 0 && + strcmp(hash_algo, "sha256") != 0 && + strcmp(hash_algo, "sha384") != 0 && + strcmp(hash_algo, "sha512") != 0) + return -EINVAL; + } else if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "sm2") == 0) { + if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0) + return -EINVAL; + if (!hash_algo) + return -EINVAL; + if (strcmp(hash_algo, "sm3") != 0) + return -EINVAL; + } else if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecrdsa") == 0) { + if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0) + return -EINVAL; + if (!hash_algo) + return -EINVAL; + if (strcmp(hash_algo, "streebog256") != 0 && + strcmp(hash_algo, "streebog512") != 0) + return -EINVAL; + } else { + /* Unknown public key algorithm */ + return -ENOPKG; } - - return -ENOPKG; + if (strscpy(alg_name, pkey->pkey_algo, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) < 0) + return -EINVAL; + return 0; } static u8 *pkey_pack_u32(u8 *dst, u32 val) @@ -113,9 +157,8 @@ static int software_key_query(const stru u8 *key, *ptr; int ret, len; - ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(params->encoding, - params->hash_algo, - pkey, alg_name); + ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(pkey, params->encoding, + params->hash_algo, alg_name); if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -179,9 +222,8 @@ static int software_key_eds_op(struct ke pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); - ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(params->encoding, - params->hash_algo, - pkey, alg_name); + ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(pkey, params->encoding, + params->hash_algo, alg_name); if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -340,9 +382,8 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const st return -EKEYREJECTED; } - ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(sig->encoding, - sig->hash_algo, - pkey, alg_name); + ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(pkey, sig->encoding, + sig->hash_algo, alg_name); if (ret < 0) return ret;