Received: by 2002:a05:6a10:2726:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id ib38csp684904pxb; Tue, 5 Apr 2022 18:42:49 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJyQalmUW/bMOngj8fc4u1yWB2XDUvlpU1xGDvnJk5ysf2QpZnfFDr9adVuPxbaX1JGmsqP3 X-Received: by 2002:a05:6402:84f:b0:419:638f:2bd5 with SMTP id b15-20020a056402084f00b00419638f2bd5mr6206171edz.283.1649209369056; Tue, 05 Apr 2022 18:42:49 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1649209369; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=CtKGjhHIT+AWMoLR5lM5YJLv8e3QLySMq47PooSj1V5vPJ110bsv71r6w23wk2wu19 O9AUsRFVm78TynBT+fyDPezeN24FJmXAnRsXdbR9rvJSUcjAb2DhCzuYgkrwNIL9Am6C /xImdyFOzdQaaJtJfeiKmFFf+oWUt11QIet1Y8QDaYupAPTDncT94O1MmEhy5nlVtAYx IZhs8samx5d080m0A4K8HuTiM/XZZQhm5zA24lD2nPp7+nrcJciqugty0tiRhzjstb0F eoKSEGaCWaxBjCv/ZqyA+hYeLeHq190CA07gqa0fgIMg/I772JB4ZJfeXCuSVIRzDl80 dsaw== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:content-transfer-encoding:mime-version :user-agent:references:in-reply-to:message-id:date:subject:cc:to :from:dkim-signature; bh=ERBdM817CSvrGMY5Gu0zaDaYIoCxZJQEij+PkEOFHL0=; b=Tt6bFxQIMseWfbTTg72gtR1qCiWikIw3sFEpId7Uyh2gf4RjfvvpialNU4+jOos3LN C2w44lIo7mgb3uHcIKrakcDGZTUI9wdfBZQG45isJmwADmHt9zEmgVvodzpDlTukGM2O m3Mf+BF6+WzwC2CukaqK3wiyGakakXh/ktY7FJyMX6hGOR02DNMNQ2Bmpk724CxJ1j64 xpIgCEifdsl6Bp/txz4ndkNABdzae1kn/ScxeiykwQpeX8pNujX/q/4Yb4UlM13AbASC Ir8giZr+Dnb1gBMNm4CkeHgK8UmZFwVorxqw/WeRAGI94QZvBOb4ZOJjVDRjiFGgEw3W uWRg== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.s=korg header.b=01iWNJKs; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=linuxfoundation.org Return-Path: Received: from out1.vger.email (out1.vger.email. [2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id x12-20020a50d9cc000000b0041904b21a46si8846522edj.281.2022.04.05.18.42.19; Tue, 05 Apr 2022 18:42:49 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.s=korg header.b=01iWNJKs; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=linuxfoundation.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S240932AbiDEJGt (ORCPT + 99 others); Tue, 5 Apr 2022 05:06:49 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:34710 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S239047AbiDEITp (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 Apr 2022 04:19:45 -0400 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4641:c500::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 575F975E7B; Tue, 5 Apr 2022 01:10:06 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BFE34609AD; Tue, 5 Apr 2022 08:10:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5CBC7C385A0; Tue, 5 Apr 2022 08:10:04 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1649146205; bh=S4mnxFmPAJsdiaLabF/BAqmNFqBOwa3u59E0nxy9LkQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=01iWNJKsclMLvuBbiaVEymbjk1jIfkI+cqKUOQ5qdwUiQkpYZEKfXU6rX+sGTEpyO yhESQ0k0T5Tisplty3BAvkHuZiSX7KR6mbDXK+9EZ/wNw38uMZUrvCpcGI0G2zTlI9 8lwYPWwd7CUxf4iEZu1C3rscIHllOggdk1YWlCqY= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Kuniyuki Iwashima , "David S. Miller" , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.17 0681/1126] af_unix: Fix some data-races around unix_sk(sk)->oob_skb. Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2022 09:23:48 +0200 Message-Id: <20220405070427.609069367@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.35.1 In-Reply-To: <20220405070407.513532867@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220405070407.513532867@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Kuniyuki Iwashima [ Upstream commit e82025c623e2bf04d162bafceb66a59115814479 ] Out-of-band data automatically places a "mark" showing wherein the sequence the out-of-band data would have been. If the out-of-band data implies cancelling everything sent so far, the "mark" is helpful to flush them. When the socket's read pointer reaches the "mark", the ioctl() below sets a non zero value to the arg `atmark`: The out-of-band data is queued in sk->sk_receive_queue as well as ordinary data and also saved in unix_sk(sk)->oob_skb. It can be used to test if the head of the receive queue is the out-of-band data meaning the socket is at the "mark". While testing that, unix_ioctl() reads unix_sk(sk)->oob_skb locklessly. Thus, all accesses to oob_skb need some basic protection to avoid load/store tearing which KCSAN detects when these are called concurrently: - ioctl(fd_a, SIOCATMARK, &atmark, sizeof(atmark)) - send(fd_b_connected_to_a, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_OOB) BUG: KCSAN: data-race in unix_ioctl / unix_stream_sendmsg write to 0xffff888003d9cff0 of 8 bytes by task 175 on cpu 1: unix_stream_sendmsg (net/unix/af_unix.c:2087 net/unix/af_unix.c:2191) sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:705 net/socket.c:725) __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2040) __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2048) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:113) read to 0xffff888003d9cff0 of 8 bytes by task 176 on cpu 0: unix_ioctl (net/unix/af_unix.c:3101 (discriminator 1)) sock_do_ioctl (net/socket.c:1128) sock_ioctl (net/socket.c:1242) __x64_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:52 fs/ioctl.c:874 fs/ioctl.c:860 fs/ioctl.c:860) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:113) value changed: 0xffff888003da0c00 -> 0xffff888003da0d00 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 176 Comm: unix_race_oob_i Not tainted 5.17.0-rc5-59529-g83dc4c2af682 #12 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.0-2.amzn2 04/01/2014 Fixes: 314001f0bf92 ("af_unix: Add OOB support") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/unix/af_unix.c | 12 +++++------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c index c19569819866..0c37e5595aae 100644 --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c @@ -2084,7 +2084,7 @@ static int queue_oob(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sock *other if (ousk->oob_skb) consume_skb(ousk->oob_skb); - ousk->oob_skb = skb; + WRITE_ONCE(ousk->oob_skb, skb); scm_stat_add(other, skb); skb_queue_tail(&other->sk_receive_queue, skb); @@ -2602,9 +2602,8 @@ static int unix_stream_recv_urg(struct unix_stream_read_state *state) oob_skb = u->oob_skb; - if (!(state->flags & MSG_PEEK)) { - u->oob_skb = NULL; - } + if (!(state->flags & MSG_PEEK)) + WRITE_ONCE(u->oob_skb, NULL); unix_state_unlock(sk); @@ -2639,7 +2638,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *manage_oob(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk, skb = NULL; } else if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_URGINLINE)) { if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) { - u->oob_skb = NULL; + WRITE_ONCE(u->oob_skb, NULL); consume_skb(skb); } } else if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) { @@ -3094,11 +3093,10 @@ static int unix_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) case SIOCATMARK: { struct sk_buff *skb; - struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk); int answ = 0; skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue); - if (skb && skb == u->oob_skb) + if (skb && skb == READ_ONCE(unix_sk(sk)->oob_skb)) answ = 1; err = put_user(answ, (int __user *)arg); } -- 2.34.1