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[23.128.96.19]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id a8-20020a63e408000000b0039c690a744fsi2299101pgi.38.2022.04.06.08.33.16 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 06 Apr 2022 08:33:16 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: softfail (google.com: domain of transitioning linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org does not designate 23.128.96.19 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.19; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=softfail (google.com: domain of transitioning linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org does not designate 23.128.96.19 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=arm.com Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 879751F163C; Wed, 6 Apr 2022 06:44:54 -0700 (PDT) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S233647AbiDFNqn (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 6 Apr 2022 09:46:43 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:36484 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S233881AbiDFNqC (ORCPT ); Wed, 6 Apr 2022 09:46:02 -0400 Received: from foss.arm.com (foss.arm.com [217.140.110.172]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id E3BC6523906 for ; Wed, 6 Apr 2022 03:58:38 -0700 (PDT) Received: from usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (unknown [10.121.207.14]) by usa-sjc-mx-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A8A6123A; Wed, 6 Apr 2022 03:58:38 -0700 (PDT) Received: from FVFF77S0Q05N (unknown [10.57.10.98]) by usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 650483F718; Wed, 6 Apr 2022 03:58:36 -0700 (PDT) Date: Wed, 6 Apr 2022 11:58:32 +0100 From: Mark Rutland To: Tong Tiangen Cc: Andrew Morton , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Alexander Viro , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, james.morse@arm.com Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH -next V2 3/7] arm64: add support for machine check error safe Message-ID: References: <20220406091311.3354723-1-tongtiangen@huawei.com> <20220406091311.3354723-4-tongtiangen@huawei.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20220406091311.3354723-4-tongtiangen@huawei.com> X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RDNS_NONE, SPF_HELO_NONE,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Apr 06, 2022 at 09:13:07AM +0000, Tong Tiangen wrote: > In arm64 kernel hardware memory errors process(do_sea()), if the errors > is consumed in the kernel, the current processing is panic. However, > it is not optimal. In some case, the page accessed in kernel is a user > page (such as copy_from_user/get_user), kill the user process and > isolate the user page with hardware memory errors is a better choice. > > Consistent with PPC/x86, it is implemented by CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_COPY_MC. Why do we need new helpers for this, rather than doing this for *any* uaccess? I understand this is consistent with PPC & X86, but *why* is it done that way today? e.g. are there cases where we access memroy where we do not expect the situation to be recoverable? > This patch only enable machine error check framework, it add exception > fixup before kernel panic in do_sea() and only limit the consumption of > hardware memory errors in kernel mode triggered by user mode processes. > If fixup successful, there is no need to panic. > > Also add _asm_extable_mc macro used for add extable entry to help > fixup. > > Signed-off-by: Tong Tiangen > --- > arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + > arch/arm64/include/asm/asm-extable.h | 13 ++++++++++++ > arch/arm64/include/asm/esr.h | 5 +++++ > arch/arm64/include/asm/extable.h | 2 +- > arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c | 2 +- > arch/arm64/mm/extable.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++- > arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > include/linux/uaccess.h | 8 ++++++++ > 8 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig > index d9325dd95eba..012e38309955 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig > +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig > @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ config ARM64 > select ARCH_ENABLE_SPLIT_PMD_PTLOCK if PGTABLE_LEVELS > 2 > select ARCH_ENABLE_THP_MIGRATION if TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE > select ARCH_HAS_CACHE_LINE_SIZE > + select ARCH_HAS_COPY_MC if ACPI_APEI_GHES > select ARCH_HAS_CURRENT_STACK_POINTER > select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_VIRTUAL > select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_VM_PGTABLE > diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/asm-extable.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/asm-extable.h > index c39f2437e08e..74d1db74fd86 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/asm-extable.h > +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/asm-extable.h > @@ -8,6 +8,11 @@ > #define EX_TYPE_UACCESS_ERR_ZERO 3 > #define EX_TYPE_LOAD_UNALIGNED_ZEROPAD 4 > > +/* _MC indicates that can fixup from machine check errors */ > +#define EX_TYPE_FIXUP_MC 5 > + > +#define IS_EX_TYPE_MC(type) (type == EX_TYPE_FIXUP_MC) If we need this, I'd strongly prefer that we have a EX_TYPE_UACCESS_MC or EX_TYPE_UACCESS_MC_ERR_ZERO for the uaccess cases, so that we can clearly distinguish those from non-uaccess cases. AFAICT the only remaining raw EX_TYPE_FIXUP cases we have today are in some cache maintenance routines, and we should be able to convert those to a new EX_TYPE_FIXUP_UACCESS, or EX_TYPE_UACCESS_ERR_ZERO. > + > #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__ > > #define __ASM_EXTABLE_RAW(insn, fixup, type, data) \ > @@ -27,6 +32,14 @@ > __ASM_EXTABLE_RAW(\insn, \fixup, EX_TYPE_FIXUP, 0) > .endm > > +/* > + * Create an exception table entry for `insn`, which will branch to `fixup` > + * when an unhandled fault(include sea fault) is taken. > + */ > + .macro _asm_extable_mc, insn, fixup > + __ASM_EXTABLE_RAW(\insn, \fixup, EX_TYPE_FIXUP_MC, 0) > + .endm > + > /* > * Create an exception table entry for `insn` if `fixup` is provided. Otherwise > * do nothing. > diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/esr.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/esr.h > index d52a0b269ee8..11fcfc002654 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/esr.h > +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/esr.h > @@ -330,6 +330,11 @@ > #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ > #include > > +static inline bool esr_is_sea(u32 esr) > +{ > + return (esr & ESR_ELx_FSC) == ESR_ELx_FSC_EXTABT; > +} > + > static inline bool esr_is_data_abort(u32 esr) > { > const u32 ec = ESR_ELx_EC(esr); > diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/extable.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/extable.h > index 72b0e71cc3de..f7835b0f473b 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/extable.h > +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/extable.h > @@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ bool ex_handler_bpf(const struct exception_table_entry *ex, > } > #endif /* !CONFIG_BPF_JIT */ > > -bool fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs); > +bool fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int esr); > #endif > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c > index d9dfa82c1f18..16a069e8eec3 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c > +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c > @@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ int __kprobes kprobe_fault_handler(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int fsr) > * In case the user-specified fault handler returned > * zero, try to fix up. > */ > - if (fixup_exception(regs)) > + if (fixup_exception(regs, fsr)) > return 1; > } > return 0; > diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/extable.c b/arch/arm64/mm/extable.c > index 489455309695..f1134c88e849 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/mm/extable.c > +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/extable.c > @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ > > #include > #include > +#include > > static inline unsigned long > get_ex_fixup(const struct exception_table_entry *ex) > @@ -23,6 +24,18 @@ static bool ex_handler_fixup(const struct exception_table_entry *ex, > return true; > } > > +static bool ex_handler_fixup_mc(const struct exception_table_entry *ex, > + struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int esr) > +{ > + if (esr_is_sea(esr)) > + regs->regs[0] = 0; > + else > + regs->regs[0] = 1; This needs more explanation. Why does this hard-code an assumption that we can alter x0? Why is the x0 value distinct for SEA or non-SEA? What is this meant to represent specifically? What if this SEA was taken for a reason other than a memory error? > + > + regs->pc = get_ex_fixup(ex); > + return true; > +} > + > static bool ex_handler_uaccess_err_zero(const struct exception_table_entry *ex, > struct pt_regs *regs) > { > @@ -63,7 +76,7 @@ ex_handler_load_unaligned_zeropad(const struct exception_table_entry *ex, > return true; > } > > -bool fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs) > +bool fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int esr) > { > const struct exception_table_entry *ex; > > @@ -71,9 +84,14 @@ bool fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs) > if (!ex) > return false; > > + if (esr_is_sea(esr) && !IS_EX_TYPE_MC(ex->type)) > + return false; I don't think this check belongs here. Either this should be folded into ex_handler_fixup_mc(), or we should make the judgement earlier in the fault handling path, and have a separate fixup_exception_mc() that we can call specifically in the case of a memory error. > + > switch (ex->type) { > case EX_TYPE_FIXUP: > return ex_handler_fixup(ex, regs); > + case EX_TYPE_FIXUP_MC: > + return ex_handler_fixup_mc(ex, regs, esr); > case EX_TYPE_BPF: > return ex_handler_bpf(ex, regs); > case EX_TYPE_UACCESS_ERR_ZERO: > diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c > index 77341b160aca..ffdfab2fdd60 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c > +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c > @@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ static void __do_kernel_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, > * Are we prepared to handle this kernel fault? > * We are almost certainly not prepared to handle instruction faults. > */ > - if (!is_el1_instruction_abort(esr) && fixup_exception(regs)) > + if (!is_el1_instruction_abort(esr) && fixup_exception(regs, esr)) > return; > > if (WARN_RATELIMIT(is_spurious_el1_translation_fault(addr, esr, regs), > @@ -695,6 +695,30 @@ static int do_bad(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs) > return 1; /* "fault" */ > } > > +static bool arm64_process_kernel_sea(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, > + struct pt_regs *regs, int sig, int code) > +{ > + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_COPY_MC)) > + return false; > + > + if (user_mode(regs) || !current->mm) > + return false; > + > + if (apei_claim_sea(regs) < 0) > + return false; > + > + current->thread.fault_address = 0; > + current->thread.fault_code = esr; > + > + if (!fixup_exception(regs, esr)) > + return false; > + > + arm64_force_sig_fault(sig, code, addr, > + "Uncorrected hardware memory error in kernel-access\n"); > + > + return true; > +} > + > static int do_sea(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs) > { > const struct fault_info *inf; > @@ -720,6 +744,10 @@ static int do_sea(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs) > */ > siaddr = untagged_addr(far); > } > + > + if (arm64_process_kernel_sea(siaddr, esr, regs, inf->sig, inf->code)) > + return 0; > + > arm64_notify_die(inf->name, regs, inf->sig, inf->code, siaddr, esr); > > return 0; > diff --git a/include/linux/uaccess.h b/include/linux/uaccess.h > index 546179418ffa..dd952aeecdc1 100644 > --- a/include/linux/uaccess.h > +++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h > @@ -174,6 +174,14 @@ copy_mc_to_kernel(void *dst, const void *src, size_t cnt) > } > #endif > > +#ifndef copy_mc_to_user > +static inline unsigned long __must_check > +copy_mc_to_user(void *dst, const void *src, size_t cnt) > +{ > + return raw_copy_to_user(dst, src, cnt); > +} ... this isn't using the new EX_TYPE_FIXUP_MC type, so isn't this just broken as of this patch? Thanks, Mark. > +#endif > + > static __always_inline void pagefault_disabled_inc(void) > { > current->pagefault_disabled++; > -- > 2.18.0.huawei.25 > > > _______________________________________________ > linux-arm-kernel mailing list > linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org > http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel