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Date:   Fri, 8 Apr 2022 15:11:08 +0800
From:   Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
To:     Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>, Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
Cc:     Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
        Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
        Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
        Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
        Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>,
        Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>,
        Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>,
        Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>,
        Alexander Egorenkov <egorenar@linux.ibm.com>,
        AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>,
        James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
        Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
        Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>,
        linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
        keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        stable@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/4] Fix arm64 kexec forbidding kernels signed with keys
 in the secondary keyring to boot
Message-ID: <Yk/eFBCqBTu4eZf2@MiWiFi-R3L-srv>
References: <cover.1644953683.git.msuchanek@suse.de>
 <83b3583f35c50c609739a8d857d14e8410293373.1644953683.git.msuchanek@suse.de>
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In-Reply-To: <83b3583f35c50c609739a8d857d14e8410293373.1644953683.git.msuchanek@suse.de>
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Hi,

On 02/15/22 at 08:39pm, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> commit d3bfe84129f6 ("certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically")
> split of .system_keyring into .builtin_trusted_keys and
> .secondary_trusted_keys broke kexec, thereby preventing kernels signed by
> keys which are now in the secondary keyring from being kexec'd.
> 
> Fix this by passing VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING to
> verify_pefile_signature().
> 
> Cherry-picked from
> commit ea93102f3224 ("Fix kexec forbidding kernels signed with keys in the secondary keyring to boot")

This line may need a line feed?

The patch 1~3 looks good to me. Coiby encountered the same issue
on arm64, and has posted a patch series to fix that and there's clean up
and code adjustment.

https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220401013118.348084-1-coxu@redhat.com/T/#u

Hi Coiby,

Maybe you can check this patchset, and consider how to integrate your
patches based on this patch 1~/3?

For this patch itself, ack.

Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>

> 
> Fixes: 732b7b93d849 ("arm64: kexec_file: add kernel signature verification support")
> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
> Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: stable@kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
> ---
>  arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c | 3 ++-
>  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
> index 9ec34690e255..1fbf2ee7c005 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
> @@ -133,7 +133,8 @@ static void *image_load(struct kimage *image,
>  #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
>  static int image_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
>  {
> -	return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, NULL,
> +	return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
> +				       VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
>  				       VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
>  }
>  #endif
> -- 
> 2.31.1
>