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Message-ID: <48e087af-cc93-72f0-3907-9d1978530b87@linux.ibm.com>
Date:   Tue, 12 Apr 2022 13:02:50 +0300
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing
 secret area
Content-Language: en-US
To:     linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc:     Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>, Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
        Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
        Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        Andrew Scull <ascull@google.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
        "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
        Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>,
        Lenny Szubowicz <lszubowi@redhat.com>,
        Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>,
        Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
        James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
        Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@linux.ibm.com>,
        Jim Cadden <jcadden@ibm.com>,
        Daniele Buono <dbuono@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
References: <20220331215607.3182232-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
From:   Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
In-Reply-To: <20220331215607.3182232-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
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On 01/04/2022 0:56, Dov Murik wrote:
> Confidential computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted
> Virtualization) allows guest owners to inject secrets into the VMs
> memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them.  In SEV,
> secret injection is performed early in the VM launch process, before the
> guest starts running.
> 
> OVMF already reserves designated area for secret injection (in its
> AmdSev package; see edk2 commit 01726b6d23d4 "OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the
> Sev Secret area using a configuration table" [1]), but the secrets were
> not available in the guest kernel.
> 
> The patch series keeps the address of the EFI-provided memory for
> injected secrets, and exposes the secrets to userspace via securityfs
> using a new efi_secret kernel module.  The module is autoloaded (by the
> EFI driver) if the secret area is populated.
> 
> The first patch in EFI keeps the address of the secret area as passed in
> the EFI configuration table.  The second patch introduces the new
> efi_secret module that exposes the content of the secret entries as
> securityfs files, and allows clearing out secrets with a file unlink
> interface.  The third patch auto-loads the efi_secret module during
> startup if the injected secrets area is populated.  The last patch
> documents the data flow of confidential computing secret injection.
> 
> As a usage example, consider a guest performing computations on
> encrypted files.  The Guest Owner provides the decryption key (= secret)
> using the secret injection mechanism.  The guest application reads the
> secret from the efi_secret filesystem and proceeds to decrypt the files
> into memory and then performs the needed computations on the content.
> 
> In this example, the host can't read the files from the disk image
> because they are encrypted.  Host can't read the decryption key because
> it is passed using the secret injection mechanism (= secure channel).
> Host can't read the decrypted content from memory because it's a
> confidential (memory-encrypted) guest.
> 
> This has been tested with AMD SEV and SEV-ES guests, but the kernel side
> of handling the secret area has no SEV-specific dependencies, and
> therefore might be usable (perhaps with minor changes) for any
> confidential computing hardware that can publish the secret area via the
> standard EFI config table entry.
> 
> To enable this functionality, set CONFIG_EFI_SECRET=m when building the
> guest kernel.
> 
> Here is a simple example for usage of the efi_secret module in a guest
> to which an EFI secret area with 4 secrets was injected during launch:
> 
> ...
> [    0.000000] efi: EFI v2.70 by EDK II
> [    0.000000] efi: CocoSecret=0x7f222680 SMBIOS=0x7f541000 ACPI=0x7f77e000 ACPI 2.0=0x7f77e014 MEMATTR=0x7ea16418
> ...
> [    1.127627] Run /init as init process
> Loading, please wait...
> Starting version 245.4-4ubuntu3.15
> ...
> [    0.763204] efi_secret efi_secret.0: Created 4 entries in securityfs secrets/coco
> ...
> 
> # ls -la /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco
> total 0
> drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .
> drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 ..
> -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b
> -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6
> -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2
> -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910
> 
> # hd /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910
> 00000000  74 68 65 73 65 2d 61 72  65 2d 74 68 65 2d 6b 61  |these-are-the-ka|
> 00000010  74 61 2d 73 65 63 72 65  74 73 00 01 02 03 04 05  |ta-secrets......|
> 00000020  06 07                                             |..|
> 00000022
> 
> # rm /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910
> 
> # ls -la /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco
> total 0
> drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:55 .
> drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 ..
> -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b
> -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6
> -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2
> 
> 
> [1] https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/01726b6d23d4
> 
> 
> ---
> 
> v9 changes:
> - Change the module into a platform driver (thanks Ard)
> - Remove special auto-loading code in efi; instead register a platform
>   device (udev will load the efi_secret module) (thanks Ard)
> - Change logging in the efi_secret module to dev_err() etc.
> - efi_secret: first check that the secret area header is valid; only then start
>   creating securityfs dirs.
> 
> v8: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20220228114254.1099945-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/
> v8 changes:
>  - Change path of filesystem to <securityfs>/secrets/coco and fix the
>    documentation accordingly (Thanks Gerd, Matthew)
>  - Remove patch 2/5 (of v7) because the latest OVMF release (edk2-stable202202)
>    already contains the fix to mark the launch secret page as EFI_RESERVED_TYPE.
> 
> v7: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20220201124413.1093099-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/
> v7 changes:
>  - Improve description of efi_secret module in Kconfig.
>  - Fix sparse warnings on pointer address space mismatch
>    (Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>)
> 
> v6: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211129114251.3741721-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/
> v6 changes:
>  - Autoload the efi_secret module if the secret area is populated
>    (thanks Greg KH).
>  - efi_secret: Depend on X86_64 because we use ioremap_encrypted() which
>    is only defined for this arch.
>  - efi_secret.c: Remove unneeded tableheader_guid local variable.
>  - Documentation fixes.
> 
> v5: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211118113359.642571-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/
> v5 changes:
>  - Simplify EFI code: instead of copying the secret area, the firmware
>    marks the secret area as EFI_RESERVED_TYPE, and then the uefi_init()
>    code just keeps the pointer as it appears in the EFI configuration
>    table.  The use of reserved pages is similar to the AMD SEV-SNP
>    patches for handling SNP-Secrets and SNP-CPUID pages.
>  - In order to handle OVMF releases out there which mark the
>    confidential computing secrets page as EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA, add
>    efi/libstub code that detects this and fixes the E820 map to reserve
>    this page.
>  - In the efi_secret module code, map the secrets page using
>    ioremap_encrypted (again, similar to the AMD SEV-SNP guest patches
>    for accessing SNP-Secrets and SNP-CPUID pages).
>  - Add documentation in Documentation/security/coco/efi_secret.
> 
> v4: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211020061408.3447533-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/
> v4 changes:
>  - Guard all the new EFI and efi-stub code (patches 1+2) with #ifdef
>    CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET (thanks Greg KH).  Selecting
>    CONFIG_EFI_SECRET=m (patch 3) will enable the EFI parts as well.
>  - Guard call to clflush_cache_range() with #ifdef CONFIG_X86
>    (Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>)
> 
> v3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211014130848.592611-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/
> v3 changes:
>  - Rename the module to efi_secret
>  - Remove the exporting of clean_cache_range
>  - Use clflush_cache_range in wipe_memory
>  - Document function wipe_memory
>  - Initialize efi.coco_secret to EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR to correctly detect
>    when there's no secret area published in the EFI configuration tables
> 
> v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211007061838.1381129-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com
> v2 changes:
>  - Export clean_cache_range()
>  - When deleteing a secret, call clean_cache_range() after explicit_memzero
>  - Add Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-sev_secret
> 
> v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20210809190157.279332-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/
> 
> RFC: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20210628183431.953934-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/
> 
> 
> 
> Dov Murik (4):
>   efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area
>   virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
>   efi: Register efi_secret platform device if EFI secret area is
>     declared
>   docs: security: Add secrets/coco documentation
> 


This series has Reviewed-by tags on all patches (though, as I mentioned,
there's a missing #ifdef in patch 3).

Ard, are you going to take this through the EFI tree?

Should I resend the series with the fix for patch 3?

Thanks,
-Dov


>  Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco |  51 +++
>  Documentation/security/index.rst                  |   1 +
>  Documentation/security/secrets/coco.rst           | 103 ++++++
>  Documentation/security/secrets/index.rst          |   9 +
>  arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c                       |   3 +
>  drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig                      |  16 +
>  drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c                        |   9 +
>  drivers/virt/Kconfig                              |   3 +
>  drivers/virt/Makefile                             |   1 +
>  drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig              |  16 +
>  drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile             |   2 +
>  drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c         | 349 ++++++++++++++++++++
>  include/linux/efi.h                               |  10 +
>  13 files changed, 573 insertions(+)
>  create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco
>  create mode 100644 Documentation/security/secrets/coco.rst
>  create mode 100644 Documentation/security/secrets/index.rst
>  create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig
>  create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile
>  create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c
> 
> 
> base-commit: 7e57714cd0ad2d5bb90e50b5096a0e671dec1ef3