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Date:   Fri, 22 Apr 2022 11:32:15 +1000
Message-Id: <20220422013215.2301793-1-tweek@google.com>
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Subject: [PATCH v2] firmware_loader: use kernel credentials when reading firmware
From:   "=?UTF-8?q?Thi=C3=A9baud=20Weksteen?=" <tweek@google.com>
To:     Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc:     Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>,
        Saravana Kannan <saravanak@google.com>,
        Alistair Delva <adelva@google.com>,
        Adam Shih <adamshih@google.com>, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        "=?UTF-8?q?Thi=C3=A9baud=20Weksteen?=" <tweek@google.com>
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Device drivers may decide to not load firmware when probed to avoid
slowing down the boot process should the firmware filesystem not be
available yet. In this case, the firmware loading request may be done
when a device file associated with the driver is first accessed. The
credentials of the userspace process accessing the device file may be
used to validate access to the firmware files requested by the driver.
Ensure that the kernel assumes the responsibility of reading the
firmware.

This was observed on Android for a graphic driver loading their firmware
when the device file (e.g. /dev/mali0) was first opened by userspace
(i.e. surfaceflinger). The security context of surfaceflinger was used
to validate the access to the firmware file (e.g.
/vendor/firmware/mali.bin).

Because previous configurations were relying on the userspace fallback
mechanism, the security context of the userspace daemon (i.e. ueventd)
was consistently used to read firmware files. More devices are found to
use the command line argument firmware_class.path which gives the kernel
the opportunity to read the firmware directly, hence surfacing this
misattribution.

Signed-off-by: Thi=C3=A9baud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
---
v2: Add comment

 drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c b/drivers/base/firmware_lo=
ader/main.c
index 94d1789a233e..8f3c2b2cfc61 100644
--- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
+++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
@@ -735,6 +735,8 @@ _request_firmware(const struct firmware **firmware_p, c=
onst char *name,
 		  size_t offset, u32 opt_flags)
 {
 	struct firmware *fw =3D NULL;
+	struct cred *kern_cred =3D NULL;
+	const struct cred *old_cred;
 	bool nondirect =3D false;
 	int ret;
=20
@@ -751,6 +753,18 @@ _request_firmware(const struct firmware **firmware_p, =
const char *name,
 	if (ret <=3D 0) /* error or already assigned */
 		goto out;
=20
+	/*
+	 * We are about to try to access the firmware file. Because we may have b=
een
+	 * called by a driver when serving an unrelated request from userland, we=
 use
+	 * the kernel credentials to read the file.
+	 */
+	kern_cred =3D prepare_kernel_cred(NULL);
+	if (!kern_cred) {
+		ret =3D -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	old_cred =3D override_creds(kern_cred);
+
 	ret =3D fw_get_filesystem_firmware(device, fw->priv, "", NULL);
=20
 	/* Only full reads can support decompression, platform, and sysfs. */
@@ -776,6 +790,8 @@ _request_firmware(const struct firmware **firmware_p, c=
onst char *name,
 	} else
 		ret =3D assign_fw(fw, device);
=20
+	revert_creds(old_cred);
+
  out:
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		fw_abort_batch_reqs(fw);
--=20
2.36.0.rc2.479.g8af0fa9b8e-goog