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[2620:137:e000::1:18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id f2-20020a656282000000b003816043f0dasi2067616pgv.719.2022.04.27.10.58.51 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 27 Apr 2022 10:58:52 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:18 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=arm.com Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9038B2819A4; Wed, 27 Apr 2022 10:32:34 -0700 (PDT) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S244115AbiD0Rf2 (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 27 Apr 2022 13:35:28 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:54378 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S244152AbiD0Re5 (ORCPT ); Wed, 27 Apr 2022 13:34:57 -0400 Received: from foss.arm.com (foss.arm.com [217.140.110.172]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 235A67DA94 for ; Wed, 27 Apr 2022 10:31:43 -0700 (PDT) Received: from usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (unknown [10.121.207.14]) by usa-sjc-mx-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D0A17ED1; Wed, 27 Apr 2022 10:31:42 -0700 (PDT) Received: from lakrids.cambridge.arm.com (usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com [10.121.207.14]) by usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTPA id 9CB7B3F73B; Wed, 27 Apr 2022 10:31:41 -0700 (PDT) From: Mark Rutland To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, alex.popov@linux.com, catalin.marinas@arm.com, keescook@chromium.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, mark.rutland@arm.com, will@kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v2 04/13] stackleak: rework stack low bound handling Date: Wed, 27 Apr 2022 18:31:19 +0100 Message-Id: <20220427173128.2603085-5-mark.rutland@arm.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 In-Reply-To: <20220427173128.2603085-1-mark.rutland@arm.com> References: <20220427173128.2603085-1-mark.rutland@arm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RDNS_NONE, SPF_HELO_NONE autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org In stackleak_task_init(), stackleak_track_stack(), and __stackleak_erase(), we open-code skipping the STACK_END_MAGIC at the bottom of the stack. Each case is implemented slightly differently, and only the __stackleak_erase() case is commented. In stackleak_task_init() and stackleak_track_stack() we unconditionally add sizeof(unsigned long) to the lowest stack address. In stackleak_task_init() we use end_of_stack() for this, and in stackleak_track_stack() we use task_stack_page(). In __stackleak_erase() we handle this by detecting if `kstack_ptr` has hit the stack end boundary, and if so, conditionally moving it above the magic. This patch adds a new stackleak_task_low_bound() helper which is used in all three cases, which unconditionally adds sizeof(unsigned long) to the lowest address on the task stack, with commentary as to why. This uses end_of_stack() as stackleak_task_init() did prior to this patch, as this is consistent with the code in kernel/fork.c which initializes the STACK_END_MAGIC value. In __stackleak_erase() we no longer need to check whether we've spilled into the STACK_END_MAGIC value, as stackleak_track_stack() ensures that `current->lowest_stack` stops immediately above this, and similarly the poison scan will stop immediately above this. For stackleak_task_init() and stackleak_track_stack() this results in no change to code generation. For __stackleak_erase() the generated assembly is slightly simpler and shorter. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland Cc: Alexander Popov Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Kees Cook --- include/linux/stackleak.h | 15 ++++++++++++++- kernel/stackleak.c | 14 ++++---------- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/stackleak.h b/include/linux/stackleak.h index ccaab2043fcd5..67430faa5c518 100644 --- a/include/linux/stackleak.h +++ b/include/linux/stackleak.h @@ -15,9 +15,22 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK #include +/* + * The lowest address on tsk's stack which we can plausibly erase. + */ +static __always_inline unsigned long +stackleak_task_low_bound(const struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + /* + * The lowest unsigned long on the task stack contains STACK_END_MAGIC, + * which we must not corrupt. + */ + return (unsigned long)end_of_stack(tsk) + sizeof(unsigned long); +} + static inline void stackleak_task_init(struct task_struct *t) { - t->lowest_stack = (unsigned long)end_of_stack(t) + sizeof(unsigned long); + t->lowest_stack = stackleak_task_low_bound(t); # ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS t->prev_lowest_stack = t->lowest_stack; # endif diff --git a/kernel/stackleak.c b/kernel/stackleak.c index f7a0f8cf73c37..24b7cf01b2972 100644 --- a/kernel/stackleak.c +++ b/kernel/stackleak.c @@ -72,9 +72,11 @@ late_initcall(stackleak_sysctls_init); static __always_inline void __stackleak_erase(void) { + const unsigned long task_stack_low = stackleak_task_low_bound(current); + /* It would be nice not to have 'kstack_ptr' and 'boundary' on stack */ unsigned long kstack_ptr = current->lowest_stack; - unsigned long boundary = (unsigned long)end_of_stack(current); + unsigned long boundary = task_stack_low; unsigned int poison_count = 0; const unsigned int depth = STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH / sizeof(unsigned long); @@ -88,13 +90,6 @@ static __always_inline void __stackleak_erase(void) kstack_ptr -= sizeof(unsigned long); } - /* - * One 'long int' at the bottom of the thread stack is reserved and - * should not be poisoned (see CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK=y). - */ - if (kstack_ptr == boundary) - kstack_ptr += sizeof(unsigned long); - #ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS current->prev_lowest_stack = kstack_ptr; #endif @@ -140,8 +135,7 @@ void __used __no_caller_saved_registers noinstr stackleak_track_stack(void) /* 'lowest_stack' should be aligned on the register width boundary */ sp = ALIGN(sp, sizeof(unsigned long)); if (sp < current->lowest_stack && - sp >= (unsigned long)task_stack_page(current) + - sizeof(unsigned long)) { + sp >= stackleak_task_low_bound(current)) { current->lowest_stack = sp; } } -- 2.30.2