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Reply-To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Date:   Fri, 13 May 2022 19:49:59 +0000
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Subject: [PATCH 1/2] KVM: x86/mmu: Drop RWX=0 SPTEs during ept_sync_page()
From:   Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To:     Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>,
        Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
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Precedence: bulk

Drop SPTEs whose new protections will yield a RWX=0 SPTE, i.e. a SPTE
that is marked shadow-present but is not-present in the page tables.  If
EPT with execute-only support is in use by L1, KVM can create a RWX=0
SPTE can be created for an EPTE if the upper level combined permissions
are R (or RW) and the leaf EPTE is changed from R (or RW) to X.  Because
the EPTE is considered present when viewed in isolation, and no reserved
bits are set, FNAME(prefetch_invalid_gpte) will consider the GPTE valid.

Creating a not-present SPTE isn't fatal as the SPTE is "correct" in the
sense that the guest translation is inaccesible (the combined protections
of all levels yield RWX=0), i.e. the guest won't get stuck in an infinite
loop.  If EPT A/D bits are disabled, KVM can mistake the SPTE for an
access-tracked SPTE.  But again, such confusion isn't fatal as the "saved"
protections are also RWX=0.

Add a WARN in make_spte() to detect creation of SPTEs that will result in
RWX=0 protections, which is the real motivation for fixing ept_sync_page().
Creating a useless SPTE means KVM messed up _something_, even if whatever
goof occurred doesn't manifest as a functional bug.

Fixes: d95c55687e11 ("kvm: mmu: track read permission explicitly for shadow EPT page tables")
Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Cc: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 9 ++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c        | 2 ++
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
index b025decf610d..d9f98f9ed4a0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
@@ -1052,7 +1052,14 @@ static int FNAME(sync_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
 		if (sync_mmio_spte(vcpu, &sp->spt[i], gfn, pte_access))
 			continue;
 
-		if (gfn != sp->gfns[i]) {
+		/*
+		 * Drop the SPTE if the new protections would result in a RWX=0
+		 * SPTE or if the gfn is changing.  The RWX=0 case only affects
+		 * EPT with execute-only support, i.e. EPT without an effective
+		 * "present" bit, as all other paging modes will create a
+		 * read-only SPTE if pte_access is zero.
+		 */
+		if ((!pte_access && !shadow_present_mask) || gfn != sp->gfns[i]) {
 			drop_spte(vcpu->kvm, &sp->spt[i]);
 			flush = true;
 			continue;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
index 75c9e87d446a..9ad60662beac 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
@@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ bool make_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
 	u64 spte = SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK;
 	bool wrprot = false;
 
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!pte_access && !shadow_present_mask);
+
 	if (sp->role.ad_disabled)
 		spte |= SPTE_TDP_AD_DISABLED_MASK;
 	else if (kvm_mmu_page_ad_need_write_protect(sp))
-- 
2.36.0.550.gb090851708-goog