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Date:   Wed, 18 May 2022 13:34:21 -0700
From:   Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
To:     Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Cc:     Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>, Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, dm-devel@redhat.com,
        Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-raid@vger.kernel.org,
        Song Liu <song@kernel.org>,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 1/3] dm: Add verity helpers for LoadPin
Message-ID: <YoVYTf7oI4FNVHAJ@google.com>
References: <20220517233457.1123309-1-mka@chromium.org>
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 <19149028-ec94-8f64-aed4-1e58f29942a8@gmail.com>
 <YoUNH7MrfEb844ft@google.com>
 <YoVRIHfXPa7+e1Zh@redhat.com>
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On Wed, May 18, 2022 at 04:03:44PM -0400, Mike Snitzer wrote:
> On Wed, May 18 2022 at 11:13P -0400,
> Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org> wrote:
> 
> > Hi Milan,
> > 
> > On Wed, May 18, 2022 at 09:57:43AM +0200, Milan Broz wrote:
> > > On 18/05/2022 01:34, Matthias Kaehlcke wrote:
> > > > LoadPin limits loading of kernel modules, firmware and certain
> > > > other files to a 'pinned' file system (typically a read-only
> > > > rootfs). To provide more flexibility LoadPin is being extended
> > > > to also allow loading these files from trusted dm-verity
> > > > devices. For that purpose LoadPin can be provided with a list
> > > > of verity root digests that it should consider as trusted.
> > > > 
> > > > Add a bunch of helpers to allow LoadPin to check whether a DM
> > > > device is a trusted verity device. The new functions broadly
> > > > fall in two categories: those that need access to verity
> > > > internals (like the root digest), and the 'glue' between
> > > > LoadPin and verity. The new file dm-verity-loadpin.c contains
> > > > the glue functions.
> > > > 
> > > > Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
> > > 
> > > ...
> > > 
> > > > +
> > > > +	if (dm_verity_get_root_digest(ti, &root_digest, &digest_size))
> > > > +		return false;
> > > 
> > > Almost unrelated note, but as there are more and more situations
> > > that checks verity root digest, shouldn't we export this as read-only
> > > sysfs attribute for DM verity devices?
> > > 
> > > Attacker can always calculate (but not change) Merkle tree, so this
> > > is not something that need to be hidden.
> > > 
> > > It would allow userspace to easily enumerate trusted DM devices without
> > > calling kernel ioctls...
> > 
> > I guess that's an option if there are scenarios where it is useful. It
> > should probably be a separate patch, since it isn't directly related with
> > extending LoadPin support to trusted verity devices.
> > 
> > > > +
> > > > +	table = dm_get_live_table(md, &srcu_idx);
> > > > +
> > > > +	if (dm_table_get_num_targets(table) != 1)
> > > > +		goto out;
> > > > +
> > > > +	ti = dm_table_get_target(table, 0);
> > > > +
> > > > +	if (is_trusted_verity_target(ti))
> > > > +		trusted = true;
> > > 
> > > What happens is someone reloads verity table later with
> > > a different content (or even different target type)?
> > > Does LoadPin even care here?
> > 
> > LoadPin cares, but only when new kernel files are loaded. It will then check
> > against the new verity table, and only allow loading of the file if it comes
> > from a verity target with a trusted digest.
> > 
> > > >   static struct target_type verity_target = {
> > > >   	.name		= "verity",
> > > >   	.version	= {1, 8, 0},
> > > 
> > > Please increase the minor version, it is very useful to detect (in logs)
> > > that the target driver has compatible extensions.
> > 
> > I can do that, but would like to confirm that this is really needed/desired.
> > This patch adds kernel-internal APIs which aren't accessible to userspace,
> > that don't impact verity directly, so I'm not sure an increased minor version
> > would be useful.
> 
> Bumping to 1.8.1 is useful to indicate new changes that offer expanded
> use of the verity target (even if by LoadPin).

Ok, I'll bump the version, thanks for the confirmation.