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Date:   Thu, 26 May 2022 14:37:18 -0400
From:   Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
To:     Jue Wang <juew@google.com>
Cc:     pizhenwei@bytedance.com, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>, jasowang@redhat.com,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Linux MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>, mst@redhat.com,
        HORIGUCHI =?utf-8?B?TkFPWUEo5aCA5Y+jIOebtOS5nyk=?= 
        <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
        qemu-devel@nongnu.org, virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/3] recover hardware corrupted page by virtio balloon
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References: <CAPcxDJ5pduUyMA0rf+-aTjK_2eBvig05UTiTptX1nVkWE-_g8w@mail.gmail.com>
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On Wed, May 25, 2022 at 01:16:34PM -0700, Jue Wang wrote:
> The hypervisor _must_ emulate poisons identified in guest physical
> address space (could be transported from the source VM), this is to
> prevent silent data corruption in the guest. With a paravirtual
> approach like this patch series, the hypervisor can clear some of the
> poisoned HVAs knowing for certain that the guest OS has isolated the
> poisoned page. I wonder how much value it provides to the guest if the
> guest and workload are _not_ in a pressing need for the extra KB/MB
> worth of memory.

I'm curious the same on how unpoisoning could help here.  The reasoning
behind would be great material to be mentioned in the next cover letter.

Shouldn't we consider migrating serious workloads off the host already
where there's a sign of more severe hardware issues, instead?

Thanks,

-- 
Peter Xu