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Donenfeld" To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" , Stephen Boyd , Ard Biesheuvel , Catalin Marinas , Russell King , Arnd Bergmann , Phil Elwell Subject: [PATCH] random: do not use jump labels before they are initialized Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2022 12:02:10 +0200 Message-Id: <20220607100210.683136-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.8 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org [ I would like to pursue fixing this more directly first before actually merging this, but I thought I'd send this to the list now anyway as a the "backup" plan. If I can't figure out how to make headway on the main plan in the next few days, it'll be easy to just do this. ] Stephen reported that a static key warning splat appears during early boot on systems that credit randomness from device trees that contain an "rng-seed" property, because because setup_machine_fdt() is called before jump_label_init() during setup_arch(): static_key_enable_cpuslocked(): static key '0xffffffe51c6fcfc0' used before call to jump_label_init() WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at kernel/jump_label.c:166 static_key_enable_cpuslocked+0xb0/0xb8 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.18.0+ #224 44b43e377bfc84bc99bb5ab885ff694984ee09ff pstate: 600001c9 (nZCv dAIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : static_key_enable_cpuslocked+0xb0/0xb8 lr : static_key_enable_cpuslocked+0xb0/0xb8 sp : ffffffe51c393cf0 x29: ffffffe51c393cf0 x28: 000000008185054c x27: 00000000f1042f10 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 00000000f10302b2 x24: 0000002513200000 x23: 0000002513200000 x22: ffffffe51c1c9000 x21: fffffffdfdc00000 x20: ffffffe51c2f0831 x19: ffffffe51c6fcfc0 x18: 00000000ffff1020 x17: 00000000e1e2ac90 x16: 00000000000000e0 x15: ffffffe51b710708 x14: 0000000000000066 x13: 0000000000000018 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 00000000ffffffff x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 61632065726f6665 x6 : 6220646573752027 x5 : ffffffe51c641d25 x4 : ffffffe51c13142c x3 : ffff0a00ffffff05 x2 : 40000000ffffe003 x1 : 00000000000001c0 x0 : 0000000000000065 Call trace: static_key_enable_cpuslocked+0xb0/0xb8 static_key_enable+0x2c/0x40 crng_set_ready+0x24/0x30 execute_in_process_context+0x80/0x90 _credit_init_bits+0x100/0x154 add_bootloader_randomness+0x64/0x78 early_init_dt_scan_chosen+0x140/0x184 early_init_dt_scan_nodes+0x28/0x4c early_init_dt_scan+0x40/0x44 setup_machine_fdt+0x7c/0x120 setup_arch+0x74/0x1d8 start_kernel+0x84/0x44c __primary_switched+0xc0/0xc8 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- random: crng init done Machine model: Google Lazor (rev1 - 2) with LTE A trivial fix went in to address this on arm64, 73e2d827a501 ("arm64: Initialize jump labels before setup_machine_fdt()"). But it appears that fixing it on other platforms might not be so trivial. Instead, defer the setting of the static branch until later in the boot process. Fixes: f5bda35fba61 ("random: use static branch for crng_ready()") Reported-by: Stephen Boyd Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: Russell King Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Phil Elwell Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld --- drivers/char/random.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 4862d4d3ec49..f9a020ec08b9 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -650,7 +650,8 @@ static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits) if (orig < POOL_READY_BITS && new >= POOL_READY_BITS) { crng_reseed(); /* Sets crng_init to CRNG_READY under base_crng.lock. */ - execute_in_process_context(crng_set_ready, &set_ready); + if (static_key_initialized) + execute_in_process_context(crng_set_ready, &set_ready); wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); pr_notice("crng init done\n"); @@ -779,6 +780,14 @@ int __init random_init(const char *command_line) unsigned int i, arch_bytes; unsigned long entropy; + /* + * If we were initialized by the bootloader before jump labels are + * initialized, then we should enable the static branch here, where + * it's guaranteed that jump labels have been initialized. + */ + if (!static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) && crng_init >= CRNG_READY) + crng_set_ready(NULL); + #if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) static const u8 compiletime_seed[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE] __initconst __latent_entropy; _mix_pool_bytes(compiletime_seed, sizeof(compiletime_seed)); -- 2.35.1