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[2620:137:e000::1:18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id d69-20020a636848000000b003db2ab7cae4si26781049pgc.688.2022.06.07.23.10.06 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Tue, 07 Jun 2022 23:10:06 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:18 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.s=korg header.b=FqbOK11x; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=linuxfoundation.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id C344B4903B6; Tue, 7 Jun 2022 22:32:26 -0700 (PDT) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S240668AbiFHBja (ORCPT + 99 others); Tue, 7 Jun 2022 21:39:30 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57264 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1383421AbiFGWCC (ORCPT ); Tue, 7 Jun 2022 18:02:02 -0400 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4641:c500::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E7EDC24E1DE; Tue, 7 Jun 2022 12:14:28 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1E84361807; Tue, 7 Jun 2022 19:14:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 2B291C385A2; Tue, 7 Jun 2022 19:14:26 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1654629266; bh=EiSjocjnXZ3Sefu6jfOPUzWV7XoFiois5Khd0F2S5w8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=FqbOK11xTQ/PWvcaDFTFWIaXsrw4sIaWKTN3OzWbDIx8uNiE1i1jjBmqN0yQJsVEB bUFltaievYkyr6gVuFfs4QDmvAO/r4jOrE8rLike/a9z2n3WoBFQTfAbaMJHTZCkxu yMyHbAQ4jfqPpK+iFQZ+JhXJEMe6ScGtB/t+gzI0= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Christoph Hellwig , Dan Williams , Jane Chu , Borislav Petkov , Stephen Rothwell , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.18 627/879] x86/mce: relocate set{clear}_mce_nospec() functions Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2022 19:02:25 +0200 Message-Id: <20220607165021.048717739@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.36.1 In-Reply-To: <20220607165002.659942637@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220607165002.659942637@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RDNS_NONE,SPF_HELO_NONE,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Jane Chu [ Upstream commit b3fdf9398a16f01dc013967a4ab25e99c3f4fc12 ] Relocate the twin mce functions to arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c file where they belong. While at it, fixup a function name in a comment. Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Reviewed-by: Dan Williams Signed-off-by: Jane Chu Acked-by: Borislav Petkov Cc: Stephen Rothwell [sfr: gate {set,clear}_mce_nospec() by CONFIG_X86_64] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165272527328.90175.8336008202048685278.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: Dan Williams Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h | 52 ------------------------------- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- include/linux/set_memory.h | 8 ++--- 3 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h index 78ca53512486..b45c4d27fd46 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h @@ -86,56 +86,4 @@ bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page); extern int kernel_set_to_readonly; -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 -/* - * Prevent speculative access to the page by either unmapping - * it (if we do not require access to any part of the page) or - * marking it uncacheable (if we want to try to retrieve data - * from non-poisoned lines in the page). - */ -static inline int set_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn, bool unmap) -{ - unsigned long decoy_addr; - int rc; - - /* SGX pages are not in the 1:1 map */ - if (arch_is_platform_page(pfn << PAGE_SHIFT)) - return 0; - /* - * We would like to just call: - * set_memory_XX((unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), 1); - * but doing that would radically increase the odds of a - * speculative access to the poison page because we'd have - * the virtual address of the kernel 1:1 mapping sitting - * around in registers. - * Instead we get tricky. We create a non-canonical address - * that looks just like the one we want, but has bit 63 flipped. - * This relies on set_memory_XX() properly sanitizing any __pa() - * results with __PHYSICAL_MASK or PTE_PFN_MASK. - */ - decoy_addr = (pfn << PAGE_SHIFT) + (PAGE_OFFSET ^ BIT(63)); - - if (unmap) - rc = set_memory_np(decoy_addr, 1); - else - rc = set_memory_uc(decoy_addr, 1); - if (rc) - pr_warn("Could not invalidate pfn=0x%lx from 1:1 map\n", pfn); - return rc; -} -#define set_mce_nospec set_mce_nospec - -/* Restore full speculative operation to the pfn. */ -static inline int clear_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn) -{ - return set_memory_wb((unsigned long) pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), 1); -} -#define clear_mce_nospec clear_mce_nospec -#else -/* - * Few people would run a 32-bit kernel on a machine that supports - * recoverable errors because they have too much memory to boot 32-bit. - */ -#endif - #endif /* _ASM_X86_SET_MEMORY_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c index 0656db33574d..417440c6bf80 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -29,7 +30,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include @@ -1805,7 +1805,7 @@ static inline int cpa_clear_pages_array(struct page **pages, int numpages, } /* - * _set_memory_prot is an internal helper for callers that have been passed + * __set_memory_prot is an internal helper for callers that have been passed * a pgprot_t value from upper layers and a reservation has already been taken. * If you want to set the pgprot to a specific page protocol, use the * set_memory_xx() functions. @@ -1914,6 +1914,52 @@ int set_memory_wb(unsigned long addr, int numpages) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_memory_wb); +/* + * Prevent speculative access to the page by either unmapping + * it (if we do not require access to any part of the page) or + * marking it uncacheable (if we want to try to retrieve data + * from non-poisoned lines in the page). + */ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +int set_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn, bool unmap) +{ + unsigned long decoy_addr; + int rc; + + /* SGX pages are not in the 1:1 map */ + if (arch_is_platform_page(pfn << PAGE_SHIFT)) + return 0; + /* + * We would like to just call: + * set_memory_XX((unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), 1); + * but doing that would radically increase the odds of a + * speculative access to the poison page because we'd have + * the virtual address of the kernel 1:1 mapping sitting + * around in registers. + * Instead we get tricky. We create a non-canonical address + * that looks just like the one we want, but has bit 63 flipped. + * This relies on set_memory_XX() properly sanitizing any __pa() + * results with __PHYSICAL_MASK or PTE_PFN_MASK. + */ + decoy_addr = (pfn << PAGE_SHIFT) + (PAGE_OFFSET ^ BIT(63)); + + if (unmap) + rc = set_memory_np(decoy_addr, 1); + else + rc = set_memory_uc(decoy_addr, 1); + if (rc) + pr_warn("Could not invalidate pfn=0x%lx from 1:1 map\n", pfn); + return rc; +} + +/* Restore full speculative operation to the pfn. */ +int clear_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn) +{ + return set_memory_wb((unsigned long) pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), 1); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(clear_mce_nospec); +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ + int set_memory_x(unsigned long addr, int numpages) { if (!(__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX)) diff --git a/include/linux/set_memory.h b/include/linux/set_memory.h index f36be5166c19..683a6c3f7179 100644 --- a/include/linux/set_memory.h +++ b/include/linux/set_memory.h @@ -42,14 +42,14 @@ static inline bool can_set_direct_map(void) #endif #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP */ -#ifndef set_mce_nospec +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +int set_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn, bool unmap); +int clear_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn); +#else static inline int set_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn, bool unmap) { return 0; } -#endif - -#ifndef clear_mce_nospec static inline int clear_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn) { return 0; -- 2.35.1