Received-SPF: softfail (google.com: domain of transitioning linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org does not designate 23.128.96.19 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.19;
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <20220607153139.35588-1-cgzones@googlemail.com>
 <20220608112728.b4xrdppxqmyqmtwf@wittgenstein> <CAOQ4uxipD6khNUYuZT80WUa0KOMdyyP0ia55uhmeRCLj4NBicg@mail.gmail.com>
 <20220608124808.uylo5lntzfgxxmns@wittgenstein>
In-Reply-To: <20220608124808.uylo5lntzfgxxmns@wittgenstein>
From:   Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Date:   Wed, 8 Jun 2022 18:12:29 +0300
Message-ID: <CAOQ4uxjP7kC95ou56wabVhQcc2vkNcD-8usYhLhbLOoJZ-jkOw@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] f*xattr: allow O_PATH descriptors
To:     Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc:     =?UTF-8?Q?Christian_G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>,
        selinux@vger.kernel.org, Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>,
        Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-man <linux-man@vger.kernel.org>,
        Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
        linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Precedence: bulk

On Wed, Jun 8, 2022 at 3:48 PM Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> wrote=
:
>
> On Wed, Jun 08, 2022 at 03:28:52PM +0300, Amir Goldstein wrote:
> > On Wed, Jun 8, 2022 at 2:57 PM Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> w=
rote:
> > >
> > > On Tue, Jun 07, 2022 at 05:31:39PM +0200, Christian G=C3=B6ttsche wro=
te:
> > > > From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
> > > >
> > > > Support file descriptors obtained via O_PATH for extended attribute
> > > > operations.
> > > >
> > > > Extended attributes are for example used by SELinux for the securit=
y
> > > > context of file objects. To avoid time-of-check-time-of-use issues =
while
> > > > setting those contexts it is advisable to pin the file in question =
and
> > > > operate on a file descriptor instead of the path name. This can be
> > > > emulated in userspace via /proc/self/fd/NN [1] but requires a procf=
s,
> > > > which might not be mounted e.g. inside of chroots, see[2].
> > > >
> > > > [1]: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/commit/7e979b56fd2ce=
e28f647376a7233d2ac2d12ca50
> > > > [2]: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/commit/de285252a1801=
397306032e070793889c9466845
> > > >
> > > > Original patch by Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
> > > > https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-fsdevel/patch/2020050509=
5915.11275-6-mszeredi@redhat.com/
> > > >
> > > > > While this carries a minute risk of someone relying on the proper=
ty of
> > > > > xattr syscalls rejecting O_PATH descriptors, it saves the trouble=
 of
> > > > > introducing another set of syscalls.
> > > > >
> > > > > Only file->f_path and file->f_inode are accessed in these functio=
ns.
> > > > >
> > > > > Current versions return EBADF, hence easy to detect the presense =
of
> > > > > this feature and fall back in case it's missing.
> > > >
> > > > CC: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
> > > > CC: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
> > > > Signed-off-by: Christian G=C3=B6ttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
> > > > ---
> > >
> > > I'd be somewhat fine with getxattr and listxattr but I'm worried that
> > > setxattr/removexattr waters down O_PATH semantics even more. I don't
> > > want O_PATH fds to be useable for operations which are semantically
> > > equivalent to a write.
> >
> > It is not really semantically equivalent to a write if it works on a
> > O_RDONLY fd already.
>
> The fact that it works on a O_RDONLY fd has always been weird. And is
> probably a bug. If you look at xattr_permission() you can see that it

Bug or no bug, this is the UAPI. It is not fixable anymore.

> checks for MAY_WRITE for set operations... setxattr() writes to disk for
> real filesystems. I don't know how much closer to a write this can get.
>
> In general, one semantic aberration doesn't justify piling another one
> on top.
>
> (And one thing that speaks for O_RDONLY is at least that it actually
> opens the file wheres O_PATH doesn't.)

Ok. I care mostly about consistent UAPI, so if you want to set the
rule that modify f*() operations are not allowed to use O_PATH fd,
I can live with that, although fcntl(2) may be breaking that rule, but
fine by me.
It's good to have consistent rules and it's good to add a new UAPI for
new behavior.

However...

>
> >
> > >
> > > In sensitive environments such as service management/container runtim=
es
> > > we often send O_PATH fds around precisely because it is restricted wh=
at
> > > they can be used for. I'd prefer to not to plug at this string.
> >
> > But unless I am mistaken, path_setxattr() and syscall_fsetxattr()
> > are almost identical w.r.t permission checks and everything else.
> >
> > So this change introduces nothing new that a user in said environment
> > cannot already accomplish with setxattr().
> >
> > Besides, as the commit message said, doing setxattr() on an O_PATH
> > fd is already possible with setxattr("/proc/self/$fd"), so whatever sec=
urity
> > hole you are trying to prevent is already wide open.
>
> That is very much a something that we're trying to restrict for this
> exact reason and is one of the main motivator for upgrade mask in
> openat2(). If I want to send a O_PATH around I want it to not be
> upgradable. Aleksa is working on upgrade masks with openat2() (see [1]
> and part of the original patchset in [2]. O_PATH semantics don't need to
> become weird.
>
> [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220526130355.fo6gzbst455fxywy@senku
> [2]: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/linuxppc-dev/patch/201907280102=
07.9781-8-cyphar@cyphar.com

... thinking forward, if this patch is going to be rejected, the patch that
will follow is *xattrat() syscalls.

What will you be able to argue then?

There are several *at() syscalls that modify metadata.
fchownat(.., AT_EMPTY_PATH) is intentionally designed for this.

Do you intend to try and block setxattrat()?
Just try and block setxattrat(.., AT_EMPTY_PATH)?
those *at() syscalls have real use cases to avoid TOCTOU races.
Do you propose that applications will have to use fsetxattr() on an open
file to avert races?

I completely understand the idea behind upgrade masks
for limiting f_mode, but I don't know if trying to retroactively
change semantics of setxattr() in the move to setxattrat()
is going to be a good idea.

And forgive me if I am failing to see the big picture.
It is certainly a possibility.

Thanks,
Amir.