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From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        stable@vger.kernel.org, Theodore Tso <tytso@mit.edu>,
        Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>,
        Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
        "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 121/264] random: do not xor RDRAND when writing into /dev/random
Date:   Thu, 23 Jun 2022 18:41:54 +0200
Message-Id: <20220623164347.490872627@linuxfoundation.org>
In-Reply-To: <20220623164344.053938039@linuxfoundation.org>
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From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>

commit 91c2afca290ed3034841c8c8532e69ed9e16cf34 upstream.

Continuing the reasoning of "random: ensure early RDSEED goes through
mixer on init", we don't want RDRAND interacting with anything without
going through the mixer function, as a backdoored CPU could presumably
cancel out data during an xor, which it'd have a harder time doing when
being forced through a cryptographic hash function. There's actually no
need at all to be calling RDRAND in write_pool(), because before we
extract from the pool, we always do so with 32 bytes of RDSEED hashed in
at that stage. Xoring at this stage is needless and introduces a minor
liability.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/char/random.c |   14 ++------------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1357,25 +1357,15 @@ static unsigned int random_poll(struct f
 static int write_pool(const char __user *buffer, size_t count)
 {
 	size_t bytes;
-	u32 t, buf[16];
+	u8 buf[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE];
 	const char __user *p = buffer;
 
 	while (count > 0) {
-		int b, i = 0;
-
 		bytes = min(count, sizeof(buf));
-		if (copy_from_user(&buf, p, bytes))
+		if (copy_from_user(buf, p, bytes))
 			return -EFAULT;
-
-		for (b = bytes; b > 0; b -= sizeof(u32), i++) {
-			if (!arch_get_random_int(&t))
-				break;
-			buf[i] ^= t;
-		}
-
 		count -= bytes;
 		p += bytes;
-
 		mix_pool_bytes(buf, bytes);
 		cond_resched();
 	}