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Donenfeld" Subject: [PATCH 4.19 078/234] random: always wake up entropy writers after extraction Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 18:42:25 +0200 Message-Id: <20220623164345.266205691@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.36.1 In-Reply-To: <20220623164343.042598055@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220623164343.042598055@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" commit 489c7fc44b5740d377e8cfdbf0851036e493af00 upstream. Now that POOL_BITS == POOL_MIN_BITS, we must unconditionally wake up entropy writers after every extraction. Therefore there's no point of write_wakeup_threshold, so we can move it to the dustbin of unused compatibility sysctls. While we're at it, we can fix a small comparison where we were waking up after <= min rather than < min. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Suggested-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- drivers/char/random.c | 36 ++++++++++++-------------------- 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) --- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt +++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt @@ -821,9 +821,49 @@ The kernel command line parameter printk a one-time setting until next reboot: once set, it cannot be changed by this sysctl interface anymore. -============================================================== +pty +=== -randomize_va_space: +See Documentation/filesystems/devpts.rst. + + +random +====== + +This is a directory, with the following entries: + +* ``boot_id``: a UUID generated the first time this is retrieved, and + unvarying after that; + +* ``entropy_avail``: the pool's entropy count, in bits; + +* ``poolsize``: the entropy pool size, in bits; + +* ``urandom_min_reseed_secs``: obsolete (used to determine the minimum + number of seconds between urandom pool reseeding). This file is + writable for compatibility purposes, but writing to it has no effect + on any RNG behavior. + +* ``uuid``: a UUID generated every time this is retrieved (this can + thus be used to generate UUIDs at will); + +* ``write_wakeup_threshold``: when the entropy count drops below this + (as a number of bits), processes waiting to write to ``/dev/random`` + are woken up. This file is writable for compatibility purposes, but + writing to it has no effect on any RNG behavior. + +If ``drivers/char/random.c`` is built with ``ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH`` +defined, these additional entries are present: + +* ``add_interrupt_avg_cycles``: the average number of cycles between + interrupts used to feed the pool; + +* ``add_interrupt_avg_deviation``: the standard deviation seen on the + number of cycles between interrupts used to feed the pool. + + +randomize_va_space +================== This option can be used to select the type of process address space randomization that is used in the system, for architectures --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -296,12 +296,6 @@ enum { */ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait); static struct fasync_struct *fasync; -/* - * If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we - * should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write - * access to /dev/random. - */ -static int random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_MIN_BITS; static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock); static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list); @@ -739,10 +733,8 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_stat return; } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count, 0) != entropy_count); extract_entropy(buf.key, sizeof(buf.key)); - if (random_write_wakeup_bits) { - wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait); - kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT); - } + wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait); + kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT); } else { _extract_crng(&primary_crng, buf.block); _crng_backtrack_protect(&primary_crng, buf.block, @@ -1471,7 +1463,7 @@ static __poll_t random_poll(struct file mask = 0; if (crng_ready()) mask |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM; - if (input_pool.entropy_count < random_write_wakeup_bits) + if (input_pool.entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS) mask |= EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM; return mask; } @@ -1556,7 +1548,10 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, */ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; - input_pool.entropy_count = 0; + if (xchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, 0)) { + wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait); + kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT); + } return 0; case RNDRESEEDCRNG: if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) @@ -1631,9 +1626,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user * #include -static int min_write_thresh; -static int max_write_thresh = POOL_BITS; static int random_min_urandom_seed = 60; +static int random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_MIN_BITS; +static int sysctl_poolsize = POOL_BITS; static char sysctl_bootid[16]; /* @@ -1672,7 +1667,6 @@ static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table return proc_dostring(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); } -static int sysctl_poolsize = POOL_BITS; extern struct ctl_table random_table[]; struct ctl_table random_table[] = { { @@ -1694,9 +1688,7 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = { .data = &random_write_wakeup_bits, .maxlen = sizeof(int), .mode = 0644, - .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, - .extra1 = &min_write_thresh, - .extra2 = &max_write_thresh, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, }, { .procname = "urandom_min_reseed_secs", @@ -1877,13 +1869,13 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const ch } /* Throttle writing if we're above the trickle threshold. - * We'll be woken up again once below random_write_wakeup_thresh, - * when the calling thread is about to terminate, or once - * CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL has lapsed. + * We'll be woken up again once below POOL_MIN_BITS, when + * the calling thread is about to terminate, or once + * CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL has elapsed. */ wait_event_interruptible_timeout(random_write_wait, !system_wq || kthread_should_stop() || - input_pool.entropy_count <= random_write_wakeup_bits, + input_pool.entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS, CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL); mix_pool_bytes(buffer, count); credit_entropy_bits(entropy);