Received: by 2002:a6b:fb09:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id h9csp6144917iog; Thu, 23 Jun 2022 12:16:25 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGRyM1urZLCnu1Jb22BYLw3PRdVhf4awd0xuWYU6oPPR+mGgo+9t0jUpZdpSqL/5glgYev/0kAtH X-Received: by 2002:a05:6402:3907:b0:431:6776:64e7 with SMTP id fe7-20020a056402390700b00431677664e7mr12792420edb.0.1656011785535; Thu, 23 Jun 2022 12:16:25 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1656011785; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=yqCcG7RhTjFvlHUAiIR1AS2DGUiCnxvRwsVFuGVibylzKW/ZGHmwttLDc5+jZRssb3 D1AnH0WibqO+urw4PqHaeQAm7guy6QQDPQ+xO0MekToPgQoZsitLNUtZYoEvS66hHMlM c7/TiJ7ibNAvNA1TZLFLmlGDVJKTGSkrLk7cKQHQx4DOQv2+EjEWAaNHCJoPEiUzHutW ckA5m6HVICEOqY0yz+y2WoQSuqcK+sI2YFunzuKtNxTdlAa1iSw8lIhXkGDPrTNmkMP0 q0UGhqctsf5Jpdb6y2ols++0H3l+9/qzQ/F4VKYXc/nwqcDyYKVqfnxAQITmBq1aEy8b YTJA== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:content-transfer-encoding:mime-version :user-agent:references:in-reply-to:message-id:date:subject:cc:to :from:dkim-signature; bh=L7R6g/1vQNUz8Ej5xCeHZQmSQkoYxVOmFTizTeGcL/I=; b=ZowEoRI+KEamzu0Qwf2d5EO+AmGSB7DDQsRwv0d94R4Gdn8NczTPGtjH/aT0qOq37A 5dSKPm07lRnKWrbgTkGfwsIpGOtxzx1OlEug4Kd6f7On9vv21euKSHhuDwRFh2SLEc7s jppinxla06lOzfos/lHXtd7Bj396jEmPhtbMzAMdA3CY3PL19+QO+GYIP3pIfog+hzD2 4u1pZ4btzQ4cvePl7xrrixTDHftbBD1laJl381nsrvOA3HQV+9U4D9ITHCFm21SVlPQ9 8Xe/55WB4V5D/F49xMnkPkwGfIX//LPpIslRRZ/Wogc/h3APaABTUky42AFPRViahZEU tT/g== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.s=korg header.b="qlf6/y9p"; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=linuxfoundation.org Return-Path: Received: from out1.vger.email (out1.vger.email. [2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id ho39-20020a1709070ea700b0072315b7527dsi4521403ejc.988.2022.06.23.12.15.59; Thu, 23 Jun 2022 12:16:25 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.s=korg header.b="qlf6/y9p"; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=linuxfoundation.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S236523AbiFWSNm (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 23 Jun 2022 14:13:42 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:56642 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S233956AbiFWSMU (ORCPT ); Thu, 23 Jun 2022 14:12:20 -0400 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4601:e00::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CBABDBEAA2; Thu, 23 Jun 2022 10:20:39 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 603DEB82480; Thu, 23 Jun 2022 17:20:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id AA2DBC3411B; Thu, 23 Jun 2022 17:20:36 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1656004837; bh=PHqgsiCBFiSCo6xy0pye59C3TYC/dAmQBjvcwFWr20c=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=qlf6/y9psHifPdox5ODhEIomTXhfpJlDY1Lcg8ld0mmwW4JoQ8N1+MqhKqpeX/Ed8 +76EV49ybHGDZoxLmRxb7y2M3gny9lMT5qatNMTpF466A6vbDo9VbxOKoqkPJ4E1QW ILxO4nNFaayXH0p7Mp1sxKMMsvoI39OV67K6nDqw= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, "Jason A. Donenfeld" Subject: [PATCH 4.19 164/234] random: use proper return types on get_random_{int,long}_wait() Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 18:43:51 +0200 Message-Id: <20220623164347.695256092@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.36.1 In-Reply-To: <20220623164343.042598055@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220623164343.042598055@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" commit 7c3a8a1db5e03d02cc0abb3357a84b8b326dfac3 upstream. Before these were returning signed values, but the API is intended to be used with unsigned values. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 195 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- include/linux/random.h | 24 +++--- 2 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 112 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(co * * There are a few exported interfaces for use by other drivers: * - * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes) + * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len) * u32 get_random_u32() * u64 get_random_u64() * unsigned int get_random_int() @@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct crng, crngs }; /* Used by crng_reseed() and crng_make_state() to extract a new seed from the input pool. */ -static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes); +static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len); /* This extracts a new crng key from the input pool. */ static void crng_reseed(void) @@ -403,24 +403,24 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_s local_irq_restore(flags); } -static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes) +static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len) { u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)]; u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]; - size_t len; + size_t first_block_len; - if (!nbytes) + if (!len) return; - len = min_t(size_t, 32, nbytes); - crng_make_state(chacha_state, buf, len); - nbytes -= len; - buf += len; + first_block_len = min_t(size_t, 32, len); + crng_make_state(chacha_state, buf, first_block_len); + len -= first_block_len; + buf += first_block_len; - while (nbytes) { - if (nbytes < CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) { + while (len) { + if (len < CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) { chacha20_block(chacha_state, tmp); - memcpy(buf, tmp, nbytes); + memcpy(buf, tmp, len); memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); break; } @@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, chacha20_block(chacha_state, buf); if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0)) ++chacha_state[13]; - nbytes -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; + len -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; buf += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; } @@ -445,20 +445,20 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once * at any point prior. */ -void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes) +void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len) { warn_unseeded_randomness(); - _get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes); + _get_random_bytes(buf, len); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes); -static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) +static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *ubuf, size_t len) { - size_t len, left, ret = 0; + size_t block_len, left, ret = 0; u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)]; u8 output[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]; - if (!nbytes) + if (!len) return 0; /* @@ -472,8 +472,8 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(voi * use chacha_state after, so we can simply return those bytes to * the user directly. */ - if (nbytes <= CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE) { - ret = nbytes - copy_to_user(buf, &chacha_state[4], nbytes); + if (len <= CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE) { + ret = len - copy_to_user(ubuf, &chacha_state[4], len); goto out_zero_chacha; } @@ -482,17 +482,17 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(voi if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0)) ++chacha_state[13]; - len = min_t(size_t, nbytes, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE); - left = copy_to_user(buf, output, len); + block_len = min_t(size_t, len, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE); + left = copy_to_user(ubuf, output, block_len); if (left) { - ret += len - left; + ret += block_len - left; break; } - buf += len; - ret += len; - nbytes -= len; - if (!nbytes) + ubuf += block_len; + ret += block_len; + len -= block_len; + if (!len) break; BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE % CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE != 0); @@ -663,24 +663,24 @@ unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned lo * use. Use get_random_bytes() instead. It returns the number of * bytes filled in. */ -size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t nbytes) +size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t len) { - size_t left = nbytes; + size_t left = len; u8 *p = buf; while (left) { unsigned long v; - size_t chunk = min_t(size_t, left, sizeof(unsigned long)); + size_t block_len = min_t(size_t, left, sizeof(unsigned long)); if (!arch_get_random_long(&v)) break; - memcpy(p, &v, chunk); - p += chunk; - left -= chunk; + memcpy(p, &v, block_len); + p += block_len; + left -= block_len; } - return nbytes - left; + return len - left; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch); @@ -691,15 +691,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch); * * Callers may add entropy via: * - * static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes) + * static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len) * * After which, if added entropy should be credited: * - * static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbits) + * static void credit_init_bits(size_t bits) * * Finally, extract entropy via: * - * static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) + * static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len) * **********************************************************************/ @@ -721,9 +721,9 @@ static struct { .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock), }; -static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes) +static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len) { - blake2s_update(&input_pool.hash, in, nbytes); + blake2s_update(&input_pool.hash, buf, len); } /* @@ -731,12 +731,12 @@ static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void * * update the initialization bit counter; the caller should call * credit_init_bits if this is appropriate. */ -static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes) +static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len) { unsigned long flags; spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); - _mix_pool_bytes(in, nbytes); + _mix_pool_bytes(buf, len); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags); } @@ -744,7 +744,7 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *i * This is an HKDF-like construction for using the hashed collected entropy * as a PRF key, that's then expanded block-by-block. */ -static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) +static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len) { unsigned long flags; u8 seed[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE], next_key[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE]; @@ -773,12 +773,12 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, s spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags); memzero_explicit(next_key, sizeof(next_key)); - while (nbytes) { - i = min_t(size_t, nbytes, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); + while (len) { + i = min_t(size_t, len, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); /* output = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || ++counter) */ ++block.counter; blake2s(buf, (u8 *)&block, seed, i, sizeof(block), sizeof(seed)); - nbytes -= i; + len -= i; buf += i; } @@ -786,16 +786,16 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, s memzero_explicit(&block, sizeof(block)); } -static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbits) +static void credit_init_bits(size_t bits) { static struct execute_work set_ready; unsigned int new, orig, add; unsigned long flags; - if (crng_ready() || !nbits) + if (crng_ready() || !bits) return; - add = min_t(size_t, nbits, POOL_BITS); + add = min_t(size_t, bits, POOL_BITS); do { orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.init_bits); @@ -831,13 +831,11 @@ static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbit * The following exported functions are used for pushing entropy into * the above entropy accumulation routines: * - * void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size); - * void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, - * size_t entropy); - * void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size); + * void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len); + * void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy); + * void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len); * void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq); - * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, - * unsigned int value); + * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value); * void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk); * * add_device_randomness() adds data to the input pool that @@ -901,7 +899,7 @@ int __init random_init(const char *comma { ktime_t now = ktime_get_real(); unsigned int i, arch_bytes; - unsigned long rv; + unsigned long entropy; #if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) static const u8 compiletime_seed[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE] __initconst __latent_entropy; @@ -909,13 +907,13 @@ int __init random_init(const char *comma #endif for (i = 0, arch_bytes = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; - i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(rv)) { - if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&rv) && - !arch_get_random_long_early(&rv)) { - rv = random_get_entropy(); - arch_bytes -= sizeof(rv); + i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(entropy)) { + if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&entropy) && + !arch_get_random_long_early(&entropy)) { + entropy = random_get_entropy(); + arch_bytes -= sizeof(entropy); } - _mix_pool_bytes(&rv, sizeof(rv)); + _mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy)); } _mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now)); _mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname()))); @@ -938,14 +936,14 @@ int __init random_init(const char *comma * the entropy pool having similar initial state across largely * identical devices. */ -void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size) +void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len) { unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy(); unsigned long flags; spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); _mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy)); - _mix_pool_bytes(buf, size); + _mix_pool_bytes(buf, len); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness); @@ -955,10 +953,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness); * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled * when our pool is full. */ -void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, - size_t entropy) +void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy) { - mix_pool_bytes(buffer, count); + mix_pool_bytes(buf, len); credit_init_bits(entropy); /* @@ -974,11 +971,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_random * Handle random seed passed by bootloader, and credit it if * CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set. */ -void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size) +void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len) { - mix_pool_bytes(buf, size); + mix_pool_bytes(buf, len); if (trust_bootloader) - credit_init_bits(size * 8); + credit_init_bits(len * 8); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_bootloader_randomness); @@ -1178,8 +1175,7 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct credit_init_bits(bits); } -void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, - unsigned int value) +void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value) { static unsigned char last_value; static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = { INITIAL_JIFFIES }; @@ -1298,8 +1294,7 @@ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void * **********************************************************************/ -SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, unsigned int, - flags) +SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, ubuf, size_t, len, unsigned int, flags) { if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK | GRND_RANDOM | GRND_INSECURE)) return -EINVAL; @@ -1311,8 +1306,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user * if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) return -EINVAL; - if (count > INT_MAX) - count = INT_MAX; + if (len > INT_MAX) + len = INT_MAX; if (!crng_ready() && !(flags & GRND_INSECURE)) { int ret; @@ -1323,7 +1318,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user * if (unlikely(ret)) return ret; } - return get_random_bytes_user(buf, count); + return get_random_bytes_user(ubuf, len); } static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) @@ -1332,21 +1327,21 @@ static __poll_t random_poll(struct file return crng_ready() ? EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM : EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM; } -static int write_pool(const char __user *ubuf, size_t count) +static int write_pool(const char __user *ubuf, size_t len) { - size_t len; + size_t block_len; int ret = 0; u8 block[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE]; - while (count) { - len = min(count, sizeof(block)); - if (copy_from_user(block, ubuf, len)) { + while (len) { + block_len = min(len, sizeof(block)); + if (copy_from_user(block, ubuf, block_len)) { ret = -EFAULT; goto out; } - count -= len; - ubuf += len; - mix_pool_bytes(block, len); + len -= block_len; + ubuf += block_len; + mix_pool_bytes(block, block_len); cond_resched(); } @@ -1355,20 +1350,20 @@ out: return ret; } -static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer, - size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *ubuf, + size_t len, loff_t *ppos) { int ret; - ret = write_pool(buffer, count); + ret = write_pool(ubuf, len); if (ret) return ret; - return (ssize_t)count; + return (ssize_t)len; } -static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, - loff_t *ppos) +static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf, + size_t len, loff_t *ppos) { static int maxwarn = 10; @@ -1378,22 +1373,22 @@ static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file else if (ratelimit_disable || __ratelimit(&urandom_warning)) { --maxwarn; pr_notice("%s: uninitialized urandom read (%zd bytes read)\n", - current->comm, nbytes); + current->comm, len); } } - return get_random_bytes_user(buf, nbytes); + return get_random_bytes_user(ubuf, len); } -static ssize_t random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, - loff_t *ppos) +static ssize_t random_read(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf, + size_t len, loff_t *ppos) { int ret; ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); if (ret != 0) return ret; - return get_random_bytes_user(buf, nbytes); + return get_random_bytes_user(ubuf, len); } static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) @@ -1516,8 +1511,8 @@ static u8 sysctl_bootid[UUID_SIZE]; * UUID. The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is, * then a new UUID is generated and returned to the user. */ -static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, - void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) +static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buf, + size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) { u8 tmp_uuid[UUID_SIZE], *uuid; char uuid_string[UUID_STRING_LEN + 1]; @@ -1543,14 +1538,14 @@ static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table } snprintf(uuid_string, sizeof(uuid_string), "%pU", uuid); - return proc_dostring(&fake_table, 0, buffer, lenp, ppos); + return proc_dostring(&fake_table, 0, buf, lenp, ppos); } /* The same as proc_dointvec, but writes don't change anything. */ -static int proc_do_rointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buffer, +static int proc_do_rointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buf, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) { - return write ? 0 : proc_dointvec(table, 0, buffer, lenp, ppos); + return write ? 0 : proc_dointvec(table, 0, buf, lenp, ppos); } extern struct ctl_table random_table[]; --- a/include/linux/random.h +++ b/include/linux/random.h @@ -12,12 +12,12 @@ struct notifier_block; -void add_device_randomness(const void *, size_t); -void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *, size_t); +void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len); +void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len); void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value) __latent_entropy; void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy; -void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy); +void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy); #if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) && !defined(__CHECKER__) static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) @@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ static inline void add_latent_entropy(vo static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) { } #endif -void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes); -size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t nbytes); +void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len); +size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t len); u32 get_random_u32(void); u64 get_random_u64(void); static inline unsigned int get_random_int(void) @@ -81,18 +81,18 @@ static inline int get_random_bytes_wait( return ret; } -#define declare_get_random_var_wait(var) \ - static inline int get_random_ ## var ## _wait(var *out) { \ +#define declare_get_random_var_wait(name, ret_type) \ + static inline int get_random_ ## name ## _wait(ret_type *out) { \ int ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); \ if (unlikely(ret)) \ return ret; \ - *out = get_random_ ## var(); \ + *out = get_random_ ## name(); \ return 0; \ } -declare_get_random_var_wait(u32) -declare_get_random_var_wait(u64) -declare_get_random_var_wait(int) -declare_get_random_var_wait(long) +declare_get_random_var_wait(u32, u32) +declare_get_random_var_wait(u64, u32) +declare_get_random_var_wait(int, unsigned int) +declare_get_random_var_wait(long, unsigned long) #undef declare_get_random_var /*