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From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        stable@vger.kernel.org, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
        Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>,
        "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 119/237] random: do not take pool spinlock at boot
Date:   Thu, 23 Jun 2022 18:42:33 +0200
Message-Id: <20220623164346.578536073@linuxfoundation.org>
In-Reply-To: <20220623164343.132308638@linuxfoundation.org>
References: <20220623164343.132308638@linuxfoundation.org>
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From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>

commit afba0b80b977b2a8f16234f2acd982f82710ba33 upstream.

Since rand_initialize() is run while interrupts are still off and
nothing else is running, we don't need to repeatedly take and release
the pool spinlock, especially in the RDSEED loop.

Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/char/random.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -973,10 +973,10 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void)
 			rv = random_get_entropy();
 			arch_init = false;
 		}
-		mix_pool_bytes(&rv, sizeof(rv));
+		_mix_pool_bytes(&rv, sizeof(rv));
 	}
-	mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now));
-	mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())));
+	_mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now));
+	_mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())));
 
 	extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
 	++base_crng.generation;