Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752918AbXEZXJR (ORCPT ); Sat, 26 May 2007 19:09:17 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1756407AbXEZXI7 (ORCPT ); Sat, 26 May 2007 19:08:59 -0400 Received: from nz-out-0506.google.com ([64.233.162.235]:40950 "EHLO nz-out-0506.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752319AbXEZXI5 (ORCPT ); Sat, 26 May 2007 19:08:57 -0400 DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=beta; h=received:message-id:date:from:to:subject:cc:in-reply-to:mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding:content-disposition:references; b=pjNs5Pfn3bmZ1v0NYkYbfclfY7LpYWnv3pquFlm52fHa/npvtdZVC8g94411hIVBkhPRU5A7W/2P/xJHxVz1mP7aSkjEVVZeXGtZyaCWWNSWpG6P/my99KH/J54P8+TCoMbBP2ny4Dywb23zc1+lvNMWEXu61cFDyytrSclEBcc= Message-ID: <9d732d950705261608j4bc72cd4s4378df9848101c84@mail.gmail.com> Date: Sun, 27 May 2007 08:08:56 +0900 From: "Toshiharu Harada" To: "James Morris" Subject: Re: [AppArmor 01/41] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_create LSM hook Cc: "Kyle Moffett" , casey@schaufler-ca.com, "Andreas Gruenbacher" , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org In-Reply-To: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline References: <309300.41401.qm@web36615.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1126 Lines: 29 2007/5/27, James Morris : > On Sat, 26 May 2007, Kyle Moffett wrote: > > AppArmor). On the other hand, if you actually want to protect the _data_, > > then tagging the _name_ is flawed; tag the *DATA* instead. > > Bingo. > > (This is how traditional Unix DAC has always functioned, and is what > SELinux does: object labeling). Object labeling (or labeled security) looks simple and straight forward way, but it's not. (1) Object labeling has a assumption that labels are always properly defined and maintained. This can not be easily achieved. (2) Also, assigning a label is something like inventing and assigning a *new* name (label name) to objects which can cause flaws. I'm not saying labeled security or SELinux is wrong. I just wanted to remind that the important part is the "process" not the "result". :-) -- Toshiharu Harada haradats@gmail.com - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/